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Introduction 
1.1 Defining apposition 
 
In traditional grammars, apposition is a family resemblance concept of which 
there is a paragon (see 1) and various ‘resemblances’ thereof (Matthews 
1981:236). 
 
(1) The Big Apple, New York, is a huge city. 
 
Generative linguists are tasked with positing a formal definition for 
apposition that, while unable to correspond with its informal family 
resemblance usage exactly, is nonetheless intuitive and also empirically and 
theoretically justified. I aim to provide such a definition herein. Thus, this 
thesis focusses on appositions and their resemblances, which together I call 
appositives.   
 Influential in many generative attempts to define apposition has been the 
functional distinction between reformulative and attributive apposition.1 
Reformulative appositions provide additional and often more informative 
names for their anchors (see 1, where the anchor is boldfaced), while 
attributive appositions predicate properties of them (see 2). 
 
(2) The Big Apple, a magical place, is a huge city. 
 
Recent analyses have proposed that the functional distinction between 
reformulative and attributive appositions is indicative of syntactic differences 
                                                     
1  Heringa (2011) traces this distinction as far back as Poutsma (1904). For discussion of this 
distinction and formal analyses based thereupon, see Smith (1964), Motsch (1966), Burton-Roberts 
(1975), Klein (1976), McCawley (1998), Heringa & De Vries (2008), Cardoso & De Vries (2010), Heringa 
(2011), among others. 
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between them. For instance, Cardoso & De Vries (2010) follow McCawley 
(1998) in supposing that reformulative appositions display ‘what you see is 
what you get’ (WYSIWYG) syntax, while attributive appositions are derived 
from appositive relative clauses. In other words, they propose that New York 
in (1) is merely a referential noun phrase, while a magical place in (2) is a 
predicate nominal that is contained within a parenthetical relative clause 
whose copula and relative pronoun are unpronounced (see 3, where, for 
now, I enclose unpronounced material in chevrons). 
 
(3) The Big Apple, <which is> a magical place, is a huge city. 
 
Other analyses encode this supposed syntactic dissimilarity in other ways. 
Heringa (2011), for example, proposes that reformulative appositions are 
contained within small clauses whose subject is obligatorily unpronounced 
(see 4a) while attributive appositions are derived from underlying finite 
parenthetical copular clauses (see 4b).  
 
(4) a. The Big Apple, <it> New York, is a huge city. 
 b. The Big Apple, <it is> a magical place, is a huge city. 
 
Conversely, Döring (2014) and Ott (2014a, b) maintain that both 
reformulative and attributive appositions are derived from underlying finite 
parenthetical clauses and that the differences observed between the two types 
of apposition can be ascribed to their position within this underlying clause: 
reformulative appositions and their anchors are base-generated in the same 
syntactic position within their respective clauses (see 5), while attributive 
appositions are base-generated as postcopular elements in finite 
parenthetical copular clauses (see 4b).2 
 
(5) The Big Apple, New York <is a huge city>, is a huge city. 
                                                     
2  For Döring (2014), the ellipsis that purportedly derives the surface appearance of appositional 
constructions involves extraction of the remnant of ellipsis above the ellipsis site, as (i) shows. Meanwhile, 
Ott (2014a, b) remains ambivalent about how this supposed ellipsis operation applies. In order to avoid 
committing to a particular analysis of how ellipsis is licensed in appositional constructions in this 
introductory chapter, I simply represent elliptical constructions as displaying the same word order that 
they would display if ellipsis did not occur. 
(i) Pete visited The Big Apple, [New York]1 <Pete visited t1>, last summer. 
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What the abovementioned analyses have in common is that, while they 
ascribe to reformulative and attributive appositions dissimilar internal 
syntax (this term refers to appositions’ internal constituency), they ascribe to 
them the same external syntax (this term refers to appositions’ relation to 
their hosts). In the case of Cardoso & De Vries (2010) and Heringa (2011), 
both types of appositions are proposed to share a special kind of 
‘parenthetical coordinative’ relationship with their anchor. (For the sake of 
exposition, I represent this simply as &P in 6 and 7. I also omit the 
parenthetical coordinator.) For Döring (2014) and Ott (2014a, b), the clauses 
in which they claim that reformulative and attributive appositions are 
contained are syntactically unconnected to their hosts. Rather, these are 
orphaned clauses that interpolate into their hosts by non-syntactic means 
(see §6.2 for a discussion of orphanage). 
 
(6) Cardoso & De Vries (2010) 
 a. [&P [The Big Apple,][New York,]] is a huge city. 
 b. [&P [The Big Apple,][<which is> a magical place,]] is a huge city. 
 
(7) Heringa (2011) 
 a. [&P [The Big Apple,][<it> New York,]] is a huge city. 
 b. [&P [The Big Apple,][<it is> a magical place,]] is a huge city. 
 
In my pursuit of an adequate definition for apposition, I will also take the 
functional distinction between reformulative and attributive apposition as 
indicative of syntactic variance. However, unlike the abovementioned recent 
approaches to apposition, I will demonstrate that there are differences in 
both the internal and external syntax of reformulative and attributive 
apposition. In other words, I will show that these two types of appositions 
have neither their internal nor external syntax in common. 
  With respect to reformulative appositions, I will use syntactic and 
semantic diagnostics to show that they are syntactically coordinated with 
their anchors. The coordination that I advocate is not the special kind of 
parenthetical coordination utilised by Cardoso & De Vries (2010) and 
Heringa (2011) however: it is regular coordination of the type that 
coordinates noun phrases in an utterance like Bill and Ben slept. While past 
analyses have been reluctant to entertain the notion that reformulative 
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apposition involves regular coordination (for pertinent remarks on this 
topic, see Burton-Roberts 1975), I will show that reformulative apposition 
displays all the syntactic hallmarks of regular coordination. I thus propose 
that reformulative apposition is a syntactic exaptation of coordination, and 
that pragmatic factors give rise to the prosodic and interpretative differences 
that pertain between regular and appositional coordination. 
  With respect to attributive appositions, I use syntactic and semantic 
diagnostics to show that Heringa (2011) and others are correct to claim that 
attributive appositions are postcopular elements of finite parenthetical 
copular clauses in which all other material is rendered unpronounced (see 
4b). Specifically, I claim that these copular clauses are Force phrases (Rizzi 
1997), which are syntactic units that are used to commit speech acts. With 
respect to their external syntax, I claim that these parenthetical clauses adjoin 
to a maximal syntactic projection within their host clauses (see 8). I argue 
that their status as independent Force phrases makes these parenthetical 
clauses opaque: no syntactic or compositional semantic relations can be 
established across the boundary between them and the host clauses to which 
they adjoin (precisely how Forcehood engenders opacity is demonstrated in 
§3.2). As a result, their adjunction to their hosts is unconstrained from the 
perspective of syntax and compositional semantics. All constraints that 
dictate to which maximal syntactic projection they may adjoin therefore 
arise from extraneous factors, which are prosodic or pragmatic in nature, or 
else pertain to how non-pronunciation is licensed. 
 
(8) [DP [DP The Big Apple,] [ForceP <it is> a magical place,]] is a huge city. 
 
There is a twist to this tale, however. I argue that, while the functional 
distinction between reformulative and attributive apposition is instructive, it 
does not correspond with the abovementioned syntactic distinction between 
appositional coordination and Force phrasal adjunction in a one-to-one 
fashion. Rather, there is an occasion when conflict between function and 
syntax structure arises. 
 The source of this conflict stems from utterances like (9) below. From a 
functional perspective, the relationship that pertains between the appositive 
noun phrase and its anchor in (9) is one of reformulation, as Pete provides a 
 Introduction 5 
 
more informative name for the individual denoted by the specific indefinite 
noun phrase a masked man. 
 
(9) A masked man, Pete, danced with Miranda. 
 
I will show that, in certain environments, referential appositive noun phrases 
like Pete in (9) are postcopular elements of Force phrasal adjuncts that are 
underlying truncated clefts (Mikkelsen 2005), as in (10). Here lies the 
conflict: although they function to reformulate their anchors, referential 
appositive noun phrases sometimes display the Force phrasal syntax 
associated with attributive appositions. 
 
(10) [DP [DP A masked man,] [ForceP <it was> Pete,]] danced with Miranda. 
 
To resolve this conflict, I abandon the idea that the functional distinction 
between reformulative and attributive apposition has ontological significance 
for the formal characterisation of apposition (although I do not deny its 
utility as a suitable guideline). Rather, I claim that apposition should be 
defined with reference to syntactic schemata alone. 
 This brings me back to the main goal of this thesis, which is to define 
apposition. I claim that apposition is best defined with respect to appositional 
coordination. That is to say, I propose that ‘true’ appositions are conjoined 
with their anchors, and that regular and appositional coordination are 
dissimilar only insofar as regular conjuncts denote dissimilar referents or 
concepts (see 11a), while appositional conjuncts denote the same referent or 
concept (see 11b). 
 
(11) a. Joop eats [vlai or poffertjesk] every Friday. 
 b. Joop eats [vlai, or custardi,] every Friday.3 
 
This definition of apposition is stated in (12).4 
                                                     
3  Both vla and poffertjes are sweet Dutch foodstuffs. While many Dutch nationals might say 
otherwise, I am convinced that vla and English custard are identical (a comparison of the recipes for each 
certainly suggests so). 
4  The reader will notice that I formulate my definition of appositions in (12) in a disjunctive 
fashion, where part of the disjunctive statement is ‘if β denotes a member of the set of referents or 
6 Introduction 
(12) Definition of apposition 
Where α is an initial conjunct, β is a non-initial conjunct, and α and β 
are coordinated: 
If β denotes the same referent or concept as α, or if β denotes a 
member of the set of referents or concepts denoted by α, then β is an 
apposition. 
 
The definition of apposition in (12) entails that the ‘attributive appositions’ 
discussed above are not actually appositions after all. Rather, they form a 
subset of a group of Force phrasal adjuncts that I claim includes a variety of 
parenthetical structures such as and-parentheticals (Kavalova 2007, see 13a), 
exclamative epithets (Güneş 2015, see 13b), vocatives (13c), and others. 
(Indeed, I will claim that ‘attributive appositions’ are actually derived from 
copular clausal and-parentheticals in chapter three.) 
 
(13) a. Joseph will – [VP [ForceP and he’ll regret it –] [VP file for divorce]]. 
 b. Sam has, [PerfP [ForceP the lucky sod,] [PerfP been promoted]]. 
 c. Tim’s objection, [VP [ForceP my dear,] [VP was duly noted]]. 
 
Defining apposition with respect to a particular syntactic schema has both 
immediate terminological and taxonomic repercussions. With respect to 
terminology, it is confusing to continue to refer to the appositives 
exemplified by (2) as ‘attributive appositions’ when my definition in (12) 
denies them appositional status. Thus, new terminology is required. I will 
call reformulative appositions simply appositions henceforth, which reflects 
Burton-Roberts’ (1975) and McCawley’s (1998) use of the term. To maintain 
a connexion with the previous literature, I will call attributive appositions 
simply attributions hereafter. The reader should keep in mind that, for me, 
attributions are appositives that conform to a particular syntactic schema: 
attributions are postcopular elements in reduced finite parenthetical copular 
clauses that adjoin to their hosts. Thus, the terms attribution and 
attributional will no longer refer to appositives that appear to ascribe a 
property to their anchors. To talk about this property-ascribing function, I 
                                                                                                                            
concepts denoted by α’. This statement is included to account for the existence of appositions that are 
hyponyms of their anchors, which I will introduce shortly, in §1.2. 
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will always use the phrase attributive function from now on. Also, the term 
appositive henceforth refers to those constructions to which an appositional 
or attributional syntactic analysis is not yet applied. In other words, I use 
appositive to refer to constructions that, before they are disambiguated by 
syntactic tests, are structurally ambiguous between appositional coordination 
and Force phrasal adjunction. 
 With respect to the taxonomic repercussions, defining apposition with 
respect to a coordination schema that is syntactically identical to regular 
coordination establishes novel opposition to the inclusion of appositions in 
classificatory works on parenthesis such as Dehé & Kavalova (2007). This 
opposition arises because, on my account, appositions are not ‘parenthetical’ 
in any theoretically relevant sense, unless of course one deems second 
conjuncts of regular coordination to be ‘parenthetical’ too.   
  
1.2 The main themes of the thesis 
 
Having now provided a rough outline of how I achieve the main research 
objective of this thesis, which is to provide an empirically and conceptually 
adequate formal definition of apposition, I will now summarise the thesis’ 
main themes in more depth. 
 
1.2.1 Structural ambiguity in appositive constructions 
 
The first theme that I wish to mention is how to control for structural 
ambiguity. As I have already mentioned, the informal distinction between 
the reformulative and attributive function of appositives provides a 
reasonable but slightly imprecise diagnostic of an appositive’s syntactic 
structure. In the case of the attributive function, the diagnostic is completely 
precise: if on the surface an appositive α appears to attribute a property to its 
anchor, the application of various syntactic and semantic diagnostics (which 
I will list and apply in §3) show that α is the postcopular element in a 
reduced parenthetical predicative copular clause. In the case of the 
reformulative function, the diagnostic is less precise: if on the surface an 
appositive α appears to provide another name for its anchor, the application 
of various syntactic and semantic diagnostics (which I will list and apply in 
§2) will typically show that α is coordinated with its anchor. As I have already 
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discussed in §1.1, the exception in the reformulative case is constructions in 
which referential appositive noun phrases reformulate anchors that are 
either specific indefinite noun phrases (see 14a) or definite individual 
concepts (see 14b). If diagnostics for appositional syntax are applied to these 
constructions, then they appear to pattern with appositions, whereas if 
diagnostics for attributional syntax are applied to such constructions, then 
they appear to pattern with attributions. This is because such constructions 
are structurally ambiguous between appositions (see 15) and attributions that 
are derived from truncated clefts (see 16). 
 
(14) a. Someone, Pete, keeps leaving the tap on. 
 b. The salesman of the year, Grant, will win a car. 
 
(15) a. [&P [DP Someone,][DP Pete,]] keeps leaving the tap on. 
 b. [&P [DP The salesman of the year,][DP Grant,]] will win a car. 
 
(16) a. [DP [DP Someone,][ForceP <it is> Pete,]] keeps leaving the tap on. 
 b. [DP [DP The salesman of the year,][ForceP <it {is/will be}> Grant,]] 
will win a car. 
 
If structural ambiguity were only observed in this small subset of appositive 
noun phrases, then one could feasibly retain the reformulative/attributive 
functional distinction as a reliable means for diagnosing appositional or 
attributional syntax. Problematically however, it often happens that 
appositives are ambiguous with respect to their reformulative or attributive 
function. In such cases, one cannot utilise the functional reformulative/ 
attributive distinction to diagnose syntax structure in the first place. This 
type of ambiguity arises in constructions that contain appositive noun 
phrases that display the same definiteness as their anchors. The utterances in 
(17) provide exemplars. When sufficient contextual information is absent, 
one cannot be sure whether the capital of England in (17a) provides an 
additional name for its anchor or ascribes the property of being the capital of 
England to it. In such cases the same situation that arose with the examples 
in (14) would arise here: if diagnostics for appositional syntax are applied to 
such constructions then they appear to pattern with appositions, whereas if 
diagnostics for attributional syntax are applied to such constructions then 
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they appear to pattern with attributions. This is because such constructions 
are structurally ambiguous between appositions (see 18) and attributions that 
are derived from predicative copular clauses (see 19). 
 
(17) a. London, the capital of England, is a wonderful place. 
b. A certain donkey, an ass, is owned by a farmer that beatboxes. 
 
(18) a. [&P [DP London,][DP the capital of England,]] is a wonderful 
place. 
 b. [&P [DP A certain donkey,][DP an ass,]] is owned by a farmer that 
beatboxes. 
 
(19) a. [DP [DP London,][ForceP <it is> the capital of England,]] is a 
wonderful place. 
 b. [DP [DP A certain donkey,][ForceP <it is> an ass,]] is owned by a 
farmer that beatboxes. 
 
Consequently, the ambiguity observed in (14) and (17) must be controlled 
for. I introduce two means of control in the chapters to come. The first 
delimits appositions, and is introduced in §2.1.1. Appositions are delimited 
by inserting apposition markers (Burton-Roberts 1975, otherwise known as 
reformulation markers in Blakemore 1993, 1996, 2007) into otherwise 
structurally ambiguous appositives like those in (14) and (17). Apposition 
markers are coordinators like or and parentheticals that modify appositions 
qua their status as communicable strings (such markers are that is to say, 
formally speaking, in other words, and so on). The second means of control 
delimits attributions, and is introduced in §2.2.5. Attributions are best 
delimited by inserting temporal adverbs such as now, often, or frequently into 
otherwise structurally ambiguous appositives (Quirk et al. 1972, O’Connor 
2007, Heringa 2011, Döring 2014). Because they modify tense, these 
temporal adverbs expose the underlying finite clausal structure that 
characterises attributional syntax. 
 Once otherwise structurally ambiguous appositives are disambiguated by 
the insertion of apposition markers or temporal adverbs, the application of 
syntactic and semantic diagnostics ceases to return equivocal results, and two 
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natural syntactic classes – appositional conjuncts and Force phrasal adjuncts 
– are delimited.  
 
1.2.2 A taxonomy of appositives 
 
Another theme that runs through the thesis is taxonomy. I endeavour to sort 
appositives of various kinds into appositions and non-appositions, according 
to the definition of apposition in (12). In chapter two, in which I provide 
evidence that appositions are conjuncts, I develop the taxonomy of 
appositions that is represented in the hierarchy in (20) and exemplified by 
the utterances in (20a-i). 
 
(20)   appositions 
  
 
 subclausal clausal category 
 
 
  identification reformulation hyponymy reformulation  function 
 (b)  (c) 
   
 vacuous non-vacuous vacuous non-vacuous vacuity 
  (a)  (d) 
  
 elliptical non-elliptical elliptical non-elliptical ellipsis 
 (g) (e) (h, i) (f) 
 
Examples from the hierarchy above: 
 a. Brendan confusticates, or perplexes, Swantje. 
 b. Two boys, namely Bill and Ben, have just arrived. 
 c. The band, and especially the bassist, is tired of touring. 
 d. We’re rich, that is to say, we needn’t work. 
 e. That the boss fired her, fired Mary that is, is unacceptable. 
 f. That he was fired, that John was fired, is a shame. 
 g. The last pizza slice, i.e. the sixth, was reserved for me. 
 h. That he was fired, that John was, is bad. 
 i. That he was fired, John, is bad. 
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Up until now, I have characterised appositions as reformulating their 
anchors, where reformulation refers to appositions’ rechristening of the 
referents or concepts that their anchors denote. One of the more noticeable 
aspects of the hierarchy in (20) is its introduction of a more subtle 
conception of reformulation that also includes identification and hyponymy 
(see §2.2.6 for details). 
 Because appositions of all syntactic categories can perform it, 
reformulation in the sense conveyed so far in this introductory chapter is the 
paradigmatic function that appositions perform. This paradigmatic 
reformulative function is more accurately described as conventional 
reformulation: appositions that perform this function provide another 
conventional name for their apposition; a name that does not change 
depending upon the context. The identificational function introduced in the 
hierarchy in (20) refers to reformulation that is context-sensitive. This 
sensitivity to context is observed in (20b), as the denotation of the anchor 
two boys may change depending upon the context. In (20b), the anchor has 
the same referent as the set {Bill, Ben}, as the apposition makes clear. The 
hyponymy function introduced in the hierarchy in (20) refers to the 
exemplification or particularisation of a member contained within the set 
that the anchor denotes (Quirk et al. 1985, Heringa 2011). In the hyponymy 
example in (20c) for instance, the bassist from the band is exemplified by the 
apposition. Note that this hyponymy function is not reserved for plural 
entities alone: appositions can introduce hyponyms of anchors that denote 
complex concepts, as the example in (21) illustrates. 
 
(21) The soldier tortured, in particular waterboarded, the captive. 
 
As the hierarchy in (20) shows, clausal appositions may perform a 
reformulative function, but not an identificational or hyponymous one. This 
is because, when taken as real world objects, the propositions or speech acts 
that clauses denote are insensitive to context and are also not complex. For 
instance, the proposition Sam has a nice house is not a set of propositions 
that includes Sam has a nice kitchen as a member (but the former 




(22) *  Sam has a nice house, especially Sam has a nice kitchen. 
 
Another feature that the hierarchy in (20) introduces is the notion that 
appositions can be vacuous (§2.2.1-2.2.2 for details). Vacuity is observed in 
appositions when a subconstituent in the apposition reformulates a 
subconstituent in the anchor. This contrasts with regular non-vacuous 
appositional constructions, in which the entire apposition reformulates (or 
identifies, or is a hyponym of) the entire anchor. The utterances in (20e) and 
(20f) provide examples of vacuous appositions. In (20f) for instance, only the 
underlined noun phrase John in the apposition performs a reformulative 
function (specifically, it reformulates the pronoun he in the anchor). The rest 
of apposition is merely echoic and utilised for its structural form alone. 
 Lastly, the hierarchy in (20) also introduces ellipsis into the taxonomy of 
appositions (see §2.2.2 for details). Two conditions must be met for licensing 
ellipsis in appositions. Firstly, appositions must display information-
structurally given material, which only occurs in vacuous appositions. 
Secondly, because the structural configurations that license ellipsis are only 
observed in noun phrases and clauses, such appositions must be noun 
phrases or clauses. Noun phrase ellipsis is observed in (20g), verb phrase 
ellipsis is observed in (20h), and clausal ellipsis is observed in (20i). The 
underlying structures for these utterances are represented in a rough form in 
(23a-c) respectively. 
 
(23) a. [&P [DP The last pizza slice,] i.e. [DP the sixth <slice>]], was 
reserved for me. 
 b. [&P [CP That he was fired,][CP that John was <fired>]], is bad. 
 c. [&P [CP That he was fired,][CP <that> John <was fired>]], is bad. 
 
Because constructions like (20i) have received much attention in the 
previous literature, usually under the guise of background and afterthought 
constructions (see Ott & De Vries 2012 and references therein), I devote 
ample space to them in §2.2.2. Because appositions that display nominal and 
verbal ellipsis are uninteresting from a theoretical perspective, they will 
receive scant attention in the chapters to come. 
 While the appositives listed in (20) show substantial variation in their 
surface appearance, the application of syntactic and semantic diagnostics to 
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each type of construction exposes a common property; namely, that each 
displays a coordinative syntactic structure. Thus, the inclusion of the 
hierarchy in (20) in this introductory chapter serves to highlight the main 
benefit of defining apposition in syntactic terms: the definition can embrace 
many constructions that are pretheoretically understood as mere 
‘resemblances’ to appositions, and it does so in a principled way. 
 The taxonomy of attributions that I advocate in this thesis is less complex 
than the taxonomy for appositions that I have just described. As mentioned 
earlier, attributions are merely bifurcated according to the type of the clause 
that underlies them, which is either a predicative copular clause (see 24a), or 
a truncated cleft copular clause (see 24b). 
 
(24) a. Kristian, <he is> an old friend, lives in Paris. 
 b. Someone, <it was> probably Pete, has left the door open. 
 
I have suggested already that the copular clauses from which attributions are 
derived comprise a subset of Force phrases that adjoin to their hosts, an 
inexhaustive list of which was provided in (13). With regards to discovering 
which other appositives should be included within this set of Force phrasal 
adjuncts, I devote chapter four to appositive relative clauses (see 3, which is 
repeated below in 25), to which much discussion has been devoted in the 
literature, and whose place in past taxonomies of appositives has varied 
substantially. 
 
(25) The Big Apple, which is a magical place, is a huge city. 
 
Within the framework of this thesis, appositive relatives must occupy one of 
three possible taxonomic slots. They are either restrictive modifiers of null 
nominal appositions (see 26a), restrictive modifiers of null nominal 
attributions (see 26b), or stand-alone Force phrasal adjuncts (see 26c). If 
either (26a) or (26b) pertain, then appositive relatives plus their null heads 
are noun phrases (De Vries 2002, 2006a, Šimík 2008, Cardoso & De Vries 
2010, and Lassiter 2011). If (26c) pertains, then appositive relatives are stand-




(26) a. [&P [DP The Big Apple,][DP (that city) which is a magical place,]] 
is a huge city. 
 b. [DP [DP The Big Apple,][ForceP (and it is) [DP (a city) which is a 
magical place,]]] is a huge city. 
 c. [DP [DP The Big Apple,][ForceP which is a magical place,]] is a huge 
city. 
 
To assess the status of appositive relative clauses, I compare them to relative 
constructions that, by virtue of their head noun phrases being overt, are 
unmistakably appositional (see 27a) or attributional (see 27b). I demonstrate 
that appositive relative clauses display properties dissimilar to both 
appositional and attributional relative constructions. From this, I conclude 
that appositive relatives conform to the schema exemplified by (26c): they 
are stand-alone clausal parenthetical adjuncts. 
 
(27) a. Billy, i.e. the guy that I know from work, has been fired. 
 b. Pete, frequently someone that eats too much, felt sick after 
dinner. 
 
While this conclusion reflects Potts’ (2002), Arnold’s (2007), and others’, the 
eliminative method that I pursue to reach this conclusion, as well as the 
introduction of appositional and attributional relatives as constructions that 
are distinct from appositive relative clauses, is novel. 
 Once the place of appositive relative clauses as stand-alone Force phrasal 
adjuncts is secured, one arrives at the taxonomy of Force phrasal adjuncts 
that is represented in (28) below and exemplified by the utterances in (28a-i). 
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(28)   Force phrasal adjuncts 
 
 
 subclausal clausal category 
 (a, b)  
  
 copular clausal non-copular clausal internal syntax   
 
 
 truncated cleft predicational type of  
 copular clause 
 
elliptical non-elliptical elliptical non-elliptical elliptical non-elliptical ellipsis 
 (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (i) 
 
Examples from the hierarchy above: 
 a. Sam has, the lucky sod, been promoted. 
 b. Tim’s objection, my dear, was duly noted. 
 c. The record holder, currently Bill, is always held in high esteem. 
 d. Someone, (and) it was probably Pete, left the fridge door open. 
 e. Bob, my assistant, is demanding a pay rise. 
 f. Bob, {who/he} is my assistant, is demanding a pay rise. 
 g. Sandra wants to win, which she no doubt will. 
 i Jo – (and) she loves to do this – keeps leaving Harry post-it notes 
on the bathroom mirror. 
 
When unified, the hierarchies in (20) and (28) create the taxonomy of 
appositives represented in (29) below. 
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(29)  A taxonomy of appositives 
 
elliptical non-elliptical elliptical non-elliptical elliptical non-elliptical ellipsis 
 
 
 truncated cleft predicational type of  
  copular clause  
 
 copular clausal non-copular clausal internal syntax 
 
 
 subclausal clausal category 
 
 







 subclausal clausal category 
 
 
  identification reformulation hyponymy reformulation  function 
    
   
 vacuous non-vacuous vacuous non-vacuous vacuity 
     
  
 elliptical non-elliptical elliptical non-elliptical ellipsis 
 
It should be noted that, while the hierarchy in (29) represents how each of 
the appositives discussed in this thesis relate to one another, it does not 
represent an exhaustive taxonomy of appositives. This is because, according 
to my use of the term, appositives refers to ‘appositions and their 
resemblances’ (see §1.1), and is therefore an informal family resemblance 
term that roughly denotes a group of constructions for which an exhaustive 
taxonomy cannot be fashioned. As such, there no doubt exist Force phrasal 
adjuncts that many scholars would never consider to be appositive in any 
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sense. On the other hand, there may also exist parenthetical structures that 
certain scholars might consider to be appositive that are not present in the 





Another important theme in this thesis is extensibility: to what extent does 
the syntactic definition of apposition in (12) inform semantic and pragmatic 
theories about appositive constructions? I address this question directly in 
chapter five, where I discuss the pragmatics of appositives. In that chapter, I 
endeavour to show that my syntactic analysis also accounts well for certain 
pragmatic phenomena that have thus far escaped adequate explanation by 
semanticists and pragmatists. In particular, I attribute the non-uniform 
pragmatic behaviour of appositions summarised in Koev (2013:15-37) to the 
syntactic division between ‘true’ appositions (as defined in 12), which are 
typically subclausal and hence unable to bear illocutionary force, and 
attributions/appositive relative clauses, which are underlying Force phrases 
and hence marked to bear illocutionary force. I propose that the force-
bearing nature of attributions makes for their suitable use as building blocks 
of conversation; a function for which appositions, as regular conjuncts, 
cannot usually be used. Once a suitable model of the discourse is emplaced (I 
use an informal model of my own creation), the dissimilarity I mentioned 
above between those appositives that bear force and those that do not can be 
utilised to show that the heterogeneity in the pragmatic behaviour of 
appositives is expected, and engendered by the syntax. To my knowledge, an 
attempt to explain these pragmatic data by recourse to syntax has not been 
made before. 
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
 
Unlike the bulk of this introductory chapter, much of the remainder of this 
thesis is organised around syntactic schemata rather than themes. The thesis 
is organised in this fashion because much of the legwork will involve 
accruing empirical support for the idea that appositions are second conjuncts 
of regular coordination and that attributions and appositive relatives are 
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Force phrasal adjuncts. As such, the syntax of appositions is my concern in 
chapter two, the syntax of attributions is my concern in chapter three, and 
the syntax of appositive relative clauses is my concern in chapter four. Once 
sufficient evidence is accrued to support my syntactic bifurcation of 
appositives into appositions and non-appositions (as per the definition in 
12), I extend my account into the domain of pragmatics in chapter five, and 
then consider but ultimately reject three conceptual alternatives to my 
analysis in chapter six. Chapter seven concludes the thesis. 
 
1.4 Data sources 
 
Empirical evidence for my analysis comes almost exclusively from English 
and Turkish. Unless stated otherwise, all examples are procured from 
introspection. Judgements on English data come from me, a native speaker 
of the East Midlands dialect of British English, and at most nine other native 
speakers of British English (all non-linguists from England). Judgements on 
Turkish data come from seven native Turkish speaking informants (one 
linguist, six non-linguists, all from Turkey). I choose to concentrate on 
English and Turkish for three reasons. The first is ease of access to 
informants. The second is control: my knowledge of both languages is 
sufficient enough to control for extraneous factors that might pollute 
judgements. The third reason is breadth. The likelihood that ‘genetic 
closeness’ explains why two languages pattern similarly with respect to some 
property 𝑥 is lessened the more genetically unrelated two languages are. If 
recourse to ‘genetic closeness’ is implausible, then the probability that an 
analysis that captures the behaviour of two unrelated languages with respect 
to 𝑥 has universal scope, and hence correctly describes and explains some 
aspect of grammar that is common to all languages, is increased. Resultantly, 
the likelihood that the analyses advanced in this thesis, which capture the 
behaviour of appositives in both English and Turkish, have universal scope is 
greater than the likelihood that analyses that capture the behaviour of 
appositives in English and (say) Dutch have universal scope. This is because 
English displays greater phylogenetic affinity with Dutch than with Turkish. 
Needless to say, a theory that fits two unrelated languages is not a universal 
theory by default, as coincidental similarities that the languages in question 
display might bias one’s analysis. Resultantly, the theory could prove to be 
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completely unsuitable for a third unrelated language and hence not universal 
at all. While I hope that the analyses I advance hereafter make correct 
predictions for a third unrelated language (and a fourth, and a fifth…), I 
cannot say with any confidence that they will. Future research must decide. 
 

  2 
Appositions 
In §2.1, I outline and defend the claim that subclausal appositions are 
coordinated with their anchors. I extend this analysis to clausal 
appositions in §2.2.1, and discuss how clausal appositions and ellipsis 
interact in §2.2.2. In §2.2.3, I discuss the notion of extending the 
‘biclausal’ analyses from §2.2.2 to the subclausal appositions from §2.1, 
and highlight its infeasibility. §2.2.5 and §2.2.6 are devoted to 
miscellanea that pertain to appositions: §2.2.5 continues the discussion 
from §2.1 about delimiting appositions from attributions, while §2.2.6 
deals with the pragmatics of appositions and related constructions. 
2.1 Appositions as second conjuncts 
 
The main claim I defend in this chapter is that appositions are coordinated 
with their anchors. I aim to show that, from a syntactic perspective, this 
coordination is identical to ‘regular’ coordination with and or or, insofar as it 
obeys the coordinate structure constraint (Ross 1967) and requires its 
conjuncts to exhibit the same semantic type. I suggest in §2.2.6 that the 
dissimilarities observed between regular and appositional coordination are 
created by pragmatic factors alone. 
 I begin by providing evidence that appositions and their anchors are 
coordinated. 
 
2.1.1 Semantic balance 
 
My analysis of appositions does not require me to commit to a particular 
syntactic account of coordination. As such, I remain ambivalent about 
coordination phrases’ internal syntax. However, I maintain that coordination 
phrases display the same semantic type as their conjuncts (Zhang 2010), and 
that conjuncts must display the same compositional semantic type (e, 〈e, t〉, 
etc.) as each other, in accordance with a semantic formulation of William’s 
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(1981) law of coordination of likes. Also, I assume that asyndetic conjuncts 
are always separated by an unpronounced coordinator. This assumption 
arises from the observation that such coordinators are always optional: 
 
(1) John {,/and} Mary {,/and} Frank, and Polly have been fired. 
 
Constraints on extraction aside (see §2.1.3), the demand for semantic 
balance is the sole constraint that is placed on what can be coordinated. If 
balance is obtained, elements of any semantic type can be coordinated: 
 
(2) a. John and Bill went home. 
b. The red and white flag was raised. 
c. She went out and around the building. 
d. He was tarred and feathered. 
 
If appositions are second conjuncts as I maintain, one predicts that 
appositions can display any semantic type, provided that balance between 
anchors and their appositions pertains. This prediction is borne out, as the 
examples below show.5 
 
(3) a. The Big Apple, New York, is a huge city. 
 b. Pete, i.e. the guy that we met in the pub last night, is at the door. 
 c. All campanologists, i.e. all bell ringers, dream of ringing at St. 
Paul’s cathedral. 
 d. Every unmarried man in the room, every bachelor, is here for a 
date. 
 e. No philatelist, that is no stamp collector, would willingly sell her 
Perot Provisional.  
 f.  Ben drew a stereometric, i.e. three-dimensional, representation. 
                                                     
5 While appositions can be propositions (i.e. clauses) if their anchor is also propositional (as the 
example in 3j shows), I postpone any discussion of clausal appositions until §2.2 due to certain 
complicating factors that accompany them. Resultantly, the current subsection (§2.1) deals only with 
subclausal appositions. 
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 g. Brendan confusticates, that is perplexes, Swantje. 
 h. The wind blows abaft, or behind, the boat. 
 i. Alan studied there, at Oxford, for about four years. 
 j. I could murder a brew, that is to say I’d love a cup of tea. 
 
To my knowledge, there are three potential counterexamples to my claim 
that appositions and their anchors are always semantically balanced. I will 
now show that these counterexamples are only apparent, and that in each 
case semantic balance actually does pertain. 
 Constructions exemplified by (4) below provide the first potential 
counterexample. Here it looks like a referential noun phrase anchor is 
coordinated with a propositional apposition. 
 
(4) The rumour, i.e. that the company is firing staff, is false. 
 
In such constructions, the clause in the apposition is interpreted as 
modifying an implicit noun phrase that is coreferent with the anchor. That 
these appositional clauses are modifiers is demonstrated by the obligatory 
presence of the complementiser that and the nominal affix {-mA} in English 
and Turkish respectively, as (5) and (6) show. Thus, I treat such appositions 
as noun phrases that contain restrictive relative clauses, following Aboh 
(2005), Kayne (2010), Arsenjević (2009), and Haegeman (2012).  
 
(5) The rumour, i.e. (the rumour) *(that) the company is firing staff, is 
false. 
 
(6) Politikacı-nın vaad-i-ne, parti-si-nin vergi-ler-i 
  politician-GEN pledge-POSS-DAT party-POSS-GEN tax-PL-ACC 
 
  düşür-*(me)-si-ne,  inan-mak  zor. 
  lower-NM-POSS-DAT believe-INF hard 




If the analysis outlined above is correct for examples like (4) then semantic 
balance is restored, as in such constructions two referential noun phrases are 
coordinated (as in 5). 
 The second potential counterexample comes from constructions 
exemplified by (7). Here, a copula anchor appears to coordinate with a non-
constituent that includes the raising verb deem and an infinitival clause 
minus its predicate. This is another case of imbalance.  
 
(7) The Spartans were (or were deemed to be) a fierce race of warriors. 
 
I suggest that such cases display right node raising (RNR, Postal 1974), which 
refers to the absence of a contiguous string α on the rightmost edge of a 
constituent, where α would be identical to a linearly successive string β if α 
were present. RNR is observed in the example in (8b) below. 
 
(8) a. Someone who likes the Beatles will always view with suspicion 
someone who dislikes the Beatles. 
 b. Someone who likes, will always view with suspicion someone 
who dislikes, the Beatles. 
  
As Valmala (2013) points out, RNR is not a syntactically uniform 
phenomenon, and is derived by either extraction (Ross 1967) or backwards 
deletion (Wilder 1997) / multidominance (McCawley 1982). For reasons that 
are discussed in §6.2.1 but which are irrelevant for now, I will assume that 
the multidominance form of RNR applies in appositive structures.6 This 
form of RNR can be used to derive constructions in which balanced but non-
constituent anchors and appositions appear to be coordinated (for the sake 
of exposition, the schemata in 9 and 10 are simplified): 
 
(9) a. Just before John’s, that is to say just after Mary’s, defence we 
drank some tea. 
                                                     
6  For independent evidence that RNR may apply to parenthetical-like insertions such as 
insubordinations, see De Vries (2013b:161-162). 






 PPANCHOR &0 PPAPP 
 
 just PP just PP 
   
  before DP after DP  
 
  John’s  Mary’s defence 
 
   






 DPANCHOR i.e. DPAPP 
 
 the NP the NP 
   
  sovereign PP queen PP  
 
  of  of England 
 
   
 
Once the multidominance analysis of RNR is applied to the example in (7), 
semantic balance is restored, as both conjuncts are underlyingly unary 
predicates:7 
                                                     
7  Note that the RNR analysis utilised in the main text also extends to what Döring (2014:136) calls 
multiple-argument appositions in German, such as (i). Specifically, the construction in (i) can be analysed 
as involving coordinated verb phrases, where the participle verb is shared by both conjuncts.  
(i) Ich habe jemandem etwas, nämlich dem Karl das Buch, gegeben. 
 I have someone.DAT something.ACC namely the.DAT Karl the.ACC book given 
 ‘I have given something to somebody, namely the book to Karl.’ 
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 VPANCHOR or VPAPP 
 
 were  were VP 
   
   deemed TP  
 
   to be VP 
 
 a fierce race of warriors 
  
To outline the third potential counterexample to my claim, I must return to 
the examples in (3) to consider their semantic function. In these examples, 
each apposition provides a different (and typically more informative) 
description of the element denoted by their anchors. In (3e) for instance, the 
apposition no stamp collector provides a more informative name for the 
quantified noun phrase no philatelist. This is the reformulative function of 
appositions (see chapter one). 
 However, certain purported nominal appositions display a different 
function. Rather than provide additional names for the referents denoted by 
their anchors, these appositions are interpreted as attributing properties to 
them. This is observed in (11), where the addition of a racer informs us that 
Kristian’s bicycle is contained in the set of racers that exist in the world. Such 
purported appositions display an attributive function (see chapter one). 
 
(11) Kristian’s bicycle, a racer, was stolen. 
 
That a racer in (11) attributes a property to Kristian’s bicycle is indicative of 
its semantic status as a unary predicate. If the ascription of predicatehood to 
‘attributive appositions’ is valid, then my claim that appositions are always 
coordinated with their anchor is undermined because in constructions like 
(11) it looks like a referential noun phrase anchor is coordinated with 
apposition of a different semantic type; namely, a predicate. To explain this, I 
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must either concede that appositions are not coordinated with their anchors 
after all, propose that coordination can be imbalanced in certain 
environments, or claim that ‘attributive appositions’ are not coordinated 
with their anchors. 
 I choose the final option, and maintain that ‘attributive appositions’ are 
not coordinated with anchors. As mentioned in chapter one, I claim that 
such appositives are predicates of reduced finite copular clauses, and hence 
display the syntax roughly sketched in (12) below, which is repeated from 
chapter one. 
 
(12) [DP [DP The Big Apple][ForceP (it is) a magical place]] is a huge city. 
 
Because I wish to exclude these attributive appositives from the set of 
appositions proper, I will call them attributions from now on. Attributions 
are the focus of chapter three. However, before I set them aside for later I 
must provide some means by which to distinguish attributions from 
appositions, so that one does not confuse the two.8 
 As the example in (11) has demonstrated, not all appositive noun phrases 
are ambiguous with respect to their potential appositional or attributional 
syntactic status: their definiteness respective to their anchor exposes their 
true nature. This fact is encapsulated in the diagnostic below: 
 
(13) Where α is the anchor and β is the appositive noun phrase: 
If β is indefinite and α is not, then β is an attribution. 
 
Utilising the diagnostic in (13), one can delimit the appositive noun phrases 
in the exemplary cases in (14) as attributions, where the anchors are a 
definite kind and a definite individual respectively while the appositive noun 
phrases are indefinite.  
 
                                                     
8  It should be noted here that the methods that I provide to distinguish appositions from 
attributions in (13) and (16) do not provide evidence for a syntactic distinction between the two. This 
evidence is supplied in the remainder of chapter two and in chapter three. Thus, for the time being, the 
reader must trust me that a syntactic distinction between appositions and attributions indeed pertains. 
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(14) a. The lion, a species of the genus Panthera, is a ferocious beast. 
b. Kristian’s new bicycle, a racer, has a flat tyre. 
 
Unfortunately, the diagnostic in (13) cannot distinguish attributions from 
appositions in cases where the appositive noun phrase is definite (see 15a-b) 
or where both the anchor and the appositive noun phrase are indefinite (see 
15c-d). It is these cases that must be disambiguated (in lieu of the context 
providing sufficient delimitation). 
 
(15) a. London, the capital of England, is a filthy city. 
 b. A masked man, Pete, kissed Miranda at the party. 
 c. A rose, a perennial of the genus Rosa, is a symbol for romance. 
 d. A particular girl that Ben likes, a student, is coming to our 
party. 
 
The method of delimitation that I pursue utilises apposition markers (see 
Burton-Roberts 1975 for a similar test), and is encapsulated in (16) below. 
Because the diagnostic in (16) encompasses the diagnostic in (13), one may 
treat (16) as supplanting (13). 
 
(16) Where α is the appositive noun phrase: 
If α can host an apposition marker, then α is an apposition. Otherwise, 
α is an attribution. 
 
Apposition marker is the term for material that accompanies appositions. 
The linear position of markers relative to their apposition is either flexible or 
fixed. In those cases where its position is fixed, a marker must precede its 
apposition: 
 
(17) a. Cottonopolis, (that is to say) Manchester (that is to say), is a 
cold city. 
 b. Cottonopolis, (formally) Manchester (formally), is a cold city. 
 
(18) a. Cottonopolis, (or) Manchester (*or), is a cold city. 
 b. Cottonopolis, (i.e.) Manchester (*i.e.), is a cold city. 
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Apposition markers are optional (for exceptions to this generalisation, see 
the particularisation constructions in §2.2.6). If one removes the markers 
from the examples in (17) and (18) for instance, acceptability is retained. 
 For fixed markers like or, the coordination analysis that I pursue provides 
them a syntactic locus: they are the realisation of the coordinator. Those 
markers that may precede or follow their appositions are parentheticals that 
modify appositions qua their property of being utterable strings (formally 
speaking, that is to say, etc.).9, 10 
 Utilising the diagnostic in (16), the appositions in the ambiguous 
examples from (15) can be disambiguated as appositions by inserting 
apposition markers into them, as (19) shows. 
 
(19) a. London, or the capital of England, is a filthy city. 
 b. A masked man, i.e. Pete, kissed Miranda at the party. 
 c. A rose, or a perennial of the genus Rosa, is a symbol for 
romance. 
 
One sees that this method of disambiguation works simply by comparing the 
appositive noun phrases’ interpretation. In (19a) for example, the capital of 
England is disambiguated as another name for the entity that London 
denotes. In (15a) however, the same noun phrase is ambiguous between 
another name for the entity that London denotes and a property that London 
exhibits. 
 To summarise: I started this subsection (§2.1.1) by presenting evidence 
from constraints on semantic balance in coordination to support my claim 
that appositions are coordinated with their anchors. This claim appeared to 
be undermined by three sources: alleged complement clause appositions, 
semantically imbalanced non-constituent appositions, and certain appositive 
noun phrases that, while syntactically balanced with their nominal anchors, 
look like unary predicates that are coordinated with entity anchors in a 
semantically imbalanced fashion. To show that my ‘semantic balance’ claim 
                                                     
9  Note that the parenthetical apposition markers exemplified in (17) in the main text, of which 
Heringa (2011:56) provides an inexhaustive list from English, Dutch and German, are called 
reformulation markers in the much of literature on discourse and pragmatics (see for instance Gülich & 
Kotschi 1995, Blakemore 1993, 1996, 2007). 
10  For a discussion of attribution markers, see §2.2.5. 
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was not undermined, I argued that alleged complement clause appositions 
are actually noun phrases, I proposed that non-constituent appositions are 
derived by right node raising, and I excluded predicate nominal ‘appositions’ 
from the set of appositions proper. With regards to the predicate nominal 
‘appositions’, I proposed that they are attributions, which are predicate 
nominals in reduced clausal adjuncts. To ensure that attributions are not 
mistaken for appositions later on, I outlined a means by which the two can 
be distinguished. This method of delimitation concerned apposition 
markers: appositive noun phrases that are potentially ambiguous between 
appositions and attributions are delimited as appositions when they are 
accompanied by an apposition marker. 
 
2.1.2 C-command and extraction 
 
Having introduced a satisfactory delimiter of appositions, I now return to 
providing evidence for my claim that appositions and their anchors are 
coordinated. 
 First, one observes that appositions can be bound by many of the same  
c-commanding binders that second conjuncts of regular coordination can, as 
a comparison of the a-examples (appositional constructions) and b-examples 
(regular coordination) in (20) to (23) demonstrate. This observation 
provides further support for equating the two construction types. 
 
(20) Negative polarity items (NPIs) 
 a. Paul hasn’t received penny-one, anything, from his bank. 
 aʹ. Paul hasn’t received anything, penny-one, from his bank. 
 b. Grant doesn’t own any knives or any forks. 
 
(21) Modal auxiliaries 
 a. Lucy might visit the Big Apple, i.e. New York, in September. 
 b. Lucy might visit New York and New Jersey in September. 
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(22) Sentential negation 
 a. Pete can’t touch his nest egg, i.e. his trust fund, until he is 
twenty five. 




 a. Every competitor on the cookery TV programme was told that 
his entry, that is to say his jam roly-poly with custard, was too 
stodgy. 
 b. Every cricketer remembers his first century and his first maiden 
over. 
 
C-command is a prerequisite for extraction, as the landing site of extraction 
must c-command its base position. In regular coordination, extraction is licit 
only if applied equally to both conjuncts or to subconstituents thereof (Ross 
1967). This is demonstrated in (24) to (26) below. In the a-examples 
extraction occurs equally (i.e. ‘across the board’) and acceptability is 
retained, while in the b-examples extraction does not apply ‘across the board’ 
and unacceptability arises. 
 
(24) a. [Sturgeon eggs and truffles]1 I’ve tried t1 before, but foie gras I 
haven’t. 
 b.  * [Sturgeon eggs]1 I’ve tried t1 and truffles before, but foie gras I 
haven’t. 
 
(25) a. [Which country]1 do you hate the roads of t1 and the traffic of t1 
the most? 
 b.  * [Which country]1 do you hate the roads of t1 and the traffic of 
{it/that country} the most? 
 
(26) a.  It’s [England]1 that we hate the roads of t1 and the traffic of t1 
the most. 
 b. * It’s [England]1 that we hate the roads of t1 and the traffic of {it/ 
that country} the most. 
 
32 Appositions 
Extraction from appositions is constrained in precisely the same manner as 
regular coordination: it must occur across the board. This is illustrated in the 
examples below, which fit the same template as those in (24) to (26). 
 
(27) a.  [Sturgeon eggs, i.e. caviar]1, I’ve tried t1 before, but foie gras I 
haven’t. 
 b. * [Sturgeon eggs]1 I’ve tried t1, i.e. caviar, before, but foie gras I 
haven’t. 
 
(28) a.  [Which country]1 do you hate the motorways of t1, or as the 
Americans say the ‘highways’ of t1, the most? 
 b. * [Which country]1 do you hate the motorways of t1, or as the 
Americans say the ‘highways’ of {it/that country}, the most? 
 
(29) a.  It’s [England]1 that we hate the motorways of t1, or as the 
Americans say the ‘highways’ of t1, the most. 
 b. * It’s [England]1 that we hate the motorways of t1, or as the 
Americans say the ‘highways’ of {it/that country}, the most. 
 
To summarise: I have demonstrated in this subsection (§2.1.2) that 
appositions and their anchors display the same behaviour as conjuncts of 
regular coordination with respect to c-command. Like second conjuncts of 
regular coordination, appositions or subconstituents thereof can be bound 
by c-commanders such as negative polarity items, modals, sentential 
negation, and quantifiers. Also, extraction of an anchor or a subconstituent 
thereof is permitted only if an equally-sized constituent within an apposition 
(or the apposition itself) is extracted too, or vice versa. That this same 
constraint on extraction is observed with regular coordination provides 
further support for my claim that appositions are coordinated with their 
anchors. 
 
2.1.3 Morphological case 
 
Heringa (2011) provides a detailed overview of how morphological case is 
realised on nominal appositions and attributions (which he calls 
identificational and attributive appositions respectively) in a number of 
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languages, including Icelandic, Norwegian, English, German, Czech, 
Hungarian, Russian, and Japanese. 
 From the resulting data, which constitute his chapter six, he concludes 
that the case realised on nominal appositions is identical to the case realised 
on their anchors. I refer the reader to Heringa (2011:175-213) for examples.  
 The sentence in (30) provides an example from German (ibid.:178).  
 
(30) Ich habe mit unserem Chef, d. h. Herrn Müller, gesprochen. 
I have with our.DAT manager i.e. Mr.DAT Müller spoken. 
‘I spoke to our manager, i.e. Mr. Müller.’ 
 
This distribution of case is expected on an approach that treats anchors and 
their appositions as coordinated, as ceteris paribus conjuncts of regular 
coordination realise the same case, as (31) shows. 
 
(31) Ich habe mit Herrn Müller und Herrn Weber gesprochen. 
I have with Mr.DAT Müller and Mr.DAT  Weber spoken. 
‘I spoke to Mr. Müller and Mr. Weber.’ 
 
It is worth pointing out that Heringa’s conclusion extends from inflectional 
languages to agglutinative ones like Turkish, in which morphological case is 
an adphrasal (Klavans 1982) reflex of structural CASE alone. In (32) for 
example, the apposition karısı must display the same case as the anchor 
Havva, which is accusative. 
 
(32) Adem Havva-yı, yani karı-sı-{nı/*Ø}, düğün-de öp-me-di. 
Adem Havva-ACC i.e. wife-POSS-{ACC/NOM} wedding-LOC kiss-NEG-PST 
‘Adem did not kiss Havva, i.e. his wife, at the wedding.’ 
 
To summarise: the data presented in this subsection (§2.1.3) has illustrated 
that morphological case is realised on anchors and their appositions in the 
same manner that morphological case is realised on conjuncts of regular 
coordination. This further supports my equation of the two construction 
types. 
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2.1.4 Word order in Turkish 
 
The structure of Turkish appositions reflects that of English: the anchor 
precedes the apposition and fixed apposition markers, such as coordinators, 
precede the apposition.  
 
(33) Kuzen-ler-in,  (ve)  özellikle  Barış (*ve),  sen-in  
Cousin-PL-POSS   and  especially  Barış   and  you-GEN   
 
gel-me-n-i   ist-iyor. 
come-NM-POSS-ACC  want-PROG 
‘Your cousins, and especially Barış, want you to come.’ 
 
This word order is predicted on the current approach, as coordination is the 
only head-initial subclausal structure in Turkish (see Zwart 2005, 2009a, and 




Referential noun phrases trigger presuppositions that the entities denoted by 
them exist. Such presuppositions are hence existential. Existential 
presuppositions can often be plugged (Karttunen 1973). When this occurs, 
the entity denoted by the noun phrase in question is understood as existing 
in some person’s mental world or a hypothetical world, rather than existing 
in the actual world in which the conversation is set. 
 Noun phrases coordinated by and can be plugged, as the examples below 
show. In (34aB), mana and life-force can be understood as existing only in 
the minds of the cult members. In (34b), a de dicto reading is available for the 
noun phrases an Italian and a Spaniard, according to which Mary does not 
know the specific men that she wants to date simultaneously; she only knows 
that one should be Italian and the other should be Spanish. In (34c), the 
existence of Timon and Pumbaa is trapped inside the hypothetical world of 
their own christening, while in (34d) the professor and the actresses’ accrual 
of wealth occurs inside the world of their book’s publication. 
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(34) a. A: That cult believes some silly stuff. 
  B: I know! I heard they think that mana and life-force are in the air 
around us! 
 b.  Mary wants to date an Italian and a Spaniard simultaneously. 
 c.  If two children are christened Timon and Pumbaa and Disney 
Inc. finds out about it, they will sue Timon and Pumbaa’s 
parents. 
 d.  If a professor and a famous actress publish a book, they will 
make a lot of money. 
 
If anchors and appositions are coordinated as I claim, then two expectations 
arise. First, appositions should be plugged in all environments in which their 
anchors are plugged, and second, both anchors and appositions should be 
plugged in those environments in which regular conjuncts are usually 
plugged (such as those environments exemplified in 34). As the examples in 
(35) demonstrate, both expectations are met. In each example, the plugged 
reading observed for regular coordination in (34) is available for the anchor 
and apposition.11 
 
(35) a. A: That cult believes some silly stuff. 
  B: I know! I heard they think that mana, that is magical power, is 
in the air around us. 
 b.  Mary wants to date an Italian, that is a rich one. 
 c.  If a child is christened Bambi and Disney Inc. finds out about it, 
they will sue Bambi, that is the child,’s parents.  
 d.  If a professor, that is a famous one, publishes a book, he will 
make a lot of money. 
 
It is worth reminding ourselves at this point that presupposition projection 
and semantic scope are different phenomena. In (36a) for instance, Mr. 
Smith is within the scope of negation, while the existential presupposition 
that it triggers (there exists Mr. Smith) is not plugged by it. Appositions show 
identical behaviour to this, as (36b) illustrates. 
                                                     
11  Note that the examples in (35b-d) are modified from examples discussed in Wang et al. 2005 
(35b and 35d) and Geurts 1997 (35c). 
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(36) a. It’s false that Mr. Smith is now in prison for fraud. 
 b. It’s false that Mr. Smith, that is to say the Stock-Market Slasher, 
is now in prison for fraud. 
 
It seems to me that, since Potts (2005), there has been confusion in the 
literature about the presupposition projection behaviour of appositions (see 
Wang et al. 2005, Harris & Potts 2009, Nouwen 2014). This confusion has in 
part arisen from the fact that some appositive noun phrases are ambiguous 
between attributions (i.e. reduced parenthetical copular clauses) and true 
appositions. On their copular clause reading, copular clausal parentheticals 
are most often interpreted as unplugged, which is caused by the copula’s 
stativity (Asher & Lascarides 2003). As I have shown in this subsection, this 
unplugged reading is not inherent to appositive noun phrases, however: true 
appositions can be plugged. The presence of an apposition marker resolves 
any ambiguity, and disambiguates otherwise ambiguous appositives as 
appositions, as mentioned in §2.1.1. 
 To summarise: like regular coordinated noun phrases, anchors and their 
appositions can be interpreted as plugged in worlds that are not the actual 
world in which a conversation is set. That appositional constructions pattern 
with regularly coordinated noun phrases in this respect provides further 




In this subsection (§2.1.6), I discuss the prosody of appositions. For the sake 
of exposition I adopt the indirect access variant of the autosegmental-metrical 
approach to prosody, in which syntactic faithfulness constraints (MATCH, 
Selkirk 2011) compete with constraints on prosodic well-formedness. 
 According to MATCH and the coordination approach to appositions, 
subclausal appositions should be prosodically realised as phonological 
phrases (φs), as the operation MATCH PHRASE always matches subclausal 
constituents to φs. Conversely, clausal appositions, which I will discuss in 
detail in §2.2.1, should be realised as intonation phrases (ιs), as MATCH 
CLAUSE always matches clausal constituents to ιs.  
 To my knowledge, no quantitative studies on English exist to confirm or 
refute this prediction (and intuitions appear to vary to an unreliable extent). 
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However, this prediction has been partially confirmed by Güneş & Çöltekin 
(to appear), who investigate the prosody of subclausal appositions in 
Turkish. In particular, Güneş & Çöltekin investigate nominal appositions 
like (37), whose apposition marker is absent.  
 
(37) Emir-i,  yeğen-im-i, araba-yla oyun-a götür-üyor-lar.  
Emir-ACC  nephew-POSS-ACC car-INST play-DAT take-PROG-PL 
‘They are taking Emir, my nephew, to the play by car.’  (ibid.:7) 
 
They report that these appositions display prosodic excursions on their left 
and right edges that show greater similarity to the excursions observed on 
regular φs (such as host clause arguments) than those observed on regular ιs 
(such as the Turkish equivalent of attributions, which are known as ki-
clauses). Furthermore, Güneş & Çöltekin observe that excursions on nominal 
appositions’ left edges are less similar to φ-boundaries than those on their 
right edges. The authors propose that the stronger boundary observed on the 
left edge of nominal appositions is caused by a desire to establish prosodic 
separation between two alike elements (in this case, two coreferent 
elements), in order to satisfy Richards’ (2010) distinctness condition on 
linearisation, or some constraint similar to it. 
 While Güneş & Çöltekin neither compare the prosody of nominal 
appositions to that of regular second conjuncts nor investigate whether or 
not prosodic realisation differs if apposition markers are present, I treat their 
results as encouraging for the claim that appositions and their anchors are 
coordinated. If nominal appositions were actually remnants of clausal ellipsis 
as some analyses maintain (see §2.2.1), one would expect them to be 
intonated in the same manner as the host clauses in which they are 
contained: as ιs. That these appositions are realised as similar to φs casts a 
(small) shadow of doubt upon such analyses. 
 Of course further research is required before prosodic data can be 
considered as decisive in favour of one syntactic analysis of appositions or 
another. Whether or not Güneş & Çöltekin’s results for Turkish translate to 
English is unknown. It might be the case that their experiments are 
irreproducible for English, which, as an intonation language (unlike 
Turkish), displays a dissimilar sensitivity to prosodic constituency. While 
Truckenbrodt (2014:325) comments that subclausal appositions in German 
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do not display the ι-boundaries that they should if they were underlyingly 
clausal (or more particularly, assertoric) – which provides additional yet 
anecdotal evidence for the coordination approach to appositions – his 
conclusions are not derived from a quantitative study, and also there no is 
expectation that German prosody mirrors English prosody in this regard.12  
 To summarise: in this subsection (§2.1.7), I discussed the results of 
experiments carried out by Güneş & Çöltekin on Turkish parentheticals 
which hint towards the conclusion that subclausal appositions are intonated 
more like phonological phrases than intonational phrases – something that 
the coordination analysis of appositions partially predicts. Unexplained by 
the coordination analysis that I have presented is why, from an intuitive 
standpoint, subclausal appositions must be set-off from the utterance that 
surrounds them by prosodic boundary tones while regular subclausal second 
conjuncts are only optionally prosodically set-off in languages like English. 
Having excluded the possibility that subclausal appositions are underlyingly 
clausal (as they would be intonated as ιs if they were),13 I must conclude that 
prosody is sensitive to the pragmatic dissimilarities that pertain between 
subclausal appositions and regular subclausal second conjuncts (see §2.2.6 
for a discussion of these pragmatic dissimilarities). How this interaction 
between prosody and pragmatics can be captured in formal terms is unclear 
to me, however. (Note that Dehé 2014 contains some pertinent discussion on 
this topic.) 
  
                                                     
12  In intonation languages like English and German, appositions and their anchors can each bear 
sentential-like stress, as (i) shows (where small caps represents sentential-like stress). When one considers 
that more than one instance of sentential-like stress is observed elsewhere in utterances from these 
languages (for instance, in utterances that display multiple foci, as in iiB below), this fact about 
appositional constructions is unproblematic for my coordination analysis, which requires that multiple 
instances of sentential-like stress are permitted within a single assertion under certain circumstances. 
Thanks to Dennis Ott (p.c.) for drawing my attention to this issue. 
(i) JOHN, i.e. my BOSS, is a slave driver. 
(ii) A: Someone stole something. 
 B: Yeah, JOHN stole THE BOOK. 
13  Syntactic evidence that the subclausal appositions that were discussed in this section are not 
derived from underlying clauses is provided in §2.2.3. 
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2.1.7 Appositions as second conjuncts: a summary 
 
In this section (§2.1), I demonstrated that anchors and appositions display 
the same behaviour as final conjuncts of regular coordination with respect to 
semantic balance, c-command effects, the realisation of morphological case, 
word order, and how their existential presuppositions are resolved. Results 
from a prosody experiment undertaken on Turkish were also used to 
illustrate that subclausal appositions are intonated more like one would 
expect if they are syntactically subclausal in that language. 
 That regular coordination phrases and anchor/apposition phrases display 
the same behaviour follows naturally from my proposal that anchor/ 
apposition phrases display the same syntax as coordination phrases.  
 
2.2 Considerations for the coordination approach to appositions  
 
The data and arguments listed in §2.1 represent the ‘ideal’ form of my 
proposal that appositions are coordinated with their anchors. However, as 
with any dataset and theory based thereupon, the reality of the situation is 
more complicated. In this subsection (§2.2), I discuss a number of 
outstanding issues with appositions that went unmentioned in §2.1. 
 
2.2.1 Clausal appositions  
 
The ‘ideal’ form of my proposal that was expounded in §2.1 deliberately 
neglected the syntax of clausal appositions. Clausal appositions went 
unmentioned not because they weaken the coordination approach to 
appositions, but because they introduce a complicating factor, which is 
ellipsis. 
 The next four subsections (§2.2.1-2.2.4) aim to expiate this deliberate 
neglect. To provide a brief overview of these subsections: I first introduce the 
two classes of clausal apposition that are observed in English, which I call 
assertoric and vacuous. Because vacuous clausal appositions can host ellipsis 
while their assertoric counterparts cannot, assertoric appositions will be set 
aside. In §2.2.2, I introduce stripped vacuous clausal appositions, in which all 
but one constituent remains unpronounced (Hankamer & Sag 1979). A 
comparison of the examples in (38) provides a preview of what vacuous 
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clausal appositions look like (a proper introduction to both assertoric and 
vacuous clausal appositions immediately follows this overview), and 
illustrates the difference between the unstripped and stripped subtypes. 
 
(38) a. That he’s ill (that John’s ill) is worrying. (unstripped) 
b. That he’s ill, John, is worrying. (stripped) 
 
I then compare two approaches to stripping. For some, remnants survive 
ellipsis because they move above the ellipsis site (Merchant 2003). For others, 
remnants need not move to survive ellipsis (Morgan 1973). These two 
alternatives are schematised below (where strikethrough denotes ellipsis). 
 
(39) a. [remnant1 [ELLIPSIS SITE  W  X  t1 Y  Z]].  (sister ellipsis) 
b. [ELLIPSIS SITE  W  X  remnant  Y  Z].  (scattered ellipsis) 
 
On the assumption that extraction from within an elliptical clause is sensitive 
to islands,14 and remnants of clausal ellipsis are topicalised elements 
(Griffiths & Lipták 2014, Weir 2014), I will demonstrate that the sister ellipsis 
approach to stripping in (39a) is infeasible for stripped clausal appositions 
like (38b). Because no plausible contemporary formulation of the scattered 
ellipsis approach in (39b) exists (to my knowledge), I adopt it with 
trepidation, and describe some of the constraints that must be placed upon 
it. 
 At this juncture, the reader might wonder “are the appositions from §2.1 
derived from stripped vacuous clausal appositions like (38b), rather than 
‘low’ coordination structures?” In §2.2.3, I discuss the extent to which an 
analysis that claims that subclausal appositions are derived from their 
stripped clausal counterparts captures the relevant data. I will show that this 
‘clausal coordination plus ellipsis’ account is inferior to the ‘subclausal 
coordination’ approach to appositions that I outlined in §2.1. 
                                                     
14 An influential strand of research on ellipsis typified by Lasnik (2001) has suggested that ellipsis 
permits island obviation in structural environments where, if ellipsis did not occur, island sensitivity 
would be observed. However, the current research on ellipsis is now converging on the conservative 
hypothesis that ellipsis does not repair islands. For particularly convincing support along these lines, see 
Barros et al. (2014). For highlights of the debate on the purported reparative effect of ellipsis, see 
Merchant (2001, 2004, 2008), Fox & Lasnik (2003), and Griffiths & Lipták (2014). 
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 My overview of §2.2.1-2.2.4 complete, I now begin my discussion of 
clausal appositions in earnest by properly introducing the two main types: 
assertoric and vacuous. First, consider the assertoric clausal apposition in 
(40) below (see Meyer 1987 for additional examples and discussion). 
 
(40) Sam is a procrastinator, that is to say he evidently spends far too much 
time running pointless errands when he should be working. 
 
These appositions provide an alternative phrasing of the speech act that the 
anchor is used to commit. In such cases, the form of the apposition and its 
anchor is irrelevant. In addition to providing reformulations of their 
anchors, assertoric appositions can enter into rhetorical relations with their 
anchors. In the example in (40) for instance, the apposition provides both an 
alternative phrasing of the speech act for which the anchor is used (as Sam 
runs pointless errands and Sam is a procrastinator can be used to commit 
identical acts) and a reason for why Sam is a procrastinator (i.e. Sam is a 
procrastinator because he runs pointless errands). A similar function is 
observed in the example in (41), where both the anchor and the apposition 
describe the concept of being tremendously wealthy, and where the 
apposition can also be interpreted as a consequence of suddenly acquiring 
vast wealth.15 
 
(41) We’ve won the lottery, that is to say we fortunately needn’t worry 
about money anymore. 
 
Now consider clausal appositions that are not assertoric, such as those in 
(42), which reformulate their hosts in a repetitious and asinine manner. 
These appositions are used merely as ‘hosts’ for a relationship of equivalence 
that holds between two subclausal items (one in the anchor, the other in the 
apposition). Hereafter, I refer to these items as the correlate and the 
subapposition respectively. Prosodic prominence is observed on the 
                                                     
15  It should be noted that clausal appositions of this type can bear other illocutionary forces too, as 
the erotetic example procured from the internet in (i) below shows. I use assertions in the main text as 
exemplary cases. 
(i) What politicians have been the biggest "busts"? In other words, who failed to meet expectations 
the most? 
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subapposition, while the remainder of the apposition is deaccented. Even 
though the ‘true’ anchor in these cases is the entire first clause (i.e. Granny is 
dead in 42b), I reserve boldface for the correlate in these constructions. I also 
refrain from denoting with small caps the focal prominence that 
subappositions bear. (This is simply to avoid mark-up overkill.) 
 
(42) a. The Big Apple is a nice city; that is to say New York is a nice 
city. 
 b. Granny is dead; or rather Granny is now at peace. 
 c. John saw her yesterday; he saw his ex-wife yesterday, that is to 
say. 
 d. John spoke to a woman yesterday; he spoke to Mrs. Smith 
yesterday, to be precise. 
 
The licit use of markers like rather in these types of appositions highlights 
their function as reformulations of their anchors. Besides the item that bears 
focal prominence, the words used in such appositions are employed for their 
form alone. In terms of content, these appositions are vacuous with respect 
to illocutionary force.  
 Thus, it appears that the appositions in (42) are echoic phrases that 
merely repeat a precedent constituent but with minor deviations. Bearing 
this in mind, one expects that vacuous clausal appositions cannot ‘echo’ 
material that linearly follows them. This expectation is met, as the examples 
in (43) demonstrate. In (43a) for instance, the precedent material because 𝑥 
had been rude can be echoed in the apposition, but the successive constituent 
Pete was angry cannot. 
 
(43) a. Because she’d been rude – because the waitress had been rude 
(*Pete was angry) – Pete was angry. 
 b. That someone had to be fired – that the cleaner had to be fired 
(*is unfortunate) – is unfortunate. 
 
One also expects the converse situation to pertain, namely that vacuous 
clausal appositions must echo the entirety of their anchors. The examples in 
(44) show that this expectation is also met. In (44), for instance, the entire 
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clause John gave 𝑥 to Mary must be echoed. Merely echoing a portion of the 
anchor that contains the correlate is illicit. 
 
(44) John gave it to Mary, that is he gave the book *(to her). 
 
From the data in (43) and (44), the generalisation below arises: 
 
(45) Vacuous second conjuncts must display syntactic and semantic 
parallelism with the conjunct with which they are coordinated, modulo 
the deviation that pertains between subappositions and their 
correlates. 
 
To summarise: so far in my study of clausal appositions, I have divided 
clausal appositions into two types. Assertoric clausal appositions rephrase the 
assertive content of their anchors, and as such may display a different form 
and narrow semantic composition to their anchors. Conversely, vacuous 
clausal appositions are echoic in nature, and must conform to a parallelism 
requirement that their assertoric counterparts need not. 
 
2.2.2 Ellipsis in vacuous clausal appositions  
 
In the previous subsection, I discussed a subclass of clausal appositions that I 
called vacuous clausal appositions (see the examples in 42 to 44). As I already 
mentioned, these appositions are used merely as hosts for a relationship of 
equivalence that holds between the correlate and the subapposition. 
Correlates can be deictic expressions, specific indefinites, or conventional 
denotations. This is exemplified by the examples in (46) to (48) respectively. 
In these examples, I use sentential subjects and embedded interrogatives as 
anchors so that the reader is assured that clausal coordination occurs. I also 
enclose clausal appositions in brackets, as this is an orthographic strategy 
that is commonly employed in written English. Also, apposition markers are 
absent for brevity’s sake. 
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(46) a. That he was fired (that the cleaner was fired) is unfortunate. 
 b. That John’s been there (that he’s been to Oxford) surprises me. 
 c. Lucy wonders whether he ever tries to be that anymore 
(whether he ever tries to be romantic anymore). 
 
(47) a. That John saw something eerie (that he saw a ghost) is unlikely.  
 b. Bob asked if Lucy kissed a boy from her class (if she kissed Bill). 
 
(48) a. That the Big Apple is big (that New York is big) is unsurprising. 
 b. Amy asked me if Granny is now at peace (if she’s dead). 
 c. Bob wonders whether Brendan confusticates Swantje (whether 
he perplexes her). 
 
Vacuous clausal appositions display the same information structural division 
between discourse-old and discourse-new information that is observed in 
elliptical environments. As such, one expects that elliptical operations like 
verb phrase ellipsis are permitted in vacuous clausal appositions. This 
expectation is met: 
 
(49) a. That he’ll be fired (that the cleaner will) is unfortunate. 
 b. Bob asked if a certain someone was late (if Amanda was). 
 c. That the Big Apple is big (that New York is) is unsurprising. 
 
As mentioned in §2.2.1, one also expects that stripping, which “deletes 
everything in a clause under identity with corresponding parts of a preceding 
clause, except for one constituent” (Hankamer & Sag 1976:409), is permitted 
in vacuous clausal appositions. Again, this expectation is met, as the 
examples in (50) show. (In these examples, I have removed the brackets and 
underlining in the appositions so that a more conventional orthographic 
representation is obtained.) 
 
(50) a. That he was fired, the cleaner, is unfortunate. 
 b. Bob asked if a certain someone was late: Amanda. 
 c. That the Big Apple is expensive, New York, is unsurprising. 
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The utterances in (50a-b) have already been discussed the literature (see Ott 
& De Vries 2012 and references therein). The notion that these constructions 
are derived from clausal coordination (i.e. vacuous clausal appositions) plus 
ellipsis is encapsulated in the biclausal analysis, whose recent advocates are 
Ott & De Vries (2012) and De Vries (2013a).16  
 The abovementioned authors advance a biclausal analysis of the 
constructions in (50) in which the italicised elements (I call them remnants 
hereafter) survive ellipsis because they move above the ellipsis site: 
 
(51) [APPOSITION remnant1 [ELLIPSIS SITE  W  X  t1 Y  Z]].  (sister ellipsis) 
 
As I mentioned already, the schema in (51), which is repeated from the 
introductory part of §2.2.1, represents the sister ellipsis approach to clausal 
ellipsis. This ellipsis is structurally identical to that which Merchant (2004, 
2008) claims derives fragment answers such as (52B). 
 
(52) A: Who did Mary kiss? 
B: [John1 [she kissed t1]]. 
 
Griffiths & Lipták (2014), Weir (2014), and Griffiths (2015) maintain that 
fragments are remnants that are extracted to the same syntactic projection to 
which topicalised elements move in non-elliptical environments. As a root 
transformation (Emonds 1970), topicalisation is permitted only in root 
clauses, peripheral adverbial clauses (Haegeman 2012), and clausal 
complements of bridge verbs (Temmerman 2013, Griffiths 2015). 
Topicalisation is not permitted in strong islands such as sentential subjects 
and embedded interrogatives in English. For de Cuba (2007), these facts are 
linked: islandhood is caused by the absence of an elaborated left periphery 
(Rizzi 1997), which hosts topicalised elements. 
 If indeed topicalisation is banned inside islands, then Ott and De Vries’ 
analysis incorrectly predicts that examples like (50a) are unacceptable.17 This 
                                                     
16  While these authors do not discuss constructions like (50c) in the main text, I assume that each 
would advocate a biclausal analysis of them. 
17  Note that, in Ott & De Vries’ analyses, the constraint mentioned in the main text – namely, that 
the only landing-site available for remnants of clausal ellipsis is the syntactic projection that hosts 
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is because the remnant the cleaner must be ‘topicalised’ for ellipsis to be 
licensed, but topicalisation is disallowed because the apposition is a 
sentential subject and hence an island, as shown below (where the dashed arc 
denotes the ellipsis site): 
 




 &P VP 
 
 CPANCHOR &0 CPAPP is unfortunate 
 
 that he was fired the cleaner1 CP 
   
 that t1 was fired 
 
Note that this analysis cannot be rescued by proposing that the apposition is 
underlyingly complex, as in (54a), because such a suggestion contravenes the 
parallelism requirement from (45). Even if the parallelism requirement could 
be contravened, the topicalisation that is required to derive the elliptical 
clause in (54a) is illicit in non-elliptical environments, as (54b) demonstrates.  
 
(54) a. That he was fired, [the cleaner1 [that t1 was fired is 
unfortunate]], is unfortunate. 
 b. * The cleaner1 [ISLAND that t1 was fired] is unfortunate. 
 
A feasible alternative to sister ellipsis is to propose that remnants need not 
move to survive ellipsis: 
 
(55) [APPOSITION [ELLIPSIS SITE  W  X  remnant  Y  Z]].  (scattered ellipsis) 
 
As mentioned already, the schema in (55), which is repeated from the 
introductory part of §2.2.1, represents scattered ellipsis. If indeed it exists, 
                                                                                                                            
topicalised elements in non-elliptical environments – is not emplaced. Consequently, examples like (50a) 
in the main text are unproblematic for them. 
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then to my knowledge the syntactic licensing constraints upon this type of 
ellipsis are not fully formalised (though see Tancredi 1992 and Fernández 
2013 for discussion). Because I will later show that regular subclausal 
appositions are not derived from a biclausal structure, I need not explicate 
nor endorse a full-fledged theory of scattered deletion here: broad 
brushstrokes will suffice.18 
 To be charitable, I assume that the necessary conditions on licensing 
scattered deletion can be formulated and justified. In other words, I claim 
that all conceptual reasons for discarding scattered ellipsis outright are 
suppositious. For instance, advocates of the notion that ellipsis is licensed in 
the syntax might dismiss the feasibility of scattered ellipsis because it seems 
to target non-constituents. This is untrue. Whether minimal or maximal 
projections, [W], [X], [Y], and [Z] from the schema in (55) are each 
constituents ([Y Z] is an additional non-terminal constituent that is suitable 
for elision), and therefore each is a potential target for ellipsis. One might 
also claim that, to derive (55), at least three applications of ellipsis are 
required, which is uneconomical in comparison to the one application of 
ellipsis that is required on the sister ellipsis approach. This claim assumes 
that something called ‘ellipsis’ applies as a computational operation. One can 
reject this assumption. In its stead one might suggest that, included in the 
feature-bundles that comprise syntactic heads, is a feature (call it [+V]) that 
instructs the articulatory component of the grammar to superimpose onto it 
a pronounceable vocabulary item. The absence of [+V] in a feature bundle is 
‘ellipsis’ (see Carrera Hernández 2007 for a proposal that is similar to this). If 
this notion is correct, then the same number of [+V] features furnish a 
syntactic structure that is derived from sister or scattered ellipsis; this is the 
amount of [+V]s that is required to pronounce the (top copy of) the 
remnant. Resultantly, neither approach to ellipsis is conceptually more 
economical than the other.  
                                                     
18  Whether scattered deletion is comparable to dependent ellipsis (Williams 1997, Ackema & 
Szendrői 2002, Carrera Hernández 2007), according to which heads in second conjuncts (and heads of 
complements thereof) can remain unpronounced, is difficult to ascertain. Dependent ellipsis appears 
unsuitable for stripped clausal appositions, as it incorrectly predicts that the elision of subject determiners 
is possible (see Ackema & Szendrői 2002): 
(i) * He was hired yesterday, the boss was fired yesterday. 
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 While the conceptual reasons to favour sister ellipsis are unconvincing, 
empirical reasons to favour it might still be found. However, for the case of 
stripping in vacuous clausal appositions, these empirical advantages are 
unobserved. Indeed, the empirical observations discussed in (53) and (54) 
appear to disfavour sister ellipsis. In the upcoming paragraphs, I ignore sister 
ellipsis and instead describe (without properly formulating) the constraints 
that must apply to scattered ellipsis to ensure that it captures the behaviour 
of stripped vacuous clausal appositions.  
 Recall that the parallelism requirement from (45) requires that vacuous 
appositions must be as large as the anchor with which they are coordinated. 
This means that, underlyingly, the apposition in the example in (56) below 
must be as large as its entire host clause, regardless of whether or not elision 
occurs. 
 
(56)  That he was fired is a shame; that the cleaner was fired. 
 
 Underlying representation: 
 a. That he was fired is a shame; that the cleaner was fired is a 
shame. 
 b. * That he was fired is a shame; that the cleaner was fired. 
 
If examples like (56) are stripped, as in (57), unacceptability arises (see De 
Vries 2012 for similar constructions from Dutch).19 
 
(57) a. * That he was fired is a shame, the cleaner. 
 b. * Because a publisher liked his work, Pete was happy: Penguin. 
 
In order to account for the unacceptability of the examples in (57), a 
construction-specific constraint like (58) is required (a similar construction-
                                                     
19  The asterisk that accompanies (57a) is challenged by Jan-Wouter Zwart (p.c.), who deems (57a) 
acceptable. I must therefore note that the judgement reported for (57a) reflects Gundel’s (1988:133), with 
which I and the vast majority of my British English informants agree (though whether or not the results of 
an experiment with a sample size large enough to obtain statistical significance supports this judgement is 
another matter entirely). 
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specific constraint for stripping that utilises ‘[E]-features’ is introduced in 
Merchant 2003).20 
 
(58) Remnants of scattered ellipsis must be immediately contained in 
clauses that are conjuncts (where α is immediately contained in a 
clause β iff α is not contained in a clause γ that β embeds). 
 (to be modified) 
 
The constraint in (58) thus permits scattered ellipsis in vacuous clausal 
appositional constructions that fit the schema in (59a), but bans scattered 
deletion in those constructions that fit the schema in (59b). 
 
(59) a.  …[&P [CPANCHOR …] &0 [CPAPP …remnant…]]… 
b. * …[&P [CPANCHOR …] &0 [CPAPP …[CP …remnant…]…]]… 
 
When the correlate in constructions like those in (57) is contrastively 
focussed, these constructions become acceptable (cf. Ott & De Vries 2012, 
2014, and De Vries 2013a). This is shown in the b-examples in (60) and (61). 
Because their sets of alternatives is more easily retrieved from the context, I 
have used correlates that are conventional denotations (i.e. proper names) in 
these examples, rather than deictic expressions and specific indefinites. I 
allow the reader to confirm for herself that, once a suitable context is 
emplaced, contrastive focus saves with the same ease constructions that 
display deictic and indefinite correlates such as those in (57). 
 
                                                     
20  Mark de Vries (p.c.) suggests that, if one maintains that vacuous clausal appositions like those in 
(57) are derived by sister ellipsis, then the constraint advanced in (58) is unnecessary. This is because one 
can appeal to island-sensitivity to account for the unacceptability of utterances like those in (57). 
Specifically, one can say that (57a) (for instance) is unacceptable because it requires illicit extraction 
across an island boundary, as (i) below shows. 
(i) * That he was fired is a shame, [[the cleaner]1 [ISLAND that t1 was fired] is a shame].  
It seems to me that, even if the sister ellipsis approach to stripping in vacuous clausal appositions were 
feasible, the constraint in (58) would still be needed for an independent reason however, which is to 
account for the unacceptability of utterances like (ii), in which no island-violating extraction is observed 
on a sister ellipsis analysis like (iii). 
(ii) * I think he will like it here, I think Pete. 
(iii) * I think he will like it here, I think [Pete1 [t1 will like it here]]. 
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(60) a.  * That Bill was fired is a shame, the deputy manager. 
 
 A:  That Bob was fired is a shame, you say? 
 b. B:  No, that BILL was fired is a shame, THE DEPUTY MANAGER. 
  
(61) a.  *  Because Bob kissed Lucy, Pete’s jealous: my sister. 
 
  A:  Because Bob kissed Mary, Pete’s jealous, you say? 
 b. B:  No, because Bob kissed LUCY, Pete’s jealous – MY SISTER. 
 
That contrastive focus repairs these constructions is unexpected on the 
scattered ellipsis approach as currently conceived. Because of this, the 
constraint on scattered ellipsis in (58) must be modified to account for the 
reparative effect of contrastive focus: 
 
(62) Non-contrastively focussed remnants of scattered ellipsis must be 
immediately contained in clauses that are conjuncts (where α is 
immediately contained in a clause β iff α is not contained in a clause γ 
that β embeds). 
 (final version) 
  
I do not offer here any speculative remarks about how the constraint in (62) 
can be theoretically justified. Resultantly, (62) must remain as a mere 
description of a pattern of acceptability that is observed in stripped vacuous 
clausal appositions. 
 To summarise: in this section (§2.2.2), I discussed ellipsis in vacuous 
clausal appositions. I paid particular attention to stripped clausal appositions, 
in which only the subapposition is pronounced. I compared two analyses of 
how reduction is engendered. The first maintains that ellipsis is licensed only 
if the remnant of ellipsis (the subapposition) moves above the ellipsis site: 
this is the sister ellipsis approach. The second maintains that ellipsis can be 
licensed without the need for such movement: this is the scattered ellipsis 
approach. Because the sister ellipsis approach faces seemingly 
insurmountable problems, I favoured the scattered ellipsis approach to 
stripped clausal appositions, regardless of the absence of the necessary 
formal rigour to underpin it. As such, I will adopt it as a background 
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assumption in the next section (§2.2.3), where I explore the feasibility of 
treating subclausal appositions as a subclass of stripped vacuous clausal 
appositions. 
 
2.2.3 Subclausal appositions as stripped vacuous clausal appositions? 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction to §2.2.1, one may wonder whether 
subclausal appositions such as New York in (63a) are derived from stripped 
vacuous appositions such as (63b), whose underlying syntax is shown in 
(63c). In this subsection, I show that this idea cannot be correct. 
 
(63) a. The Big Apple, New York, is huge. 
 b. The Big Apple is huge, New York. 
 c. [&P [CP The Big Apple is huge] [CP New York is huge]]. 
 
If this line of analysis were correct, then stylistic reordering must derive (63a) 
from (63b). This operation, like other stylistic reordering operations 
(Sauerland 1998, Chomsky 2001a, Sauerland & Elbourne 2002, Embick & 
Noyer 2001, Göbbel 2007), reorders a phrase (in this case, is huge) 
rightwards without semantic repercussions and often in violation of Ross’ 
1967:185 right roof constraint, as (64) demonstrates, where ‘Ω’ represents the 
reordered element’s base position. 
 
(64) Before reordering: 
[&P [CP The Big Apple is huge] [CP New York is huge]]. 
 
After reordering: 
[&P [CP The Big Apple Ω1] [CP New York is huge]] [is huge]1. 
 
This ‘clausal’ coordination analysis of appositions captures many of the 
properties I utilised in §2.1 to support my ‘low’ coordination analysis of 
appositions. In §2.1.1, I used the observation that semantic balance must 
pertain between appositions and their anchors (see the examples below that 
are modified from 3) to support the notion that appositions and their 
anchors are directly coordinated. 
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(65) a. All campanologists, all bell ringers, dream of ringing at St. 
Paul’s.  
 b. Every unmarried man in the room, every bachelor, is here for a 
date.  
 
On the clausal coordination analysis, the fact that semantic balance pertains 
between appositions and their anchors is accidental, and arises from the fact 
that subappositions and their correlates occupy identical positions in their 
respective clauses: 
 
(66) a. [&P [CP All campanologists Ω1], [CP all bell ringers dream of 
ringing at St. Paul’s]], [dream of ringing at St. Paul’s]1. 
 b. [&P [CP Every unmarried man in the room Ω1], [CP every 
bachelor is here for a date]], [is here for a date]1. 
 
In §2.1.2, I demonstrated that appositions can be bound by c-commanding 
binders (see the examples below, which are repeated from 20 to 23). I 
considered these data as evidence for my ‘low’ coordination approach, as 
second conjuncts of regular coordination can be c-commanded into, too. 
 
(67) a. Paul hasn’t received penny-one, anything, from his bank. 
 b. Lucy might visit the Big Apple, New York, in September. 
 c. Pete can’t touch his nest egg, his trust fund, until he is twenty 
five. 
 d. Every competitor on the cookery TV programme was told that 
his entry, his jam roly-poly with custard, was too stodgy. 
 
The clausal coordination approach would also account for the data in (67) in 
a straightforward manner. On this analysis, appositions like anything in 
(67a) are bound by unpronounced instances of their binders within elliptical 
clauses, as (68) shows. Resultantly, anything is not c-commanded by the 
pronounced token of negation in the host clause after all. 
 
(68) [&P [CP Paul hasn’t received penny-one Ω1], [Paul hasn’t received 
anything from his bank]], [from his bank]1. 
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The same argument seems to apply to the extraction data from (28), which 
are repeated in a modified form in (69) below. In §2.1.2, I utilised the 
observation that only ‘across the board’ extraction of appositions (or 
subconstituents thereof) is licit to support my claim that appositions and 
their anchors are coordinated in a low fashion. 
 
(69) a.  Which country do you hate the motorways of, or the ‘highways’ 
of, the most? 
 b. * Which country do you hate the motorways of, or the ‘highways’ 
of {it/that country}, the most? 
 
According to the clausal coordination approach however, the parallelism 
constraint from (45) gives the impression that ‘across the board’ extraction is 
permitted in appositional constructions. In (69a), wh-movement occurs 
separately in two independent clauses:21 
 
(70) [&P [CP [Which country]1 d’you hate the motorways of t1 Ω2], or [CP 
[which country]3 d’you hate the ‘highways’ of t3 the most]], [the most]2? 
 
Thus, (69b) is unacceptable because the anchor and the vacuous clausal 
apposition are not parallel. As (71) demonstrates, the anchor is a wh-
question, while the apposition is a declarative clause. 
 
(71) * [&P [CP [Which country]1 do you hate the motorways of t1 Ω2], or  
[CP [you hate the ‘highways’ of {it / that country} the most]], [the 
most]2? 
 
Each of the other connectivity effects (Merchant 2001) that were used to 
support the low coordination analysis of appositions in §2.1 receives an 
explanation on the clausal coordination approach that is the same as the 
explanation provided above to explain the observations that appositions can 
be c-commanded and extracted from. This includes the fact that appositions 
receive the same case as their anchors, the fact that appositions are plugged 
                                                     
21  Many thanks to Dennis Ott (p.c.) for bringing my attention to the possibility of (70) in the main 
text. 
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in the same intensional environments as their anchors, and the fact that 
appositions are introduced by a left-branching head (i.e. a coordinator) in 
head-final languages like Turkish. 
 However, while the clausal coordination analysis can capture many of the 
properties displayed by subclausal appositions, the strict similarities between 
subclausal appositions and stripped clausal appositions that it predicts to 
pertain are not observed. To see proof of this, let us first consider the 
constructions in (72). 
 
(72) a. The chief, or main, problem is the military. 
b. Bren confusticates, i.e. perplexes, Swantje. 
c. The wind blows abaft, or behind, the boat. 
 
On the clausal coordination analysis, the examples in (72) are structurally 
identical to the unacceptable constructions in (73) modulo the reordering 
operation that brings the purported subapposition adjacent to its correlate.22 
 
(73) a.  * The chief problem is the military, or main. 
b. * Bren confusticates Swantje, i.e. perplexes.  
c. * The wind blows abaft the boat, or behind. 
 
The difference in acceptability between the examples in (72) and (73) is 
unexpected on the clausal coordination account. To account for this 
discrepancy, an advocate of the clausal coordination analysis must claim that 
reordering feeds ellipsis. In other words, she must claim that the ellipsis that 
derives the examples in (72) is licensed only when a reordering operation 
brings the clausal apposition adjacent to its correlate: 
 
(74) Ellipsis licensed: 
[&P [CP Bren confusticates Ω1], [CP Bren perplexes Swantje]], [Swantje]1. 
 
Ellipsis not licensed: 
[&P [CP Bren confusticates Swantje], [CP Bren perplexes Swantje]]. 
                                                     
22  Note that the examples in (73) in the main text are unacceptable regardless of whether the 
italicised elements are contrastively focussed or not.  
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However, it appears that the converse holds in other environments; that 
reordering bleeds ellipsis. In constructions like (75) for instance, the presence 
of the preposition contained within the apposition is mandatory: 
 
(75) Which country do you hate the motorways of, or rather the ‘highways’ 
*(of ), the most? 
 
Interestingly, ofl’s absence is strongly preferred in regular stripped clausal 
appositions, as (76) demonstrates.23 Thus, it seems that ellipsis of of is 
licensed only if reordering does not occur. 
 
(76)  Which country do you hate the motorways of the most; or rather the 
‘highways’ (??of )? 
 
Although theories of feeding and bleeding could be fashioned so that the 
clausal coordination analysis of subclausal appositions can be maintained, 
the hypothesis that low coordination derives subclausal appositions while 
clausal coordination derives stripped clausal appositions is more 
parsimonious on this occasion. On this more parsimonious hypothesis, the 
examples in (73) are unacceptable simply because attributive adjectives, 
transitive verbs, and prepositions never make for suitable remnants of 
ellipsis (as the fragment answers in 77 to 79 illustrate). Conversely, the 
examples in (72) are acceptable because subclausal constituents of any type 
can be coordinated, provided that semantic balance pertains. The mandatory 
presence of of in (75) can be explained in exactly the same manner. 
 
(77) A: I heard that our least-pressing problem is the military. 
B: * No, main. 
 
(78) A:  I’ve been told that Brendan combobulates Swantje. 
B: * No, confusticates. 
                                                     
23  For my British English informants, the presence of of in constructions like (76) in the main text 
creates unacceptability in cross-speaker environments: 
(i) A: Which country do you hate the motorways of the most? 
 B: You mean the ‘highways’ (*of ), right?  
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(79) A:  The captain reckons that the wind blows astern the boat. 
B: * No, abaft. 
 
The clausal coordination approach also predicts that a strict correspondence 
pertains between regular subclausal appositions and stripped clausal 
appositions with respect to the elision of prepositions in languages like 
German. As is well-known, German disallows the elision of prepositions in 
clausal ellipsis environments if the preposition’s noun phrase complement 
displays the same case as its correlate in the antecedent clause (Merchant 
2001, 2004): 
 
(80) Sie hat mit jemandem geredet, aber ich weiß nicht *(mit) wem. 
She has with someone.DAT spoken, but I know not    with who.DAT 
‘She has spoken with someone, but I don’t know who.’ 
 
If both subclausal appositions and stripped clausal appositions were derived 
from clausal ellipsis, then the same constraint observed in (80) should apply 
to them. While prepositions cannot be omitted in stripped clausal 
appositions, as the example in (81) that is modified from Ott & De Vries 
(2012:129) shows, they can be omitted in subclausal appositions, as (82) 
demonstrates (82 is based on an example from Döring 2014:132, who judges 
such constructions as slightly degraded). 
 
(81) Ich habe den ganzen Tag auf ihn gewartet, *(auf) den Ad. 
I have the whole day for him.DAT waited,   for the.DAT Ad. 
‘I waited for him the whole day, for Ad.’ 
 
(82) Peter hat mit jemandem, (mit) einem Jamaikaner, gesprochen. 
 Peter has with someone.DAT  with a.DAT Jamaican.DAT spoke 
 ‘Peter spoke with someone, a Jamaican.’ 
 
The fact that the preposition can be omitted in the subclausal apposition 
example in (82) but not in the stripped clausal apposition example in (81) is 
difficult to account for if one adopts the notion that both constructions 
involve clausal ellipsis. This discrepancy is straightforwardly explained on 
the current approach however: (82) does not involve clausal ellipsis. Rather, 
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it involves low coordination of either preposition phrases (in the case where 
the preposition is present in the apposition) or noun phrases (in the case 
where the preposition is absent from the apposition). 
 In addition to incorrectly predicting that strict similarities pertain 
between subclausal and stripped clausal appositions, the clausal coordination 
approach requires that reordering renders ellipsis obligatory. In (83a), in 
which no reordering occurs, ellipsis is optional, while in (83b) reordering 
occurs and ellipsis becomes obligatory.24 
 
(83) a. That John’s been fired, (that) my brother (has been fired), is sad. 
 b. That John, (that) my brother (*has been fired),’s been fired is 
sad. 
 
Again, an advocate of clausal coordination can claim that stylistic reordering 
bleeds optional ellipsis in constructions like (83b). However, when one 
considers that stripping is an optional process in all other environments, 
such a claim must be met with suspicion. Coupled with the fact that a 
simpler analysis is available (namely, that subclausal appositions are derived 
from ‘WYSIWYG’ low coordination), the clausal coordination analysis of 
appositions must be rejected.   
 At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that a somewhat different 
biclausal analysis of appositions can be pursued that does not involve clausal 
coordination. This analysis maintains that, regardless of whether they arise 
adjacent to their anchors or at the edge of the clauses that contain their 
anchors, appositions are the remnants of stripped clauses that are 
syntactically unconnected to their host clauses. On such an analysis, the 
examples in (84) display the syntax in (85), where no coordination is 
observed. 
 
                                                     
24  The fact that that can be retained in (83b) in the main text demonstrates that right node raising is 
possible in vacuous clausal appositions. Thus, in (i) below, been fired is shared by both that John has and 
that my brother has. Although the possibility of right node raising greatly increases the number of possible 
surface permutations for sentences that contain vacuous clausal appositions, it does not impact upon 
analyses of how stripped vacuous clausal appositions are formed. Because of this, I will ignore them 
hereafter. 
(i) [That John has, that my brother has, been fired] is sad. 
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(84) a. Mary visited the Big Apple, New York, at Easter. 
 b. Mary visited the Big Apple at Easter, New York. 
 
(85) a. Mary visited the Big Apple, [CP Mary visited New York], at 
Easter. 
 b. Mary visited the Big Apple at Easter, [CP Mary visited New 
York]. 
 
This is an orphanage analysis (cf. Döring 2014, Ott 2014a, b). It maintains 
that the host utterance (i.e. Mary visited the Big Apple at Easter in 85a) is 
constructed in complete isolation to the elliptical clause (i.e. Mary visited 
New York in 85a). According to this approach, the precedence relations that 
persist between Apple and the unpronounced token of Mary in (85a) are not 
established in syntax. Rather, they are established when the host and the 
elliptical clauses (orphan clauses) are articulated. 
 For the moment, let us assume that orphanage is conceptually desirable. 
This is a charitable assumption: in §6.2 I show that, in reality, adoption of the 
orphanage approach to parentheticals requires adoption of a number of 
unorthodox assumptions. In the remainder of this subsection, my objective 
is simply to illustrate that the orphanage analysis exemplified by (85) is, like 
clausal coordination analysis, inferior to the low coordination approach to 
appositions that was advanced in §2.1. 
 With respect to connectivity effects, the orphanage analysis is identical to 
the clausal coordination analysis. As such, the clausal coordination and 
orphanage analyses capture equally well the behaviour of appositions with 
respect to semantic balance, c-command and extraction, morphological case 
matching, presupposition projection, and the distribution of reflexives. In 
one respect the orphanage analysis is favoured over the clausal coordination 
analysis, as its advocates need not make recourse to a nebulous ‘stylistic 
reordering’ operation to ensure that appositions can appear adjacent to their 
anchors. Rather, a pragmatic condition (see Ott 2014a, b) dictates that 
orphaned elliptical clauses can only interpolate into their hosts either 
adjacent to their anchors, or at the edge of the clauses that immediately 
contain their anchors. 
 The main issue with this biclausal orphanage analysis of appositions is 
that it requires that ellipsis is sometimes optional, sometimes partly optional 
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and partly obligatory, and sometimes obligatory. To see this, first consider 
the example in (86) below. 
 
(86) Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, this candidate. 
 
The derivation for (86) cannot be (87a-b) on the orphanage account, as 
independent clauses cannot be introduced by complementisers like whether. 
(The sister ellipsis derivation in 87a, which is utilised by Döring 2014, is 
illicit for another reason: it requires topicalisation in a clause that does not 
permit it.) 
 
(87) Sister ellipsis 
a. * Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [CP this candidate1 
[whether t1 is the right choice]]. 
 
Scattered ellipsis 
b. * Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [CP whether this 
candidate is the right choice]. 
 
Bearing this in mind, one might entertain the notion that the correct 
derivation for (86) is (88), where the elliptical clause is a root clause: 
 
(88) Sister ellipsis 
a. Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [CP this candidate1 
[t1 is the right choice]]. 
 
Scattered ellipsis 
b. Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [CP this candidate is 
the right choice]. 
 
Problematically, the root clause sources in (88) provide incorrect 
interpretations. The derivations in (88) are equivalent in meaning to (89a), 
while the construction in (86) is actually interpreted as equivalent to (89b). 
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(89) a. Lucy wonders whether [this candidate]i is the right choice. Hei 
is the right choice. 
 b. Lucy wonders whether [this candidate]i is the right choice. She 
wonders whether hei is the right choice. 
  
If one relinquishes the idea that syntactic isomorphism must pertain between 
the host clause and the elliptical clause (contrary to the parallelism 
requirement in 45), then the elliptical clause could perhaps be copular 
clausal: 
 
(90) Sister ellipsis 
a. Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [this candidate1 
[{he/it} is t1]]. 
 
Scattered ellipsis 
b. Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [{he/it} is this 
candidate]. 
 
However, such constructions are not only nonsensical if ellipsis does not 
occur (as the example in 91 shows), but they incorrectly predict that the 
appositions in the constructions exemplified by (86) are always assigned 
predicate case. While this claim cannot be tested in English, the fact that 
Turkish appositional constructions that are structurally similar to the 
example in (86) must be assigned a non-predicate case (i.e. not nominative 
case) provides evidence that the claim is false (see 92, where Ayşe’s 
pregnancy exists in Ali’s mental world alone). 
 
(91) * Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice; {he/it} is this 
candidate. 
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(92) Ali Ayşe-nin Can-dan hamile ol-duğ-u-nu san-iyor,  
Ali Ayşe-GEN Can-ABL pregnant be-NM-POSS-ACC think-PROG 
 
yani  kendi öz kardeş-i-{nden/*Ø}. 
LINK  REFL own sibling-POSS-{ABL/NOM} 
‘Ali thinks that Can got Ayşe pregnant, his own brother.’ 
 
Resultantly, it appears that orphaned elliptical clauses must always be full-
fledged. In other words, the elliptical clause in the derivation of (86) must be 
the complex clause observed in (93) on the orphanage approach. Because 
extraction of the remnant crosses an island boundary in such derivations (as 
93a shows), only the scattered ellipsis approach to reduction is feasible in 
such constructions (i.e. only the derivation in 93b is feasible). 
 
(93) Sister ellipsis 
a. * Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [CP this candidate1 
[Lucy wonders [ISLAND whether t1 is the right choice]]. 
 
Scattered ellipsis 
b. Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [CP Lucy wonders 
[ISLAND whether this candidate is the right choice]. 
 
As the reader can confirm, the derivation in (93b) is acceptable (albeit 
redundant) when ellipsis does not occur. The same cannot be said for the 
derivation that the orphanage approach to appositions dictates underlies the 
construction in (94a) however, which is (94b). As (94b) shows, ellipsis 
appears to be partly optional and partly obligatory in such examples; had to 
be fired is optionally elided, while is unfortunate is obligatorily elided. 
 
(94) a. That someone had to be fired (the cleaner) is unfortunate. 
 b. That someone had to be fired [[(that) the cleaner (had to be 
fired)] (*is unfortunate)] is unfortunate. 
 
In the variation upon (94a) that is provided in (95a), ellipsis is no longer 
partly optional. Rather, it is obligatory, as (95b) shows. 
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(95) a. That someone (the cleaner) had to be fired is unfortunate. 
 b. That someone [[(that) the cleaner (*had to be fired)] (*is 
unfortunate)] had to be fired is unfortunate. 
 
To my knowledge, no form of clausal ellipsis is fully optional (93b), partly 
optional and partly obligatory (94b), and fully obligatory (95b) depending 
upon the linear position of the elliptical clause. While interpolated yet 
unconnected elliptical clauses might prove to be an exception to this rule, the 
most parsimonious conclusion to draw from the data in (93) to (95) is that 
the biclausal orphanage approach is infeasible because it places ad hoc 
constraints on ellipsis. A simpler analysis is this: those appositions that arise 
on the right edges of clauses that contain their anchors are remnants of 
stripped vacuous clausal appositions (where stripping is created by scattered 
ellipsis), while those appositions that arise adjacent to their anchors are 
directly coordinated with their anchors in a low, WYSIWYG fashion. 
  
2.2.4 Clausal appositions: a summary 
 
In §2.2.1 to §2.2.3, I discussed clausal appositions. I paid particular attention 
to vacuous clausal appositions, in which ellipsis can be licensed. I 
demonstrated that stripped vacuous clausal appositions are best understood 
as derived from scattered (rather than sister) ellipsis. I also explored the 
feasibility of the idea that subclausal appositions of the type that were 
analysed in §2.1 are derived from stripped clausal appositions, and 
concluded that this idea is infeasible. The same conclusion was reached 
about the biclausal orphanage approach to appositions, which utilises 
‘biclausal plus ellipsis’ syntactic derivations in a similar manner to the 
‘clausal coordination’ analysis of subclausal appositions. Ultimately, the 
discussion in §2.2.1 to §2.2.3 served to emphasise that, while the existence of 
clausal appositions muddy the low coordination analysis of subclausal 
appositions presented in §2.1, the low coordination analysis remains 
superior to its biclausal competitors.25 
                                                     
25 It should be noted that the vacuity observed in the vacuous clausal appositions that were the 
focus of the previous three subsections is not restricted to them. In reality, vacuity can be seen in second 
conjuncts of all types, as (i) and (ii) exemplify. This lack of restriction is expected, as there is no reason 
that echoicity should be reserved for clauses alone. 
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2.2.5 Appositions and epistemic and evaluative adverbs 
 
In the ‘ideal’ form of my coordination analysis of appositions advanced in 
§2.1, I outlined a way to delimit structurally ambiguous appositive noun 
phrases as appositions (rather than attributions) that involved adding 
elements to the appositive noun phrase to force a ‘reformulative’ 
interpretation. More specifically, I claimed that the presence of apposition 
markers in appositive noun phrases disambiguates them as appositions. This 
claim was encapsulated in the diagnostic from (16) in §2.1, which is repeated 
in (96) below. 
 
(96) Where α is the appositive noun phrase: 
If α can host an apposition marker, then α is an apposition. Otherwise, 
α is an attribution. 
 
While I provided a way to disambiguate ambiguous appositive noun phrases 
as appositions by introducing new elements, I did not provide a way to 
disambiguate such appositive noun phrases as attributions by introducing 
new elements. This oversight was not accidental. Other scholars have 
suggested that the presence of epistemic and evaluative adverbs in appositive 
noun phrases disambiguates them as attributions (Cardoso & De Vries 
2010:18, Heringa 2011). In this subsection, I aim to show that, contrary to 
these authors’ claim, epistemic and evaluative adverbs such as probably and 
unfortunately do not provide a straightforward means of delimitation after 
all.  
 The reasoning behind using epistemic and evaluative adverbs to delimit 
appositive noun phrases as attributions runs as follows. Appositions that 
look subclausal on the surface actually are subclausal underneath (see §2.1), 
while attributions that look subclausal on the surface are actually remnants 
                                                                                                                            
(i) That the boss fired her – fired Mary, that is to say – was completely unexpected. 
(ii) That John has ignored her – has ignored Mary – is impolite.  
Thus, vacuous clausal appositions are a subclass of vacuous appositions more generally (or vappositions, 
to coin a term), as I mentioned in chapter one. I focussed on clausal ‘vappositions’ in §2.2.1 to §2.2.3 
because contemporaneous scholars – whose conclusions I sought to question – have been concerned with 
only them. While their existence helps to strengthen coordination analyses of appositions, a deeper 
investigation into subclausal ‘vappositions’ must be left for future research. 
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of elliptical copular clauses (as per their definiens). Epistemic and evaluative 
adverbs select for propositions, and as such can only modify appositive noun 
phrases that are underlyingly clausal. Because attributions but not subclausal 
appositions are underlyingly clausal, the presence of epistemic or evaluative 
adverbs delimits appositive noun phrases as attributions. 
 While this method of delimitation works as a ‘rule of thumb’, 
complicating factors make it unreliable as decisive means of disambiguation. 
The first complicating factor is that epistemic adverbs do not always modify 
clauses; they can modify definite and indefinite noun phrases in an ‘in-situ’ 
manner (Bogal-Allbritten 2013). In other words, the adverbs possibly, 
perhaps, and probably do not scope over the entire sentence in utterances like 
those in (97). Rather, these adverbs only scope over the noun phrases that 
they immediately precede.26 
 
(97) a. Mate ate possibly the most expensive pizza in Amherst. 
 b. Mary drank perhaps {an/the} American bourbon. 
 c. Mary is meeting with probably a nurse practitioner. 
  (Bogal-Allbritten 2013:51) 
 
To ensure that the output of their concatenation with epistemic adverbs is 
semantically well-formed, Bogal-Allbritten claims that these noun phrases 
are type-shifted to intensional properties. However, their syntactic category 
remains constant (i.e. these noun phrases remain DPs). If epistemic adverbs 
can indeed modify noun phrases in this manner, then they cannot be 
employed to delimit definite and specific indefinite appositive noun phrases 
as attributions. This is because the presence of such adverbs is not necessarily 
indicative of underlying clausal structure. The epistemic adverb could be 
                                                     
26  Heringa (2011:99-101) dismisses the idea that epistemic adverbs can modify noun phrases ‘in-
situ’. He claims that, even when they are observed adjacent to noun phrases, epistemic adverbs always 
modify tensed clauses in which such noun phrases are contained. To support this claim, Heringa argues 
that epistemic adverbs cannot appear adjacent to noun phrases in small clauses, which are tenseless: 
(i) * They considered [his death probably a suicide]. (Heringa 2011:99) 
While it is indeed unacceptable with broad-focus, the example in (i) is acceptable for me if narrow focus is 
observed on a suicide. Thus, the interpretation of (i) is (roughly) ‘they considered his death something, 
and that something is probably a suicide’. The examples from Bogal-Allbritten (2013) in the main text are 
interpreted similarly. 
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either be (i) modifying a type-shifted noun phrase (i.e. an apposition, as in 
98a), or (ii) modifying an underlying clause (i.e. an attribution, as in 98b). 
 
(98) a. [&P [DP Someone,] [DP probably [DP Pete]]], has been fired. 
 b. [DP [DP Someone,] [ForceP it was probably Pete]], has been fired. 
 
In English and Turkish, it appears that the option exemplified by (98a) is 
never utilised. In both languages, definite and specific indefinite appositive 
noun phrases cannot host apposition markers and epistemic adverbs 
simultaneously, as the examples from English in (99) verify.27 
 
(99) a. * London, in other words allegedly the capital of England, is a 
filthy city. 
 b. * A masked man, i.e. probably Pete, kissed Miranda at the party. 
 c. * A rose, or evidently a perennial of the genus Rosa, is a symbol for 
romance. 
  
In Turkish, appositive noun phrases cannot simultaneously host epistemic 
adverbs and display the same case as their non-subject anchors. Such 
appositive noun phrases must display nominative case, as (100) shows. This 
indicates that the appositive noun phrase in (100) is a predicate nominal (as 
predicate nominals in Turkish display nominative case) and hence an 
attribution. 
 
                                                     
27 Pavel Rudnev (p.c.) observes that an example like (99a) in the main text is acceptable if the 
epistemic adverb allegedly is intonated with longer-than-usual boundary pauses (as indicated 
orthographically with brackets in (i) below). 
(i) London, in other words the capital of England (allegedly!), is a filthy city. 
In (i), the adverb comments upon the consequences of using the apposition (i.e. ‘it’s only an allegation 
that another name for London is the capital of England’). Thus, one must distinguish between the 
conventional use of epistemic adverbs (as in 99a in the main text), and the metalinguistic use (as in (i) 
above). In the remainder of this subsection, I ignore this metalinguistic use of epistemic and evaluative 
adverbs, and concentrate solely on their conventional use.  
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(100) Memet Aylin-i, muhtemelen Ali-nin karı-sı-{Ø/*nı},   




‘Memet took Aylin, probably Ali’s wife, to the cinema.’ 
 
If the derivation exemplified by (98a) were an option for English and 
Turkish, then the asterisked cases in (99) would be acceptable. That they are 
unacceptable suggests that the schema exemplified by (98a) is banned. 
Future research must determine whether or not (and why, if so) the 
derivation exemplified by (98a) is universally illegitimate. For now, I will 
maintain a cautious stance that epistemic adverbs should not be used to 
delimit definite and specific indefinite appositive noun phrases as 
attributions cross-linguistically. 
 Stripped vacuous clausal appositions also create additional complications 
for the idea that epistemic and evaluative adverbs can be used to delimit 
ambiguous appositive noun phrases as attributions.  
 As I already mentioned in §2.2.1, vacuous clausal appositions such as 
(101) are echoic in nature. 
 
(101) John saw Mary yesterday; he saw his ex-wife yesterday, that is to say. 
 
Like echoic clauses such as the protasis in (102B), these appositions can host 
semantically vacuous epistemic and evaluative adverbs, provided that they 
‘echo’ epistemic and evaluative adverbs that are exhibited in an antecedent 
clause (compare 103a and 103b). 
 
(102) A: Howard’s probably sick. 
 B: Well if [ECHO Howard’s probably sick], then you’ve gotta do his 
job for him! 
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(103) a. John unfortunately saw Mary yesterday; he unfortunately saw 
his ex-wife yesterday, that is to say. 
 b. John saw Mary yesterday; he (*unfortunately) saw his ex-wife 
yesterday, that is to say. 
 
For me and my British English informants, the stripped counterpart of 
(103a) is unacceptable if the epistemic adverb survives ellipsis (where the 
appositive is interpreted as John unfortunately saw his ex-wife, not she is 
unfortunately his ex-wife): 
 
(104) * John unfortunately saw Mary yesterday; unfortunately his ex-wife. 
 
The unacceptability of (104) shows that, as a discourse-old item, the token of 
unfortunately that is displayed in the apposition in (104) must undergo 
stripping (the same requirement holds for Turkish). Note that this differs 
from cases of stripping in regular coordination environments, in which 
discourse-new non-echoic epistemic and evaluative adverbs can survive 
ellipsis, as (105) shows (Merchant 2003). 
 
(105) Abby speaks passable Dutch, and {probably/possibly/fortunately} Ben 
speaks passable Dutch, too. 
 
The fact that echoic epistemic and evaluative adverbs cannot survive 
stripping in English and Turkish clausal appositions might not pertain cross-
linguistically; the constraints on stripping in clausal appositions in other 
languages might be less stringent, and hence might permit discourse-old 
epistemic and evaluative adverbs to survive stripping. Once again taking a 
cautious stance, I suggest that the fact that epistemic and evaluative adverbs 
might in some languages survive ellipsis in clausal appositions makes their 
use as delimiters of attributions unreliable. 
 On a more positive note, the presence of temporal adverbs in appositive 
noun phrases can straightforwardly delimit such noun phrases as 
attributions (Quirk et al. 1972, O’Connor 2007, Heringa 2011, Döring 2014): 
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(106) a. Ben, then my housemate, would always forget to wash up.  
b. Frank, once a footballer, retired when he injured his knee. 
c. Karl, now my nemesis, stole my ideas. 
 
The reasoning behind the use of temporal adverbs to delimit appositive noun 
phrases as attributions is the same as before. Because attributions are 
remnants of elliptical clauses while appositions are subclausal, the presence 
of temporal adverbs delimits attributions because such adverbs only modify 
tensed clauses. Beyond the fact that the presence of temporal adverbs forces 
‘predicate nominal’ interpretations of the italicised noun phrases in (106), 
evidence that temporal adverbs cannot modify appositions comes from the 
observation that apposition markers and temporal adverbs cannot co-
occur:28 
 
(107) a. * Sally, that is to say then John’s wife, moved to London in 2005. 
 b. * Obama, i.e. now the president of the USA, is an ineffectual 
leader. 
 
The observations in (106) and (107) therefore give rise to an additional 
diagnostic: 
 
(108) Where α is the appositive noun phrase: 
If α can host a temporal adverb, then α is an attribution. Otherwise, α 
is an apposition. 
 
It should be noted here that Acuña-Fariña (2000) claims that temporal 
markers (and other adverbs that expose underlyingly clausal structure) and 
                                                     
28  Mark de Vries (p.c.) suggests that subordinators (Heringa 2011:103) such as whether and 
(al)though could also be utilised to delimit ambiguous appositive noun phrases as attributions (cf. 
O’Connor 2008). While the addition of subordinators certainly exposes underlying clausal structure 
(compare (i) to (ii)), the resulting clausal structure is not, strictly speaking, one from which an attribution 
can be derived. This is because attributions are derived from and-parentheticals like (iii) (or so I argue in 
next chapter). 
 (i) A second-year student, a sophomore, knows more about linguistics than some third-year 
students.  
(ii) A second-year student, although a sophomore, knows more about linguistics … 
(iii) A second-year student, (and she is) a sophomore, knows more about linguistics … 
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apposition markers can co-occur in appositive constructions. The examples 
he provides as evidence are listed in (109) below. 
 
(109) a. Maureen, {that is to say/you know} (basically) a timid girl, 
stood up and expressed her opinions rather fiercely, I would say. 
 b. The president, that is to say currently Bill Clinton, is the 
commander in chief of the armed forces. 
 
For me and my informants, the example in (109b) is unacceptable, while the 
example in (109a) is acceptable only when the purported apposition marker 
is you know. I suggest that you know (and similar phrases like I mean) also 
function as fillers, and are interpreted as such in utterances like (109a). If this 
is true then Acuña-Fariña’s (2000) contention that apposition markers fail to 
sufficiently delimit ‘true’ appositions from disparate appositive constructions 
is unwarranted. When the marker in question is controlled for – that is to 
say, when the marker cannot perform an additional function aside from 
reformulation – the generalisation in (96) withstands empirical scrutiny. 
 To summarise: in this section (§2.2.4), I resumed the discussion from §2.1 
about how to delimit structurally ambiguous appositive noun phrases as 
either appositions or attributions. I discussed Cardoso & De Vries’ (2010) 
and Heringa’s (2011) suggestion that the presence of epistemic and 
evaluative adverbs delimits appositive noun phrases as attributions, and 
showed that complicating factors, such as the observation that epistemic 
adverbs can modify nouns and that epistemic and evaluative adverbs can 
survive stripping, make this diagnostic of attributionhood unreliable. 
 
2.2.6 The function of appositions, and hyponymy 
 
Each of the appositions discussed in §2.1 exemplify the reformulative 
(Blakemore 1993, 1996, 2007) function of appositions. As already seen, these 
appositions – of which (110) is a member – provide an alternative and often 
more informative ‘name’ for the element that their anchor denotes. Recall 
also from §2.1.1 that the element for which the apposition provides an 
alternative ‘name’ need not bear an atomic semantic type (i.e. e or t), as 
transitive verbs and adjectives, which bear the complex semantic types 〈e, 〈e, 
t〉〉 and 〈e, t〉 respectively, can be rechristened too. 
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(110) The Big Apple, or New York, is a huge city. 
 
Not mentioned in §2.1 is the fact that appositions are often able to ‘identify’ 
nominal anchors. This is illustrated in (111). Here, the speaker has two 
specific Shakespeare plays in mind, and the apposition serves to inform her 
interlocutor(s) of which plays they are.29 
 
(111) Two Shakespeare plays, (*or) Hamlet and Macbeth, are being 
performed at the Globe this week. 
 
Unlike in (110), the apposition marker or cannot be used to introduce those 
appositions exemplified by (111). This suggests that an interpretative 
difference pertains between reformulation and identification. The difference 
seems intuitive enough: the Big Apple in (110) is maximally informative from 
a conventional perspective, while two Shakespeare plays is not. In other 
words, if the hearer knows the conventional meaning of the Big Apple (i.e. 
that it conventionally denotes the USA’s most populous city), the addition of 
the apposition New York is pragmatically redundant. Conversely, an 
alternative conventional denotation of the set two Shakespeare plays in (111) 
is not Hamlet and Macbeth: only contextual knowledge that the hearer 
possesses renders the apposition in (111) redundant (such an occasion would 
arise if the hearer already knows the schedule for the Globe theatre that 
week). Thus, while both appositions serve to aid the hearer’s association of 
the anchor with its intended signifié (to use Saussure’s term), reformulative 
appositions are used when the speaker assumes that the hearer has a lack of 
conventional knowledge, while identificational appositions are used when 
the speaker assumes that the hearer has a lack of contextual knowledge. 
 Beyond reformulation and identification, it appears that relations of 
hyponymy can be expressed with (non-)nominal appositions too (Heringa 
2011). This is illustrated in the examples in (112) below. 
 
                                                     
29  McCawley’s (1998:468) oft-cited example in (i) is another example of an identificational 
appositional construction. 
(i) A recent winner of the Illinois State Lottery, (namely) Albert Swenson, has announced that he 
plans to move to Bermuda. 
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(112) a. The soldier tortured, {and/but} in particular waterboarded, his 
captive. 
 b. Pete uses red, {and/but} especially crimson, paint in his artwork. 
 
The appositions in (112) are instances of what Quirk et al. (1985) call 
particularisation. In such cases, the apposition is a hyponym of the concept 
denoted by its anchor. In other words, the appositions in (112) spell out the 
fact that waterboarding is a method of torture, and that crimson is a shade of 
red. 
 It is worth pointing out here that some ‘particularising’ appositions 
appear to affect the truth conditions of their host sentence, while others do 
not. In the examples in (112), the truth conditions of the host clause appear 
to be affected by the appositions’ presence. If the apposition were absent in 
(112a), the sentence would be true if the soldier applied other techniques of 
torture aside from waterboarding. However when the apposition is present, 
waterboarding must have been used. Conversely, in the example in (113), the 
apposition’s presence does not seem to affect the host clause’s truth 
conditions. Rather, the apposition merely spells out an implicature that was 
already present (as Cameron, as a politician, is a member of the set all 
politicians). 
 
(113) All politicians, {and/but} especially Cameron, are crooks. 
 
As mentioned in the introductory paragraph of §2.1, I claim that pragmatic 
factors are responsible for the unusual interpretation of coordinators in 
appositional constructions, following Burton-Roberts (1993) and Blakemore 
(2007). The coordinator or provides a useful example case. In cases of regular 
coordination such as (114), or receives an exclusive interpretation, while in 
appositional constructions like (110), or receives a free choice interpretation 
(i.e. while both the names the Big Apple and New York must be associated 
with the place that is a huge city, it does not matter which of these names is 
utilised in the explicature of 110). 
 
(114) They will hire John or Pete.  
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The exclusive reading of (114) is often attributed to how scalar implicatures 
are computed (Horn 1972, Gazdar 1979). On the assumption that or in (114) 
is the logical connective ⋁, a scalar implicature of (114) is (115), which is 
logically ‘stronger’ than (114).  
 
(115) They will hire John and Pete. 
 
Because, on Gricean reasoning, the hearer will assume that the speaker 
would have said (115) if that is what she meant (roughly speaking), (115) is 
removed from the possible interpretations of (114). Consequently, only an 
exclusive interpretation of or in (114) remains. 
 Similar Gricean reasoning extends to the coordinator that is observed in 
appositions like (110). If understood as involving the regular coordination of 
extensions, (110) either creates a logical contradiction or provides redundant 
information. More specifically, contradiction arises if (116a) is true and 
(116b) is false, or redundancy occurs if both (116a) and (116b) are true or 
false.  
 
(116) a. [The Big Apple]i is a huge city. 
 b. [New York]i is a huge city 
 
Because cooperative speakers should be informative, one infers that 
appositional constructions therefore involve the coordination of names for 
extensions, rather than extensions themselves. On this interpretation, 
redundancy again arises if or is understood as exclusive, as the truth value of 
a construction like (110) remains unaltered regardless of whether the Big 
Apple or New York is employed as the name for the extension of the entity 
that occupies (110)’s subject position. Thus, the utterance in (110) is only 
informative if or is interpreted as inclusive. From this, the free choice 
interpretation of or in (110) arises (cf. Levy & Potts 2015). 
 A similar explanation can be invoked for the coordinators observed in 
instances of particularisation such as (112). I suggest that the emphatic 
interpretation of such constructions is caused by the fact that, as examples of 
regular coordination, these utterances involve redundancy. Thus, one infers 
from this redundancy that an emphatic ancillary message is conveyed. 
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 If one of the functions of appositions is the conveyance of relations of 
hyponymy, one might wonder if the sentences displayed in (117) also 
contain appositions. 
 
(117) a. My family, excluding my grandmother, are expatriating to 
Rome. 
 b. I think that all rodents, including all rats, should be 
exterminated. 
 
Syntactic evidence suggests that the italicised strings in these constructions 
merely replicate the function of appositions: they are not ‘true’ appositions 
after all. To see this, let us consider how the constructions in (117) distribute 
with respect to ‘across the board’ extraction. 
 In §2.1.2, I utilised the observation that only across the board extraction 
of appositions (or subconstituents thereof) is licit to support my claim that 
appositions and their anchors are coordinated in a low fashion: 
  
(118) Which country do you hate the motorways of, or as the Americans 
say the ‘highways’ of  (*{it / that county}), the most? 
 
As (118) shows, particularisation constructions pattern identically to their 
reformulative counterparts with respect to across the board extraction, as 
(119) shows. This fact supports my claim that particularisation constructions 
are indeed appositions. 
 
(119) Which country do you hate the roads of, but especially the motorways  
of (*{it / that county}), the most? 
 
However, the inclusive/exclusive phrases from (117) pattern dissimilarly 
with respect to across the board extraction, as illustrated in (120) below. 
Here, phrases like it or that country, which appear to resume the wh-phrase 
which country, are optional. 
 
(120)  Which country do you hate the roads of t1, including the motorways  
of ({it / that county}), the most? 
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This observation indicates that the gap displayed in (120) is parasitic (Ross 
1967) on the wh-extraction in the host clause. The fact that optional parasitic 
gaps are often observed in adjuncts (see 121) suggests that the phrases 
introduced by including and excluding in the preceding examples are actually 
adjuncts rather than true appositions. 
 
(121) a. Which memo did you burn without reading (it)? 
 b. Which starter did you order after you tried (it)? 
 
Before I conclude this subsection (§2.3.1), I wish to note that hyponymous 
appositions can be utilised to provide additional support for my claim that 
appositions are directly coordinated with their anchors. This evidence 
concerns recoverability under ellipsis.   
 In (122a), the ellipsis site, which is represented by Δ, is interpreted as 
enjoy the company of friends especially Brendan, while in (122b) the deictic 
element the same is understood as coreferent with talk about ethics 
particularly free will. This shows that appositions are recoverable under 
ellipsis. 
 
(122) a. For the last few days Alice has enjoyed the company of my 
friends, especially Brendan, and I think that today she will Δ 
too. 
 b. Professor Jones talked about ethics, particularly free will, for a 
long time last night, and I bet that he’ll do the same tonight too. 
 
The need to recover the apposition can create incoherence. This is seen in 
(123). Here, Brendan cannot be writing songs with the band, because he is 
part of the band. 
 
(123) # Pete has been writing songs with the band, particularly Brendan, 
and Brendan has too. 
 
This behaviour is predicted on my coordination analysis of appositions, as 
no information about the second conjunct is lost under ellipsis or 
coreference in regular coordination: 
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(124) a. Jo met Bill and Ben, and Frank did Δ too. (= met Bill and Ben) 
 b. Jo wants tea and jam, and Pete wants the same. (= tea and jam) 
 
To summarise: in this section (§2.2.6), I suggested that pragmatic factors are 
responsible for the differing interpretative functions of regular and 
appositional coordinators such as or. I also showed that appositionhood 
extends beyond reformulation and identification (i.e. synonymy) to 
constructions that exemplify their anchors. However, I warned that 
appositionhood should not be extended to adjuncts that are introduced by 
including or excluding, as such phrases fail to pattern like paradigmatic 
appositions with respect to ‘across the board’ extraction.  
 
2.3 Concluding remarks on appositions 
 
In §2.1 of this chapter, I advanced the idea that appositions (and not 
attributions) are directly coordinated with their anchors. I used 
distributional, syntactic, and basic semantic evidence to support this claim. If 
my analysis is correct, then appositions are not parentheticals in any real 
sense, unless one wishes to call the second conjuncts of regular coordination 
as such. The prosodic results available at the current time also hint towards 
this conclusion, and suggest that appositions are intonated differently to 
their regular coordination counterparts because appositions and their 
anchors share a referent, while regular conjuncts do not. 
 In §2.2, I discussed a number of disparate phenomena that serve to 
complicate (and thus potentially weaken) my claim that appositions and 
their anchors are coordinated. The majority of §2.2 was concerned with 
clausal appositions and the ellipsis operations that can be licensed therein. I 
discussed how the stripping that is observed in certain clausal appositions 
should be characterised, and assessed the claim – which competes with the 
claim from §2.1 – that regular subclausal appositions are actually 
constituents of clausal appositions in which ellipsis occurs. I concluded that 
this ‘clausal ellipsis’ analysis is inferior to the analysis advanced in §2.1. The 
final parts of §2.2 (namely, §2.2.5 and §2.2.6) were devoted to ‘miscellanea’ 
that are relevant to the study of appositions more generally. In §2.2.5 I 
showed that epistemic and evaluative adverbs make for unreliable delimiters 
of attributions, while in §2.2.6 I proposed that the coordinators observed in 
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appositions are different from the coordinators seen in regular coordination 
in terms of their pragmatics alone (Burton-Roberts 1993, Blakemore 2007). 
This latter conclusion leads to the characterisation of apposition as a 
syntactic exaptation of coordination. 
  3 
Attributions 
The focus of this chapter is finite copulative parenthetical clauses (a 
subset of Kavalova’s 2007 and-parentheticals) in which only the 
postcopular phrase is pronounced. I call these reduced parenthetical 
clauses attributions. In §3.1, I introduce attributions and highlight the 
fact that, because they have two possible sources, which are predicative 
– ‘(John is) a doctor’ – and truncated cleft – ‘(It was) Pete’ – copular 
clauses, attributions can be non-referential or referential. In §3.2, I 
outline my syntactic analysis of attributions, which treats their source 
clauses as Force phrases that freely adjoin to their host, and which 
explicates the means by which the functional elements (i.e. the subject, 
auxiliaries, the copula) in these clauses are rendered unpronounced. In 
§3.3, I introduce means by which attributions can be delimited from 
similar-looking but ultimately dissimilar appositives. In §3.4-3.5, I 
provide evidence for the analysis of attributions outlined in §3.2.  
3.1 Introductory remarks 
 
The focus of this chapter is parenthetical clauses whose core is either (i) a 
predicational copular clause whose subject is a pronoun or (ii) a truncated 
cleft copula clause.  
 
(1) He is a nice guy. (predicational) 
(2) It’s Pete. (truncated cleft) 
  
In predicational copular clauses, the subject denotes an entity and the 
postcopular item denotes a property. In truncated clefts, the subject denotes 
a property and the postcopular item denotes an entity (Mikkelsen 2005). In 
regular definite descriptions such as (3a), the predicate noun (man) is 
provided by regular vocabulary insertion. In the case of pronouns like it in 
(2), the predicate noun is retrieved via coreference with a salient property 
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contained within the surrounding discourse (Cooper 1979). As a 
consequence, the predicate noun phrase is not vocabulary-inserted and is 
therefore phonologically unrealised, as (3b) shows. The absence of a 
phonologically realised predicate noun phrase results in the determiner 
being realised as it rather than the (Elbourne 2001, and ultimately Postal 
1966). In truncated clefts, the DP in (3b) is type-shifted to a unary predicate 
by Partee’s (1987) IDENT operator. 
 
(3) a. DP b. DP 
 ι𝑥[man(𝑥)] ι𝑥[Ri(𝑥)] 
 
 
 D0 NP D0 NP 
 the man it Ø 
 λPι𝑥[P(𝑥)] λ𝑦[man(𝑦)] λPι𝑥[P(𝑥)] λ𝑦[Ri(𝑦)] 
 
Parenthetical versions of (1) and (2), and various permutations thereon, are 
commonplace, as the examples in (4) and (5) illustrate. Provided pragmatic 
coherence is obtained, these interpolations may occupy any position within 
their host that does not split up major prosodic constituents like verb, 
preposition, and noun phrases (these positions are called niches in Ross 
1984). In each case, the precopular item is coreferent with an element 
contained within the host. Extending the terminology used in chapter one 
and two, I call this host element the anchor. For predicational parenthetical 
clauses the anchor must be definite, while for their truncated cleft 
counterparts the anchor must be specific indefinite or a generic definite 
individual concept such as the winner of the tournament. For both cases 
linkers like and can introduce the parenthetical (I let the reader confirm that 
this is true for the examples in 4 and 5). 
 
(4) Predicational 
a. Ben ((I think) he’s a nice guy) has baked us a cake. 
b. Ben has ((I think) he’s a nice guy) baked us a cake. 
 
c. Ben ({is he / d’you think he’s} a nice guy?) has baked a cake. 
d. Ben has ({is he / d’you think he’s} a nice guy?)  baked a cake. 
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e. Ben (please tell me he’s a nice guy!) has baked us a cake. 
f. Ben has (please tell me he’s a nice guy!) baked us a cake. 
 
(5) Truncated cleft 
a. A masked man ((I think) it was Pete) has kissed Miranda. 
b. A masked man has ((I think) it was Pete)) kissed Miranda. 
 
c. Someone ({was it / do you think it was} Bo?) has eaten the cake. 
d. Someone has ({was it / do you think it was} Bo?) eaten the cake. 
 
e. A masked man (please tell me it was Pete!) has kissed Miranda. 
f. A masked man has (please tell me it was Pete!) kissed Miranda. 
 
Turkish does not exhibit a pronominal counterpart of the truncated cleft 
pronoun observed in the English examples above. Instead, it displays a 
demonstrative phrase that is identical to Elbourne’s (2005) underlying 
schema for English pronouns, which is usually dropped, as (6) illustrates. 
Thus, the only difference between the examples in (4) and (5) and their 
Turkish counterparts is the absence of a pronoun in the truncated cleft cases. 
Note that the Turkish linker for finite parenthetical clauses is invariably the 
morpheme ki, which is optionally realised (Griffiths & Güneş 2014). 
 
(6) Maske-li  bir  adam  Merve-yi  (ki  bence  (maske  giy-en   
Mask-COM a  man  Merve-ACC   LINK  for.me   mask  wear-NM  
 
bu adam) Ali-y-di) parti-de  öp-tü. 
this man Ali-COP-PST party-LOC  kiss-PST 
‘A man with a mask on (I think (the mask-wearing man) was Ali) 
kissed Merve at the party.’ 
 
Now consider the examples in (7) below. Because of their proximity to their 
anchors and because their anchors are noun phrases, one might at first 
glance consider the parentheticals in these examples to be appositions, i.e. 
phrases that are directly coordinated with their anchors (see chapter two). 
 
80 Attributions 
(7) a. Ben, a nice guy, baked me a cake. 
b. Pete, someone that always drinks too much, is a Town Planner. 
c. Someone, Pete, keeps leaving the door open. 
 
Contrary to this first blush consideration, I claim that these parentheticals 
are copular clauses like (1) and (2) that are reduced down to their 
postcopular items.30 This claim is a specific variant of the more general 
proposal that certain appositives are underlyingly copular clausal, which is 
pursued in various guises by Motsch (1966), Klein (1976), Molitor (1979), 
Heringa (2011), Döring (2014), Ott (2014a,b), and others. 
 
(8) a. Ben, he is a nice guy, baked a cake. 
b. Pete, he is someone that always drinks too much, is a lawyer. 
c. Someone, it is Pete, keeps leaving the door open. 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, I call the items that survive reduction in the 
examples in (8) attributions. In the remainder of the current chapter, I 
formalise and provide evidence for my claim that the appositive elements in 
(7) are indeed postcopular items of parenthetical copular clauses.  
 
3.2 A theory of attributions 
 
The theory of parenthetical copular clauses that I pursue treats them as Force 
phrases that adjoin within their host clauses (cf. Arnold 2007, Koev 2013). To 
adequately explain what this means, I must first discuss the gap that 
separates the creation and utilisation of complex linguistic objects, and how 
Force phrases can bridge it. 
 Syntactic theory in a post-Chomskyan (1995) vein assumes the inverted 
Y-model of grammar. On this view, a concatenation operation called MERGE 
creates two-membered sets from tokens of lexical items or two-membered 
sets thereof. The module of grammar in which MERGE applies is syntax. 
MERGE proceeds stepwise. The product of successive applications of MERGE 
at any juncture in derivational time is a structured set that I will call a tree 
                                                     
30  In Turkish, the copula suffixes to what its equivalent in English is the postcopular element. I 
continue to use postcopular to describe this element, even though it is, in terms of linearity, immediately 
precopular in Turkish. 
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(see 9a). If trees are clauses, verb phrases (i.e. vPs), referential noun phrases 
(i.e. DPs), or preposition phrases then they are phases (Abels 2012, following 
Chomsky 2001a), as (9b) shows. Phases are passed for assessment of their 
well-formedness to the syntax’s interfaces with the sound and meaning 
modules. If well-formed they are either reused in the syntax as atoms, or are 
ejected from the computational module altogether (Zwart 2009b, 2011).31 I 
refer to ejected trees or phases as roots. Roots are utilised in conversation to 
perform illocutionary acts (Austin 1962).32 
  
(9) a. At derivational time t1: 
 A ∘ B = C C 
   A tree 
 (where ∘ = MERGE) A B 
 
b. At derivational time t+1: 
 A ∘ B = C  DP 
 C ∘ D = DP   
  D C A tree that  
    is a phase 
  A B 
  
If ‘roothood’ were the necessary and sufficient condition for the utilisation of 
a tree as an illocutionary act, one need not postulate that trees bear a 
syntactic feature that instructs the grammar to use them as such: roothood 
itself would provide this instruction. This view accords with the intuitive 
notion that roots are underspecified for their use. After all, it seems that 
declarative sentences like this dog bites can be used as assertions, warnings, 
admissions, and so on, depending upon the circumstances (Alston 1964). 
                                                     
31  To be precise, Zwart’s (2009b, 2011) system uses derivational layers, which for our purposes are 
equivalent to phases (though see Zwart’s work for discussion of their dissimilarities). 
32  Note that the description in the main text does not demand that roots are phases. Assertoric acts 
must be truth-evaluable, and hence propositional, but opinions differ with regards to whether 
propositions must be syntactically clausal (or indeed phasal to any extent). This difference of opinion is 
especially evident in the literature on ellipsis, as Merchant’s (2013) overview makes clear. With respect to 
non-assertoric acts such as ouch!, hurray!, and the lucky fucker (when used as an exclamative epithet, see 
the example below) the necessity for phasal syntax is even less apparent. 
(i) John, the lucky fucker, got a decent job without even trying. 
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 But if roothood is a necessary but insufficient condition for the utilisation 
of a tree as an act, one must maintain that trees bear a syntactic feature that 
instructs the grammar to use them as such. Koev (2013) and Krifka (2001, 
2014) claim that this instruction is encoded as a syntactic feature that is 
generated as the head of a Force phrase (Rizzi 1997). The semantic module 
treats Force0 as a predicate such as ASSERT, DEMAND, QUESTION, etc. that 
takes a denotational meaning as its argument (Potts 2005, 2007, Maier 2014, 
and ultimately Searle 1969). Because all roots are topped by Force phrases, 
roothood and eligibility for utilisation as an act are causally unrelated. This 
view accords with the notion that underspecification for force is illusory, as 
speakers always intend to use the tree that they create for a specific act (if this 
intention were absent, why would the tree be built in the first place?). 
  Because there are occasions when acts are used as arguments in semantic 
composition, the hypothesis that illocutionary force is syntactically encoded 
has greater empirical reach than the hypothesis that roothood equates with 
illocutionary force. Krifka (2001), for instance, shows that acts can be 
quantified over (see 10). Because quantifiers may syntactically dominate the 
quantified act, this requires that acts can be dominated. Thus, acts cannot 
always be derived from roots. 
 
(10) a. I hereby promise you to do everything you want me to. 
Possible interpretation: for everything 𝑥 you want me to do, I 
hereby promise you to do 𝑥. 
 
 b. What did every guest bring to the party? 
  Possible interpretation: for every guest 𝑥, what did 𝑥 bring to the 
party? 
 
A critic of the notion that force is syntactically encoded could attempt to 
account for the embeddability of acts by arguing that ‘phasehood’ is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the utilisation of a tree as an act. 
However, because not all phases bear illocutionary force, a syntactic means 
by which to distinguish those phases that bear force from those that do not is 
independently needed. 
 Although it incorrectly predicts the nonexistence of embedded acts, the 
‘root’ analysis of acts straightforwardly accounts for the observation that 
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variables contained within one act are outside of the scope of quantifiers 
contained within another (see 11): self-containment arises because acts do 
not share a syntactic connexion.33  
 
(11) # [Every dog]i came in. Iti was a Dachshund. 
 
To capture self-containment, analyses that invoke illocutionary force 
operators like ASSERT must posit that ASSERT prevents the establishment of 
syntactic and hence compositional semantic dependencies across it. This is 
implemented by maintaining that all relevant lexical material within ASSERT’s 
syntactic scope is relativised to it (Koev 2013), as (12) demonstrates. 
(Sub/superscripts denote to which operator items are relativised in the 
examples below).  
 
(12)  ForceP 
 
 ASSERTp TP 
 
 αp βp 
 
Operators such as negation are also relativised to ASSERT if within ASSERT’s 
syntactic scope. In these cases, elements that are bound by the operator are 
relativised to ASSERT indirectly. This is illustrated in (13), where α is bound 
by the operator (as shown by the presence of the subscripted ‘q’ on each), 
and the operator is relativised to ASSERT (as shown by the superscripted ‘p’). 
 
(13)  ForceP 
 
 ASSERTp TP 
 
 Oppq 
 αq β 
 
                                                     
33  In exceptional cases, such as modal subordination and telescoping, the scope of a quantifier can 
extend across more than one act. See Roberts (1987) for details. 
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While acts themselves can be quantified over, the relativisation of operators 
and bindable elements to illocutionary force operators results in the self-
containment of Force phrases. This semantic isolation arises because 
elements dominated by one ASSERT (or DEMAND, or QUESTION, etc.) cannot 
be relativised to a structurally higher one. In (14), β cannot be bound by 
either DEMAND or the ‘op’ in Force1P, as ASSERT intervenes.   
 
(14)  Force1P 
 
 DEMANDp TP 
 
 Oppq 
 Force2P γq 
 
 ASSERTr TP 
 
 α βr 
 
To recapitulate, because illocutionary acts participate in narrow semantic 
composition, which itself requires syntactic hierarchy, the claim that roots 
alone can be utilised as acts cannot be upheld, as certain acts can be 
dominated. This requires that the potential to bear illocutionary force must 
be ascribed to a property of trees other than their root status. For Koev and 
Krifka, this property is the exhibition of an illocutionary force predicate such 
as ASSERT. It seems to me that, in lieu of an alternative means by which to 
instruct the grammar that certain trees can be used to commit acts while 
others cannot, all syntactic theories based on Chomsky’s Y-model must 
postulate the existence of such predicates (or some similar functional 
element) to encode illocutionary force, as an appeal to phases alone is 
insufficient.34 
                                                     
34   Since Hooper & Thompson (1973), an embedded clause’s ability to host main clause phenomena 
such as topicalised phrases has often been linked to its assertoric status (see Heycock 2006 for an 
overview). In the system advocated in this subsection, the assertoric status of such embedded clauses must 
be caused by the presence of Force0. However, unlike with parenthetical adjuncts, which are opaque to c-
command (see (i); for detailed discussion of this opacity, see §3.5.1), relations that depend upon c-
command can be established across matrix/assertoric embedded clause boundaries, as (ii) shows. 
(i) * [ForceP1 [Every climber]i, [ForceP2 hei is an experienced explorer], was found sipping cocoa at home]. 
(ii)  [ForceP1 [Every climber]i thinks [ForceP2 this afternoon hei should have aimed for the summit]]. 
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 Following on from the above discussion, Krifka (2001) claims that the 
conjunction of alike acts is equivalent to their consecutive performance. This 
implies that act-initial coordinators are semantically vacuous. If they were 
not, they would be redundant, as they would encode a semantic operation 
that occurs in their absence. Their vacuity is evidenced by their optionality, 
as (15) demonstrates.35 
 
(15) Pete drank a beer. (And) Brendan drank a whisky. 
 
I take this vacuity as instructive, and claim that act-initial coordinators are 
discourse particles that are optionally generated as specifiers of Force 
phrases, as (16) illustrates. 
 
(16)   ForceP 
 
 (and)  
 ASSERTp TP 
    
  … 
 
The claim I made at the beginning of this subsection (§3.2), that 
parenthetical copular clauses are Force phrasal adjuncts, should now make 
sense. Because they are topped by a Force phrase, elements that are 
contained within parenthetical copular clauses cannot be bound by external 
operators, as this would require the head and tail of a dependency chain to be 
relativised to dissimilar force predicates. Because they are adjuncts, 
parenthetical copular clauses are not selected for by any host clause items.  
                                                                                                                            
To account for this dissimilarity with respect to opacity, I tentatively propose that the embedded ASSERT 
predicate in (ii) is relativised to the matrix ASSERT predicate. In other words, they display the same 
superscript: 
(iii)  [ForceP1 ASSERTp Every climber thinks [ForceP2 ASSERTp this afternoon … ]] 
The parasitism on ForceP2 that ForceP1 displays in (iii) arises in part because, without ForceP2’s 
presence, ForceP1 would be incomplete (think would be missing an object). This parasitism is not 
observed in (i) because the grammaticality of ForceP1 is not dependent upon ForceP2.  
35  The fact that act-initial coordinators like and, but and for are semantically vacuous does not 
imply that they are useless. Such coordinators encode rhetorical relations such as CONTRAST (Asher and 
Lascarides 2003) that link items across the discourse.   
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 Many regular adjuncts inhabit a fixed position within the clause to which 
they adjoin. Constraints operative on semantic composition demand that 
this position be fixed (cf. Ernst 2002). If it were not, meaningful utterances 
could not be produced. This is illustrated with formulae from predicate logic 
in the toy examples in (17). Because thin can combine with man in (17a), it 
provides a suitable input for the determiner. Resultantly, acceptability for the 
entire utterance is ensured. In (17b) however, the output of thin’s 
concatenation with the determiner phrase cannot compose with the verb 
phrase met Mary, and therefore unacceptability is observed. 
 
(17) a. The thin man met Mary. 
 
 met(ι𝑥[thin(𝑥) ∧ man(𝑥)], Mary) 
 
 ι𝑥[thin(𝑥) ∧ man(𝑥)]  λ𝑦[met(𝑦, Mary)] 
 
 the λ𝑥[thin(𝑥) met Mary 
 λPι𝑥[P(𝑥)]  ∧ man(𝑥)] λ𝑦λ𝑥[met(𝑦, 𝑥)] 
  
 thin man 
 λ𝑥[thin(𝑥)] λ𝑧[man(𝑧)] 
 
 




 thin(ι𝑥[man(𝑥)]) λ𝑦[met(𝑦, Mary)] 
 
 thin ι𝑥[man(𝑥)] met Mary 
 λ𝑧[thin(𝑧)]  λ𝑦λ𝑥[met(𝑦, 𝑥)] 
 the man 
 λPι𝑥[P(𝑥)] λ𝑥[man(𝑥)] 
 
No such constraints operate on parenthetical copular clauses because they 
are, as Force phrases, semantically opaque. Thus, when a parenthetical 
copular clause and a host node concatenate, the host node is returned 
unaltered, from a semantic compositional perspective (cf. Potts 2005:125). 
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Resultantly, adjunction to any maximal projection in the host clause is 
possible for parenthetical copular clauses, though adjunction into niches is 
prosodically favoured.36 
   




 ASSERT TP 
 
 Ben TP 
 




 baked us a cake 
 (and) ForceP 
 
 ASSERT TP 
 
 he’s a nice guy 
 
Having now advanced my theory of the external syntax of parenthetical 
copular clauses (i.e. how they are related to the host clause into which they 
interpolate), I will next outline my theory of how reduction occurs to form 
attributions.   
 I claim that the reduction that occurs in parenthetical copular clauses to 
create attributions is engendered by one of two methods in English. The first 
is sister ellipsis (see §2.2.1 and §2.2.2), which is licensed only in parenthetical 
wh-questions. Thus, the application of sister ellipsis derives (19b) from (19a): 
 
                                                     
36  For Turkish, ki replaces the act-initial coordinator and in (18) in the main text. Because both 
lexemes are discourse markers, both occupy the specifier of the Force phrase. While syntactic heads 
branch rightwards in Turkish (contra Kayne 1994), its specifiers branch leftwards. Thus, just as in English, 
ki linearly precedes the parenthetical that it introduces, just as act-initial and does in English.    
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(19) a. Someone (but who is it?) has hacked into my email account. 
 b. Someone (but [who1 [is it t1?]]) has hacked into my email 
account. 
 
The second means of reduction is left-edge ellipsis (LE; Wilder 1997, Weir 
2012, Fernández 2013, also see van Oirsouw’s 1987:123 periphery constraint). 
This form of deletion operates upon contiguous strings of functional 
elements, and can therefore target non-constituents. It is an optional 
deletion process. As a ‘root’ operation (Aelbrecht et al. 2012), LE’s 
application is restricted to the left edge of Force phrases, where it applies 
rightward in a monotonic fashion. In other words, LE can target α only if α 
occupies a Force phrase’s left edge or α is linearly preceded by β, where β has 
been rendered unpronounced by LE. Like with the scattered ellipsis 
operation discussed in §2.2.1, extraction of the remnant of ellipsis is not a 
prerequisite for the application of LE. 
 My reasons to claim that copular clausal parentheticals are reduced by LE 
are properly explicated in §3.4.1, after a number of sources of ambiguity that 
muddy the theoretical landscape are dealt with in §3.3. In this subsection, let 
me provide one straightforward reason for why I adopt an LE analysis of the 
reduction that forms attributions: namely, the LE that occurs in independent 
sentences and the reduction that creates attributions display similar 
properties. For example, elision of determiners of predicate nominals can be 
licensed in both independent sentences reduced by LE and in attributions, as 
the utterances in (20) demonstrate. 
 
(20) a. John is coming over later. He’s a nice fellow. I should ask him to  
 bring his wife too. 
b. John, he’s a nice fellow, is coming over later. I should ask him to 
bring his wife too. 
 
As mentioned above, LE targets a contiguous string. Thus, act-initial 
coordinators are never present in independent sentences that display LE, as 
(21) shows, where a prosodic ι-boundary is maintained between job and nice 
fellow to ensure that the cross-sentential subclausal coordination 
interpretation (Neijt 1979) is unavailable. The fact that act-initial 
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coordinators are illicit in attributions, as the examples in (22) show, provides 
further evidence that attributions are derived by LE. 
 
(21) John is a good candidate for the job.  
 a.  And he is a nice fellow. 
 b. * And he is a nice fellow. 
 
(22) a. John, and he is a nice fellow, is a good candidate for the job. 
 b. * John, and he is a nice fellow, is a good candidate for the job. 
 
The licensing of LE in a parenthetical copular clause α appears to be 
constrained by linearity. More specifically, LE is permitted in α only if α 
immediately linearly follows the item with which α’s subject corefers (this is 
discussed further in §3.4.1). If the hypothesis that attributions are 
underlyingly Force phrases that display total syntactic and semantic opacity 
from their hosts is correct, this constraint on licensing LE in parenthetical 
copular clauses must be pragmatic in nature. I concede that I have been 
unable to discover precisely what pragmatic principles govern this licensing 
constraint on LE. I hope future research can uncover them.37 
  Parenthetical copular clauses can also be reduced to their postcopular 
elements in Turkish. I claim that neither LE nor sister ellipsis is responsible 
for this reduction, however. Instead, reduction is engendered by presence of 
pro subjects and zero copulas, which are ubiquitous in non-parenthetical 
environments in this language. 
 To summarise: in this section (§3.2), I outlined my theory of attributions. 
I proposed that attributions are parenthetical copular clauses that are 
reduced down to their postcopular items. I claimed that parenthetical 
copular clauses are Force phrasal adjuncts (as per Koev 2013), whose 
adjunction within host clauses is syntactically and semantically 
unconstrained. As Force phrases, parenthetical copular clauses are opaque 
                                                     
37  Mark de Vries (p.c.) points out that LE appears unable to delete the act-initial coordinator and 
the subject but not the copula, as (i) demonstrates: 
(i) * John, and he is a devout man, prays daily. 
On the LE approach that I advocate, one must claim that the copula’s morphological realisation is 
dependent upon the subject’s in English. If and how this claim can be substantiated must also be left for 
future research. 
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with respect to the syntactic and semantic dependencies that are established 
within their host clauses. I suggested that, in English, the reduction that 
occurs in parenthetical copular clauses to create attributions is engendered 
by two distinct mechanisms. I proposed that sister ellipsis derives wh-
attributions such as (19b), while left-edge ellipsis (LE) derives declarative 
attributions such as (20b). Note that I do not preclude that LE can target 
parenthetical wh-clauses such as (19a) too. If it did, only the coordinator 
would be elided, as the wh-phrase is discourse-new (i.e. but who is it?). 
 The claims outlined above about how LE is licensed in and operates upon 
English attributions are summarised in (23) below. 
 
(23) LE is licensed in an English parenthetical copular clause α iff: 
 a. α immediately linearly follows the host item with which α’s 
subject corefers. 
 b. All of the items from α’s left edge up to the postcopular element 
are elided (excluding parentheticals that interpolate into α). 
 
In §3.4, I will provide evidence for my analysis of attributions, which I call 
the reduced copular approach henceforth. Before I undertake this task, I first 
draw attention in §3.3 to environments in which appositives that look like 
attributions are actually structurally ambiguous between attributions and 
other parenthetical types, most notably appositions. 
 
3.3 Sources of ambiguity 
 
In this subsection (§3.3), I discuss three environments in which appositive 
noun phrases are potentially structurally ambiguous between either (i) 
truncated cleft attributions and appositions (§3.3.1), (ii) predicative 
attributions and appositions (§3.3.2), or (iii) predicative attributions and 
circumstantial secondary predicates (§3.3.3). For the first two cases, I 
demonstrate that the methods of disambiguation discussed in §2.1.1 and 
§2.2.5 (i.e. the presence of apposition markers or temporal adverbs) delimit 
appositive noun phrases as appositions and attributions, respectively. The 
purpose of §3.3.3 is simply to show that in certain environments appositive 
noun phrases are potentially ambiguous between predicative attributions 
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and secondary predicates. The method that I use to delimit such appositive 
noun phrases is discussed later, in §3.4.1. 
 
3.3.1 Truncated cleft attributions and appositions 
 
Recall from §2.1 that appositions are second conjuncts of coordination. One 
of the relations that can be modelled using coordination is reformulation, 
where an apposition provides an additional name for the referent denoted by 
its anchor: 
 
(24) The Big Apple, that is to say New York, is a huge city. 
 
Recall also that reformulative relations may pertain between specific 
indefinite anchors and appositions, even if the anchors are indefinite and the 
appositions are definite, as (25) shows. 
 
(25) Someone, Pete, keeps leaving the door open. 
 
Note that the surface structure of (25) is identical to the surface structure of 
the attribution in (8c) from §3.1. In other words, unless the context provides 
a means of disambiguation, one cannot tell whether Pete in (25) is 
coordinated with its anchor or is the postcopular element of a reduced 
truncated cleft parenthetical copular clause (this same form of ambiguity was 
discussed in chapter one and §2.1.1): 
 
(26) a. [&P [DP Someone][DP Pete]] keeps leaving the door open. 
 b. [DP [DP Someone][ForceP it’s Pete]] keeps leaving the door open. 
 
As I illustrated in §2.1.1 and §2.2.5, there are two straightforward means by 
which to disambiguate such constructions. If apposition markers like that is 
to say or i.e. are present, then the derivation in (26a) pertains. However, if 
temporal modifiers like often are present, then (26b) pertains. Once 
delimited as a truncated cleft attribution by the presence of a temporal 
adverb, apposition markers are illicit, as the example in (27) below shows. 
 
(27) Someone, (*namely) often Pete, keeps leaving the door open. 
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It should be noted that the same ambiguity that is observed in (25) also arises 
in Turkish. In this language, the presence of ki disambiguates the 
parenthetical as a truncated cleft attribution (as ki is reserved for finite 
clausal parentheticals, see §3.1 and the example in 6), while the presence of 
yani ‘namely’ disambiguates the parenthetical as an apposition (as yani is 
reserved for appositions, see Griffiths & Güneş 2014). 
 
3.3.2 Predicative attributions and appositions 
 
A similar ambiguity to that which was observed in §3.3.1 is seen in 
constructions like (28), where the appositive is ambiguous between a 
referential and non-referential noun phrase. 
 
(28) London, the capital of England, is a filthy city. 
 
Here, one cannot tell whether the capital of England is coordinated with its 
anchor (in which case it would be referential) or is the postcopular element 
of a reduced predicational parenthetical copular clause (in which case it 
would be non-referential): 
 
(29) a. [&P [DP London][DP the capital of England]] is a filthy city. 
 b. [DP [DP London][ForceP it’s the capital of England]] is a filthy city. 
 
The same means of delimitation used in the last subsection (§3.3.1) can be 
applied again here. If apposition markers like i.e. are present, then the 
derivation in (29a) pertains. However, if temporal adverbs are present, then 
(29b) pertains. Once delimited as a predicative attribution by the presence of 
a temporal adverb, apposition markers are illicit, as the example below 
shows. 
 
(30) London, (*i.e.) currently the capital of England, is a filthy city. 
 
Again, the presence of ki or yani serves to disambiguate the Turkish 
equivalent of (28). 
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3.3.3 Predicative attributions and circumstantial secondary predicates 
 
Circumstantial secondary predicates are small clauses that contain a stage-
level adjective (Carlson 1977) and a PRO subject (Chomsky 1981) that 
corefers with the subject of the clause in which it is contained: 
 
(31) Brendani came home [SC PROi completely drunk]. 
 
Like other non-finite phrases such as (32a), circumstantial secondary 
predicates can be parentheticals, as the example in (32b) demonstrates. 
 
(32) a. Brendan, being drunk, can’t find his way home. 
 b. Brendan, completely drunk, fell asleep on his own front 
doorstep. 
 
Note that (32b) is potentially ambiguous between a circumstantial secondary 
predicate and a predicative attribution, as the schemata in (33) show. 
 
(33) a. Brendan, [PRO completely drunk], fell asleep… 
 b. Brendan, [ForceP he was completely drunk], fell asleep… 
 
The same ambiguity arises in Turkish, provided that the relevant predicate is 
not the prosodic nucleus (if it is, the secondary predicate is disambiguated, as 
attributions cannot occupy their hosts’ nuclei, see Griffiths & Güneş 2014): 
 
(34) Aylin, tamamen  sarhoş,  Ali-in  kapı-sı-na  dayan-dı. 
Aylin  completely  drunk  Ali-GEN  door-POSS-LOC  turn.up-PST 
‘Aylin, completely drunk, turned up at Ali’s door.’ 
 
To disambiguate secondary predicates from predicative attributions in 
English, one must examine how they distribute within the host clause. As I 
already mentioned, I will return to this shortly, in §3.4.1. 
 It is worth mentioning here that I maintain that noun phrases cannot be 
circumstantial secondary predicates (contra McNally 1994). Rather, I claim 
that those that look like secondary predicates are headless as-PPs in their 
canonical position, as (35a) shows (see Emonds 1985 for further discussion). 
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I suggest that the elision of as is illicit when such phrases are reordered 
within the clause, as in (35b) and (35c) (where I intend the interpretation to 
remain constant in (35a-c)). 
 
(35) a. Bob has entered university [(as) a pauper]. 
 b. Bob, *(as) a pauper, has entered university. 
 c. Bob has, *(as) a pauper, entered university. 
 
To summarise: in this subsection (§3.3), I showed that, depending upon 
definiteness and the structural environment in question, appositive noun 
phrases are potentially structurally ambiguous between either (i) truncated 
cleft attributions and appositions, (ii) predicative attributions and 
appositions, or (iii) predicative attributions and circumstantial secondary 
predicates. Attributions and appositions can be disambiguated by the 
presence of temporal adverbs and apposition markers respectively, as I 
already showed in chapter two. (Thus, §3.3.1 and §3.3.2 were essentially a 
repetition of §2.1.1 and §2.2.5, except that this time the emphasis was on the 
delimitation of attributions, rather than appositions.) Finally, the fact that, in 
certain environments, appositive noun phrases are potentially ambiguous 
between predicative attributions and circumstantial secondary predicates 
was briefly discussed in §3.3.3 above. 
 
3.4 Distributional evidence for the reduced copular approach 
 
Having in §3.3 once again emphasised that appositive noun phrases can be 
structurally ambiguous, I now return to the task at hand, which is to present 
evidence for the reduced copular analyses of attributions that I outlined in 
§3.2. In this subsection (§3.4), I provide distributional evidence for the 
reduced copular analysis.  I begin in §3.4.1 by supporting my claim that left-
edge (LE) ellipsis is responsible for reducing English declarative 
parenthetical copular clauses down to their postcopular elements (a task I 
could not complete in §3.2 because of the muddying influence of potentially 
ambiguous appositive noun phrases). In §3.4.2, I examine data of increasing 
distributional complexity and show that the patterns of acceptability that are 
observed therein are expected if the reduced copular approach to attributions 
is correct. 
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3.4.1 Distributional evidence for left-edge ellipsis 
 
In this subsection (§3.4.1), I present evidence for my claims from §3.2 about 
how reduction is engendered in declarative parenthetical copular clauses, 
which are repeated from (23) in (36) below. 
 
(36) LE is licensed in an English parenthetical copular clause α iff: 
 a. α immediately linearly follows the host item with which α’s 
subject corefers. 
 b. All of the items from α’s left edge up to the postcopular element 
are elided (excluding parentheticals that interpolate into α). 
 
According to the generalisation in (36a), left-edge ellipsis (LE) is licensed 
only when a parenthetical copular clause is right-adjacent to its anchor. This 
gives rise to the prediction that attributions must appear right-adjacent to 
their anchors. This is borne out with predicative attributions, as the 
examples in (37) show.38 
 
(37) a. Suzan, a sucker for a bargain, has been at the market for hours. 
 b. * Suzan has been, a sucker for a bargain, at the market for hours. 
 c. * Suzan has been at the market for hours, a sucker for a bargain. 
 
One might claim that the generalisation in (36a) fails to account for the 
acceptability of constructions like (38a) below, where it seems that reduction 
occurs in a predicative parenthetical copular clause that is non-adjacent to its 
anchor. 
 
                                                     
38  Note that, in (37c) in the main text, the attribution is pronounced as contained within the 
intonational domain of its host clause (as the comma intends to represent). If pronounced as contained 
within an independent intonational domain, as is represented by the use of a colon in (i) below, the 
utterance in (37c) becomes acceptable. 
(i) Suzan has been at the market for hours: A sucker for a bargain! 
In such environments, (37c) is composed of two isolated utterances that are sequentially ordered in 
discourse (see (ii) below). As such, the purported ‘attribution’ is no longer parenthetical, and therefore LE 
can apply freely to it, as it can to any regular assertion. Resultantly, (ii) is reminiscent of what Ott & De 
Vries (2014) call an afterthought construction. 
(ii) [ForceP Suzan has been at the market for hours:] [ForceP She is a sucker for a bargain!] 
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(38) a. London was in the news again, the capital of England.  
 b. London was in the news again, the capital of England, that is to 
say.  
 
I propose that (38a) is licit because it is not an attribution but a stripped 
clausal apposition (see §2.2.2). As such, this parenthetical is the remnant of a 
stripping operation that occurs in vacuous clausal appositions: 
 
(39) [&P [CP London was in the news] [CP the capital of England was in the 
news]]. 
 
Support for this claim comes from two sources. Firstly, (38a) can host an 
apposition marker like that is to say, as (38b) shows. That the appositive in 
(38a) can host an apposition marker is indicative of its status as an 
apposition, according to the conclusions of §2.1. Secondly, the example in 
(38a) is rendered unacceptable when the appositive noun phrase is 
disambiguated as an attribution by the presence of a temporal adverb like 
currently, as the example in (40) demonstrates. 
 
(40) * London has been in the news again, currently the capital of 
England. 
 
One might also claim that the generalisation in (36a) is too stringent because 
stage-level predicative adjective attributions can appear non-adjacent to their 
anchor: 
 
(41) a.  Kristian has, naked, swum in the pool. 
 b.  Kristian has swum in the pool, naked. 
 
I claim that naked in (41) is a parenthetical circumstantial secondary 
predicate (see §3.3.3 above). As a non-finite clause in which no reduction 
occurs, this phrase is not subject to the generalisations in (36). Note that the 
patterns of interpolation in (41) provide the means mentioned in §3.3.3 by 
which to disambiguate parenthetical secondary predicates from predicative 
attributions: if the stage-level adjective appears non-adjacent to its anchor, it 
is a secondary predicate. 
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 At first glance, the predictions that arise from (36a) are only partially 
borne out with truncated cleft attributions. While illicit in medial positions 
that are non-adjacent to their anchors (see 42b), truncated cleft attributions 
are licit in the final position, as the example in (42c) illustrates. This is 
contrary to expectation if the generalisations in (36) are correct. 
 
(42) a.  Someone, Pete, keeps leaving the door open. 
 b. * Someone keeps, Pete, leaving the door open. 
 c.  Someone keeps leaving the door open, Pete. 
 
Again, I propose that (42c) is licit because it is not an attribution but a 
stripped clausal apposition: 
 
(43) [&P [CP Someone keeps leaving the door open][CP Pete keeps leaving the 
door open]]]. 
 
Once (42c) is disambiguated as an attribution by adding a temporal adverb 
like often, the predicted unacceptability arises, as (44a) shows.39 This 
unacceptability does not arise when often Pete is observed adjacent to its 
anchor however, as (44b) demonstrates.  
 
(44) a *  Someone keeps leaving the door open, often Pete. 
 b.  Someone, often Pete, keeps leaving the door open. 
 
The generalisations in (36) do not dictate that LE is limited to declarative 
parenthetical copular clauses. Thus, LE may occur in hortatives and polar 
questions: 
                                                     
39  Again, note that, in (44a) in the main text, the attribution is pronounced as contained within the 
intonational domain of its host clause (as the comma intends to represent). If pronounced as contained 
within an independent intonational domain, as is represented by the use of a full-stop in (i) below, the 
utterance in (44a) becomes acceptable. 
(i) Someone keeps leaving the door open. Often Pete. 
In such environments, (44a) is composed of two isolated utterance that are sequentially ordered in 
discourse (see (ii) below). As such, the purported ‘attribution’ is no longer parenthetical, and therefore LE 
can apply freely to it, as it can to any regular assertion. Again, (ii) is reminiscent of what Ott & De Vries 
(2014) call an afterthought construction. 
(ii) [ForceP Someone keeps leaving the door open.] [ForceP It is often Pete.] 
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(45) a. You must nominate someone ((let it be) me, please!) as your 
heir. 
 b. A masked man ((was it) Pete?) kissed Miranda at the party. 
 
According to the conclusions of §3.2, sister ellipsis is permitted when a 
parenthetical copular clause is a wh-question. These conclusions correctly 
predict that, even though they are reduced, parenthetical wh-questions may 
host a linker like but (see 46a), unlike their reduced declarative counterparts 
such as (22b) (repeated in 46b below), which are reduced by LE. 
 
(46) a. A masked man (but [who1 [was it t1]]?) kissed Mary at the party. 
 b. * John, and he is a nice fellow, is a good candidate for the job. 
 
I claimed in §3.2 that Turkish does not conform to the generalisations in 
(36), as its parenthetical copular clauses are not reduced by LE but by the 
presence of pro subjects and zero copulas. Because LE is licit only when 
parenthetical copular clauses’ subjects are adjacent to their anchors, English 
attributions, which I claim are formed by LE, are licit only when adjacent to 
their anchors. If Turkish attributions are not formed by LE, the prediction 
arises that Turkish attributions need not appear right-adjacent to their 
anchors. The example in (47), in which the object intervenes between a 
subject anchor and its apposition, shows that this prediction is borne out. 
 
(47) Ali  Bey  Mine-yi,  ki  evli  bir  adam,  taciz  et-ti.  
Ali  Mr. Mine-ACC LINK  married  a  man harassment  make-PST 
‘Mr. Ali, a married man, harassed Mine.’ 
 
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that most scholars of Turkish, such as 
Erguvanlı (1981), Çağrı (2005), and Göksel & Kerslake (2005), but with the 
exception of Lewis (1967), assume that the linker ki is a relativiser. I claim 
that this assumption is mistaken, as ki-clauses (as they are called) pass no 
tests for relativisation of the ‘operator/gap’ ilk. As well as exhibiting island 
insensitivity, they are not nominalised, and their purported head noun 
displays no realisation of [+REL]-features and does not move. Moreover, the 
position where their ‘gap’ should be can be occupied by a referential 
expression (i.e. not a resumptive pronoun), as (48) shows. For additional 
 Attributions 99 
 
arguments that ki-clauses are equivalent to Germanic finite parenthetical 
copular clauses, see Griffiths & Güneş (2014). 
 
(48) Ahmet, ki öğrenci-ler o  salağ-ı çok sever-ler, 
Ahmet LINK student-PL that  idiot-ACC very love-3PL  
 
okul-dan  atıl-mış. 
school-ABL  fired-EVD 
‘Ahmet, the students love that idiot very much, has been fired.’  
 
To summarise: in this subsection (§3.4.1), I demonstrated that, once 
potentially ambiguous appositive noun phrases are disambiguated as 
(derived from) appositional constructions and set aside, my claim that 
declarative attributions are derived from LE captures the restricted 
distribution of the data at hand. 
 
3.4.2 Attributions and anchors 
 
We have already seen in previous subsections that, in ‘simple’ cases,  
(non-)referential noun phrases can be attributions. This is because such 
nominals make for suitable postcopular items. In the next two subsections 
(§3.4.2.1 and §3.4.2.2), I show that in more complicated cases the same 
argument (i.e. ‘good postcopular item equals good attribution’) correctly 
predicts which nominal attributions are acceptable. 
 
3.4.2.1 Nominal attributions that contain quantifiers 
 
Partee (1987) demonstrates that certain postcopular noun phrases may 
contain quantifiers. Those that can contain quantifiers can be attributions, as 
pointed out by Potts (2005:131), whose examples I use below in (49) and 
(50). This is expected on the reduced copular approach. 
 
(49) a. Hillary is no amateur climber. 
 b. Ed’s house was at one time every colour of the rainbow. 
 c. Tanya is everything to everyone around here. 
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(50) a. We spoke with Hillary, no amateur climber, about the dangers. 
 b. Ed’s house, at one time every colour of the rainbow, now has 
aluminium siding. 
 c. We spoke with Tanya, everything to everyone around here, 
about the broken printer. 
 
Potts (ibid.) reports that the examples in (51) are unacceptable. My 
informants and I disagree (see Heringa 2011:20 for additional discussion). 
 
(51) a. We spoke with Tanya, Ashley, and Connie, every secretary in 
the department, about the broken printer. 
 b. Armin, Jaye, and Junko, all the phonologists at UCSC, attended 
the conference.  
 
At first blush, the fact that these examples are acceptable (at least for a small 
group of British English speakers that includes me) is harmful for the 
reduced copular approach that I pursue, as these attributions cannot be 
postcopular items of predicative copular clauses: 
 
(52) a. * Tanya, Ashley, and Connie are every secretary in the 
department. 
 b. * Armin, Jaye, and Junko, are all the phonologists at UCSC. 
  
I propose that the appositive noun phrases in (51) are acceptable because 
they are appositions, and not attributions. The fact that these appositive 
noun phrases can host apposition markers, as the examples in (53) show, 
supports this claim. 
 
(53) a. We spoke with Tanya, Ashley, and Connie, in other words 
every secretary in the department, about the broken printer. 
 b. Armin, Jaye, and Junko, that is to say all the phonologists at 
UCSC, attended the conference. 
 
Once disambiguated as attributions by the presence of temporal adverbs, 
unacceptability indeed arises, just as the reduced copular approach predicts: 
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(54) a. * We spoke with Tanya, Ashley, and Connie, now every secretary  
 in the department, about the broken printer. 
 b. * Armin, Jaye, and Junko, then all the phonologists at UCSC, 
attended the conference. 
 
3.4.2.2 Quantified nominal anchors 
 
In certain environments, the pronoun of a predicational copular clause can 
corefer with a noun phrase that is rendered non-specific by quantification, as 
(55a) shows. This pronoun can be paraphrased as in (55b). This paraphrase 
makes clear that such pronouns take non-specific indefinite antecedents but 
refer to them as though they are specific definites (this is their E-type usage). 
 
(55) a. Every chess set comes with [a red pawn]i. Iti’s a spare. 
 b. The red pawn that every chess set comes with is a spare. 
 
In generic statements, existential quantification can often be superfluous. 
This is observed in (56) below, where the quantifier can be omitted without 
altering the interpretation (as every man denotes all human males, as does 
the kind man). 
 
(56) a. Every man feels the need to dominate others. 
 b. Man feels the need to dominate others. 
 
Provided that a generic interpretation is maintained, the singular pronoun of 
a predicational copular clause can corefer with the seemingly quantified 
noun phrase: 
 
(57) a. Every mani feels the need to dominate others. Hei is driven to it 
by his genetic predispositions. 
 b. Mani feels the need to dominate others. Hei is driven to it by his 
genetic predispositions. 
 
The same superfluity is observed with generic statements and universal 
quantification, as the examples in (58) demonstrate. Again, provided that a 
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generic interpretation is maintained, the plural pronoun of a predicational 
copular clause can corefer with the seemingly quantified noun phrase. 
 
(58) a. (It’s a known fact that) all biologistsi wish to publish in Nature. 
Theyi are slaves to their ambition. 
 b. (It’s a known fact that) biologistsi wish to publish in Nature. 
Theyi are slaves to their ambition. 
 
A similar effect is seen with quantifiers like many and few and plural 
pronouns (the a-example comes from Doron 1994:53): 
 
(59) a. Mary has {many / few} friendsi. Theyi are leftists no doubt. 
 b. Mary has friendsi. Theyi are leftists no doubt. 
 
Quantified noun phrases like several 𝑥 and some 𝑥 can be interpreted as 
specific. When they are, they can be coreferent with the pronoun of a 
predicational copular clause: 
 
(60) {Several / some} studentsi still go to Dr. Brown’s lectures. Theyi are a 
tenacious little bunch. 
 
In those cases when (i) a paraphrase like (55b) is impossible, (ii) 
quantification is not superfluous, and/or (iii) the quantified expression 
cannot be interpreted as specific, pronouns cannot refer to non-specific 
indefinite or quantified noun phrases, as (61) exemplifies. 
 
(61) * {Every / no} climberi was found sipping cocoa in the lodge. Hei is 
an experienced adventurer. (modified from Potts 2005:122) 
 
Considering the behaviour of the pronouns in the examples above, the 
reduced copular approach predicts that one can make attribution 
constructions from (55) to (60), but not from (61). This is borne out: 
 
 Attributions 103 
 
(62) a.  Every chess set comes with a red pawn, a spare. 
 b.  (Every) man, driven to it by his genetic predispositions, feels the 
need to dominate others. 
 c.  (All) biologists, slaves to their ambition, wish to publish in  
 Nature.  
 d.  Mary has ({few / many}) friends, leftists no doubt. 
 e.  {Several / some} students, a tenacious little bunch, still go to Dr. 
Brown’s lectures. 
 f. * {Every / no} climber, an experienced adventurer, was found 
sipping cocoa in the lodge. 
 
3.4.2.3 Non-nominal attributions 
 
Having assessed simple and complex nominal anchors and attributions, I 
now move on to examine their non-nominal counterparts. 
 Although not discussed directly, the previous sections of this chapter have 
already shown that adjectives and participle phrases can be attributions. I 
provide some additional examples in (63) below, along with a prepositional 
phrase attribution. As one would expect, these non-nominal phrases can be 
attributions because they can be postcopular items, as the examples in (64) 
show. 
 
(63) a. The ex-convicts, in trouble with the police again, are suing the 
government for emotional damage. 
 b. The researcher, seeing for the first time the complexity of the 
problem at hand, gave a small gasp of terror. 
 c. Harriet, bolstered by her recent victory, has a renewed sense of 
confidence. 
 d. The novel, entertaining Lucy less and less as time goes on, is 
bound for a second-hand bookshop. 
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(64) a. The ex-convicts are in trouble with the police again. 
 b. The researcher was seeing for the first time the complexity of 
the problem at hand. 
 c. Harriet was bolstered by her recent victory. 
 d. The novel is entertaining Lucy less and less as time goes on. 
 
Conversely, whatever cannot be a postcopular item is predicted to form an 
unacceptable attribution. This is borne out for infinitivals, non-predicative 
adjectives, and (in)transitive verb phrases: 
 
(65) a.  She is *(soon) to depart for Africa 
 b.  The president, *(soon) to depart for Africa, finished up her 
paperwork. (Loock & O’Connor 2013:336) 
 
(66) a. * The president is former. 
 b. * The president, former, objects to the new legislation. 
 
(67) a. * Hannah is {fell / kissed Fred}. 
 b. * Hannah, {fell / kissed Fred}, is the happiest girl I know. 
 
As mentioned in §3.2, attributions are observed in Turkish whenever pro 
subjects and zero copulas are present. As seen in the previous sections of this 
chapter, zero copulas are licit with nominals and stage-level predicates. They 
are also licit with participle verbs, postpositional phrases, and individual-
level predicate adjectives, as the examples in (68) and (69) demonstrate. 
 
(68) a. Oku-muş-Ø. 
  read-EVD-COP 




 ‘(She is) in the bathroom.’  [as a response to ‘where is Aylin?’] 
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c.  Cok yetenekli!  
  very talented 
 ‘(She is) very talented!’  [as a response to ‘what do you think of her?’] 
 
(69) a. Aylin, ki oku-muş-Ø,  Ali-ye  mektup-tan bahset-me-di. 
 Aylin  LINK read-EVD-COP  Ali-DAT letter-ABL  mention-NEG-PST 
  ‘Aylin, (she had) read (it), did not mention the letter to Ali.’ 
 
b. Aylin,  ki  banyo-da-Ø,  Ali-yle  mesajlaş-ıyor-muş. 
 Aylin  LINK  bathroom-LOC-COP  Ali-COM  text-PROG-EVD 
  ‘Aylin, (she is) in the bathroom, is text-messaging with Ali.’ 
 
c. Aylin, ki çok yetenekli-Ø, yeni bir galeri  aç-mış. 
 Aylin LINK very talented-COP new a gallery open-EVD 
  ‘Aylin, (she is) very talented, has opened a new gallery.’ 
 
Because they are not derived from copular clauses, finite parenthetical 
clauses that display only pro subjects, such as those in (70) and (71), are 
technically not attributions. However, they look like attributions, on account 
of the absence of an overt subject and copula. 
 
(70) Erken gel-di. 
early come-PST 
‘(He has) arrived early.’ [as a response to ‘has he arrived yet?’] 
 
(71) Aylin,  ki  erken  gel-di, banyo-da-Ø. 
Aylin  LINK early come-PST bathroom-LOC-COP 
‘Aylin, (she has) arrived early, is in the bathroom.’ 
 
3.4.2.4 Non-nominal anchors 
 
If a non-nominal item α can corefer with a copular clause’s pronoun, the 
reduced copular approach predicts that α is a suitable anchor for an 
attribution. 
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 As pronouns of copular clauses can corefer with clauses, the reduced 
copular approach correctly predicts that clauses make for suitable anchors of 
attributions, as the examples in (72) demonstrate. 
 
(72) a. [Max is in custody for being in custody]i. Iti’s a Kafkaesque 
situation by anyone’s standards. 
 b. That Max is in custody for being in custody, a Kafkaesque 
situation by anyone’s standards, has made the local newspaper. 
 
Aside from nouns and clauses, other parts of speech must either be made 
exceptionally salient in order to be suitable for coreference, or be referred to 
qua their property of being a string of sounds or symbols. Contrastive focus 
achieves the former, while postcopular elements that comment upon a 
word’s string-like properties achieve the latter: 
 
(73) a. A: Does Pete use green paint in his artwork? 
  B: No, he uses VERMILLIONi paint. Iti’s a colour you would 
probably call ‘light red’. 
 
 b. A: I heard that Luke kicked his brother last week. 
 B: No, he CLOTHESLINED his brother last week. Iti’s a type of 
wrestling move. 
 
(74) I tried to order VERMILLIONi paint online but failed. Iti’s a hard word to 
spell! 
 
In environments such as these, attributive adjectives and verbs can be used as 
anchors for (degraded) attributions (see 75 and 76), as the reduced copular 
approach predicts. Note that their ‘full’ parenthetical copular clausal 
counterparts display the same degradation, which is caused by their 
interpolation into a non-niche. 
 
(75) a. A:  Does Pete use green paint in his artwork? 
 B: ? No, he uses VERMILLIONi ((iti’s) a colour you’d call ‘light red’)  
   paint. 
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b. A:  I heard that Luke kicked his brother last week. 
 B: ? No, he CLOTHESLINEDi ((iti’s) a type of wrestling move) his  
   brother last week.  
 
(76) ? I tried to order VERMILLIONi ((iti’s) a hard word to spell!) paint  
  online but failed. 
 
3.4.2.5 Individual- and stage-level adjective attributions 
 
The sentences in (77) below create an incoherent discourse because the 
pronoun it unsuccessfully attempts to act as a generic and specific noun 
phrase simultaneously. The pronoun is specific because it has a stage-level 
adjective predicated of it (which creates a specific reading) and is generic 
because it corefers with the generic noun phrase the dog. 
 
(77) * The dogi is the most popular house pet in America. Iti is happy. 
   (modified from O’Connor 2012) 
 
Predictably, the same incoherence is observed if the copular clause in (77) is 
used as a parenthetical, as in (78a). This incoherence is also observed with 
attributions, as in (78b). This provides additional support for the reduced 
copular approach. 
 
(78) a. * The dog (it is happy) is the most popular house pet in America. 
 b. * The dog, happy, is the most popular house pet in America. 
 
When one observes the unacceptability of examples like those in (79) one 
might conclude that attributions cannot be non-nominal individual-level 
predicates. Such a conclusion would be harmful for the reduced copular 
approach, as predicational parenthetical copular clauses with non-nominal 
individual-level predicates are licit, as the examples in (80) show.40 
                                                     
40  Mark de Vries (p.c.) points out that the acceptability of the examples in (79) is increased if 
evaluative adverbs like (un)fortunately are inserted in the non-nominal individual-level attributions, as (i) 
and (ii) demonstrate. While I cannot provide an explanation for why the presence of such adverbs 
increases acceptability, the fact that there exists a spectrum of acceptability for non-nominal individual-
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(79) a. * Michael, very talented, conducted the orchestra for many years. 
 b. * Greg, slightly dim, only passed one exam in his whole life. 
 
(80) a. Michael (he was very talented) conducted the orchestra for 
many years. 
 b. Greg (he was slightly dim) only passed one exam in his whole 
life. 
 
Such a conclusion would be based on an overgeneralisation. In reality, non-
nominal individual-level attributions are licensable, as the examples from 
Loock & O’Connor (2013) in (81) show. Note that for the sake of brevity I 
have shortened these examples, which are extracted from a bespoke corpus. 
 
(81) a. The man, dark and handsome, swept around the room like a 
movie star. 
 b. He hated the tone in which she said it, so sharp and 
condescending. 
 c. Her sweater, samphire green, showcased her curves. 
 
Bearing the data in (81) in mind, I conclude that an additional factor that is 
unrelated to LE constrains the licensing of non-nominal individual-level 
attributions. Upon whether this factor is pragmatic (perhaps based on 
relevance or register) or prosodic I will not speculate here. 
 
3.4.2.6 Free choice attributions 
 
Truncated cleft copular clauses can be modalised to create a free choice 
reading. The reduced copular approach correctly predicts that attributions 
that have the same reading are permitted (Dayal 2004, Heringa 2011).41 
                                                                                                                            
level attributions provides additional support for the conclusion that I reach in the main text, namely that 
additional factors unrelated to LE govern such attributions’ acceptability.   
(i) ? Michael, fortunately very talented, conducted the orchestra for many years. 
(ii) ? Greg, unfortunately slightly dim, only passed one exam in his whole life. 
41  Note that truncated clefts that display indefinite NPIs can only be reduced if a free-choice 
reading arises. If the interpretation that is obtained does not involve choice – as in (i) below, where no 
member can be chosen from the set that anyone denotes – then reduction results in unacceptably. Why 
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(82) a.  It can be any book. 
b.  Pete must choose a book, (it can be) any book. 
 
3.4.2.7 Distributional evidence for the reduced copular analysis: a summary 
 
In this subsection (§3.4.2), I examined the possible permutations on 
constructions that contain attributions, which vary with respect to types of 
anchor (quantified nominals, non-nominals) and types of attribution 
(quantified nominals, non-nominals, free-choice). I demonstrated that, for 
each permutation, the patterns of acceptability that are observed are identical 
to those seen in regular copular clauses. Resultantly, this equivalence 
provides support for reduced copular approach to attributions that was 
outlined in §3.2. 
 
3.5 Syntactic evidence for the reduced copular approach 
 
In this subsection (§3.5), I present syntactic evidence for the reduced copular 




The reduced copular approach states that attributions are derived from 
parenthetical copular clauses that are Force phrases that are adjoined to their 
host clause (see §3.2). From this claim arises the prediction that relations that 
depend upon c-command cannot be established across the host-attribution 
boundary, as operators in one Force phrase cannot bind variables in another. 
This is borne out for negative polarity items, modal auxiliaries and sentential 
negation, as the examples in (83) to (85) respectively show. 
 
                                                                                                                            
this semantic constraint is operative on reduction is unclear to me, and must be left for future research. 
Thanks to Jack Hoeksema (p.c.) for drawing my attention to this issue. 
(i) The dog was poisoned by someone, *(it could be) anyone. 
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(83) a. It’s not the case that the ransom note was {someone’s/anyone’s} 
idea of a prank. 
 b. It’s not the case that the ransom note, {someone’s/*anyone’s} 
idea of a prank, precludes a kidnapping. 
 
(84) Bob might call Jenny, a plumber, for help with his broken boiler.  
Interpretation:  Bob might call Jenny, and Jenny is a plumber. 
  * Bob might call Jenny, and Jenny might be a plumber. 
 
(85) Pete won’t visit Sally, an old friend, at the weekend. 
Interpretation  Pete won’t visit Sally, and Sally is an old friend. 
  * Pete won’t visit Sally, and Sally isn’t an old friend. 
 
For extraction to be licit, the landing-site of an extracted element must be 
contained within the same Force phrase as the base position. The reduced 
copular approach predicts that items cannot be extracted from attributions, 
as there is no permissible landing-site in the host that is contained within the 
Force phrase that contains the attribution. Such a ban on extraction is indeed 
observed, as the examples in (86) demonstrate (cf. McCawley 1998). 
 
(86) a. * Where1 is Elizabeth, the queen of t1, the country’s longest 
reigning monarch? 
 b. * It is England1 that Elizabeth, the queen of t1, is the country’s 
longest reigning monarch. 
 c. * England1 Elizabeth, the queen of t1, is the country’s longest 
reigning monarch. 
 d. * Elizabeth, the queen t1, has just been crowned [of England]1. 
 
Extraction from within the anchor alone is predicted to be licit, however, as 
the base and landing sites are contained within the same Force phrase. This 
is borne out: 
 
(87) It’s [the Labour party]1 that Miliband is leader of t1, a difficult job by 
anyone’s standards. 
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3.5.2 Bare nominals 
 
Bare nominals are permitted as attributions in English, as the examples in 
(88) illustrate. This provides support for the reduced copular approach, as 
bare nominals are only licit as postcopular items of predicational copular 
clauses, as the examples in (89) demonstrate (Doron 1994). Evidence that the 
bare nominals in (88) are indeed attributions and not appositions is provided 
from the observation that they cannot host apposition markers. 
 
(88) a. Kristian, (the) leader of our party, has been arrested for public 
disorder. 
 b. Kristian, {namely/that is to say} *(the) leader of our party, has 
been arrested for public disorder. 
 
(89) a.  Kristian is (the) leader of our party. 
b.  *(The) leader of our party is Kristian. 
  
3.5.3 Differing illocutionary force 
 
Ross (1967) notes that assertoric appositive relative clauses can appear in 
erotetic hosts. For him this observation is relevant because it demonstrates 
that appositive relatives cannot be underlyingly coordinated with their hosts, 
as regular clausal conjuncts cannot display dissimilar illocutionary force (the 
examples below are taken from Potts 2005:198). 
 
(90) a.  Did the officer arrest Clyde, who was the subject of a long 
manhunt, before he could strike again? 
 b. * Did the officer arrest Clyde before he could strike again, and 
{Clyde / he} was the subject of a long manhunt? 
 
While Ross’s data provides persuasive evidence against the position that he 
wishes to disprove, it carries the presumption that appositive relatives are 
indeed assertoric. This presumption is not supported by the data in (90) 
itself, as assertions and non-assertoric subclausal constituents both display 
declarative syntax (for instance, one would not say that the restrictive relative 
in (91) is an assertion just because it displays declarative syntax and is 
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contained within a question). Thus, evidence that the appositive relative 
clause in (90a) is an assertion must be obtained from alternative sources. 
 
(91) Did the officer arrest the man that was a subject of a long manhunt 
before he could strike again? 
 
The mirror version of (90a) is more informative, however. If a parenthetical 
that is contained within an assertion displays non-declarative syntax or is 
intonated as a question or a demand, then one can be assured that the 
parenthetical indeed does display a dissimilar illocutionary force to its host. 
And it appears that, while appositions cannot display a dissimilar 
illocutionary force to their hosts (see 92a), attributions can (see 92b-d). 
 
(92) a. * The Big Apple (i.e. New York?) is a huge city. 
 b.  A masked man (who exactly?) kissed Miranda yesterday. 
 c.  A masked man (Pete, perhaps?) kissed Miranda yesterday. 
 d.  John (a plumber?) came to fix our boiler. 
 
On the analyses I have outlined for appositions in §2.1 and attributions in 
§3.2, this distribution is expected. New York in (92a) is a noun phrase 
conjunct (see §2.1), which cannot be used as an independent question, while 
the parentheticals in (92b-d) are derived from copula clauses (see §3.2), 
which can: 
 
(93) a. A masked man (who was it exactly?) kissed Miranda yesterday. 
 b. A masked man (was it Pete, perhaps?) kissed Miranda 
yesterday. 
 c. John (is he a plumber?) came to fix our boiler. 
 
3.5.4 Morphological case 
 
In Heringa’s (2011:175-213) study of the realisation of morphological case 
on nominal appositions and attributions, he concludes that, in German and 
Romanian, when predicative attributions are sufficiently disambiguated from 
their appositional counterparts, they receive the same case that postcopular 
items receive. The same pattern is observed in Turkish, where predicative 
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attributions that are not realised with an inherent case are realised with 
nominative case, which is the same case that is realised on postcopular items 
(it is null in Turkish): 
 
(94) a. Adem Havva-yı, ki karı-sı-{Ø/*nı}, düğün-de  
 Adem Havva-ACC LINK wife-POSS-{NOM/ACC} wedding-LOC
  
 öp-me-di.  
 kiss-NEG-PST 
 ‘Adem did not kiss Havva, his wife, at the wedding.’ 
 
b. Havva  karı-sı-{Ø/*nı}-dır 
 Havva wife-POSS-{NOM/ACC}-COP 
 ‘Havva is his wife.’ 
 
As postcopular elements, one expects that truncated cleft attributions also 
arise with default, postcopular morphological case. This expectation is met in 
Turkish, where presence of accusative case on a truncated cleft attribution 
whose anchor bears accusative case results in unacceptability (95). In such 
utterances, the attribution must bear nominative case, just like in (94). 
 
(95) Maske-li  bir  adam  Merve-yi  (ki  bence   
Mask-COM  a  man  Merve-ACC   LINK  for.me 
 
Ali-{Ø/*yi}-y-di) parti-de  öp-tü. 
Ali-{NOM/ACC}-COP-PST party-LOC  kiss-PST 
‘A man with a mask on (I think Ali) kissed Merve at the party.’ 
 
Data presented in a currently unpublished manuscript by Dennis Ott (Ott 
2014c) shows that the abovementioned expectation is not met in German, 
however. In this language, truncated cleft attributions arise with the same 
morphological case as their anchors, as (96) shows. 
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(96) Sie haben  einen Obdachlosen, ich glaube den Peter,  




‘They have arrested a homeless person, I think Peter.’ 
 (modified from Ott 2014c:16) 
 
Assurance that the appositive in (96) is indeed an attribution (and not an 
apposition) is obtained from the observation that (96) cannot host an 
apposition marker such as ‘d. h.’, which is the German equivalent of i.e. in 
English: 
 
(97) Sie haben  einen Obdachlosen, (*d. h.)  ich glaube den  




 ‘They have arrested a homeless person, i.e. I think Peter.’   
 
Ott utilises data like (96) to suggest that ‘truncated cleft’ attributions do not 
involve reduced truncated cleft copula clauses after all. Instead, he claims 
that (96) involves ellipsis of a ‘regular’ clause, as (98) shows. 
 
(98) Sie haben einen Obdachlosen, ich glaube sie haben den Peter 
verhaftet, verhaftet. 
 
While the analysis that is represented by (98) straightforwardly explains the 
presence of accusative case on the Peter in (96), which is assigned by the 
elided instance of verhaftet, there are reasons to doubt its tenability. Firstly, 
the non-elliptical counterpart of (98) in (99) is unacceptable. This means that 
(98) must involve obligatory ellipsis, whose utilisation is conceptually 
unwarranted in this scenario, since the struckthrough material is otherwise 
optionally elided, as (100B) demonstrates. 
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(99) * Sie haben einen Obdachlosen, ich glaube sie haben den Peter 
verhaftet, verhaftet. 
 
(100) A: Wen  haben sie verhaftet? 
 Who have they arrested? 
 
B: Ich glaube (sie haben) den Peter (verhaftet). 
 I believe  they have the.ACC Peter  arrested. 
 ‘I believe Peter.’ 
 
Secondly, it seems that referential attributions are always derived from 
truncated clefts in English. Support for this claim comes from the 
distribution of dependent tag questions (DTQs) in parenthetical 
environments. As (101) shows, parenthetical clauses such as regular 
transitive clauses (101a) and truncated clefts (101b) can license DTQs, which 
must display strict isomorphism with the parenthetical clauses to which they 
attach. 
 
(101) a. Sam hit someone – he hit Abe, {didn’t he/*wasn’t it}? – today. 
 b. Sam hit someone – it was Abe, {wasn’t it/*didn’t he}? – today. 
 
When reduction occurs to create referential attributions, only the ‘wasn’t it?’ 
DTQ is licit, as (102) illustrates for both the object (102a) and subject (102b) 
cases (cf. Barros & van Craenenbroeck 2013).  
 
(102) a. Sam hit someone – David, {wasn’t it/*didn’t he}? – today. 
b. Someone – David {wasn’t it/*didn’t he}? – hit Sam today. 
 
Because the distribution of the DTQs in (102) patterns with (101b) but not 
(101a), the examples in (102) suggest that (101b) is the correct underlying 
derivation for referential attributions in English, even in those environments 
(such as 101a) where ‘regular’ parenthetical clauses are available as potential 
sources.42  
                                                     
42  Note that the isomorphism condition associated with DTQs is obviated when the licensing clause 
contains a contrastively-focussed element, as (i) shows (Sailor 2009).   
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  While these data from English are encouraging for the cross-linguistic 
application of the truncated cleft analysis of referential attributions, I must 
concede that they only provide circumstantial support for it, as the absence 
of DTQs in German prevents one from applying the same diagnostic to the 
German utterance in (96). 
 If the attribution in (96) is indeed derived from a reduced truncated cleft 
copular clause as I maintain, then certain construction-specific factors must 
give rise to the unexpected presence of accusative case on the attribution. It 
appears that (i) the non-pronunciation of the predicate pronoun and copula 
verb in the parenthetical clause, and (ii) the adjunction of the parenthetical 
clause to its host, interact to cause this phenomenon. At the present time, the 
nature of this interaction is unknown to me (though see Heringa 2011:199-
207 for a proposal of how to formalise this interaction, which utilises ideas 
propounded in Matushansky 2008). However, it should be pointed out that 
the unexpected case-marking observed in (96) is also observed in other 
inflectional languages aside from German. For instance, Heringa (2011, §6) 
shows that, although they are underlyingly copular clausal, both predicative 
and truncated cleft attributions in Russian and Czech must receive their 
anchor’s case. If my contention about German and Heringa’s suggestion 
about Russian and Czech are correct, then a complex of constraints that are 
operative in inflectional languages conspire to hide the fact that all 
attributions are derived from parenthetical copular clauses. Put another way, 
the distribution of morphological case seems to be an unreliable diagnostic 
of the underlying structure of attributions in inflectional languages. The 
distribution of adphrasal morphological case in agglutinative languages like 
Turkish appears to be a more reliable diagnostic in this respect. 
                                                                                                                            
(i) Bob went to CHICAGO, wasn’t it? 
I tentatively suggest that, contrary to appearances, the isomorphism condition on DTQs is not actually 
obviated in (i). Rather, utterances like (i) involve Horn amalgams (Kluck 2011) (ii), in which it was is 
rendered unpronounced (iii). Support for this suggestion comes from the fact that DTQs may immediately 
follow contrastively-focussed elements that arise clause-medially, as (iv) shows. Because DTQs must 
otherwise linearly follow their licensing clause (as (v) shows), this pattern of interpolation ceases to be 
anomalous on a Horn amalgam account, as the DTQ does fully succeed its licensing clause, which is the 
reduced interpolated clause it was Chicago. 
(ii) [Bob went to [Øi [it was CHICAGOi, wasn’t it?]]]. 
(iii) [Bob went to [Øi [it was CHICAGOi, wasn’t it?]]]. 
(iv) [Bob went to [Øi [it was CHICAGOi, wasn’t it?,]] on Saturday?] 
(v) * Bob kissed, didn’t he, Sally? 
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3.5.5 Syntactic evidence for the reduced copular approach: a summary 
 
In this subsection (§3.5), I provided syntactic evidence for the reduced 
copular approach to attributions that I propounded in §3.2. The fact that 
bare nominals can be attributions (§3.5.2), and that predicative attributions 
display predicative case in non-Slavic languages (§3.5.4) provides direct 
support for the reduced copular approach, which treats attributions as 
postcopular elements of reduced parenthetical copular clauses. The fact that 
attributions cannot be c-commanded into or extracted from (§3.5.1), and 
that attributions can display dissimilar illocutionary force to their hosts 
(§3.5.3), merely show that attributions are derived from clauses that are 
syntactically and semantically opaque and which can be used to commit 
speech acts. While these properties are captured on the reduced clausal 
approach, which treats the parenthetical copular clauses from which 
attributions are derived as Force phrasal adjuncts, it does not entail that 
alternative analyses that can also capture these properties are inferior to the 
reduced copular analysis of attributions. Thus, the inferiority of these 
alternative theories (if indeed they are inferior) must be shown by other 
means. I return to this issue in chapter six, where I discuss the feasibility of 
alternative analyses to those that I have advanced for appositions in §2.1 and 
for attributions in §3.2. 
 
3.6 Concluding remarks on attributions 
 
In this chapter, I advanced the idea that attributions are reduced 
parenthetical predicational or truncated cleft copular clauses and provided 
evidence to support it. My analysis differs from others that pursue a similar 
approach (namely, that appositives are reduced copular clauses) such as 
Heringa (2011), Döring (2014) and Ott (2014a, b) in two ways. First, I do not 
claim that all appositives are derived in this manner, as only attributions 
(and not true appositions, see chapter two) are. Secondly, I claim that, aside 
from the application of left-edge ellipsis in English and presence of pro 
subjects and zero copulas in Turkish, attributions are identical to 
parenthetical copular clauses that can be introduced by a linker like and 
(these clauses are called and-parentheticals in Kavalova 2007). This 
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association is absent in Heringa (2011), though I cannot say with any 
confidence whether or not this absence of association is intentional or not. 
 In this chapter, I proposed that and-parentheticals (and hence the 
attributions formed from their reduction) are adjoined to their host clause. 
Adjunction is not the only possibility however: and-parentheticals could be 
coordinated with or orphaned from their hosts. I will provide evidence 
against these alternative hypotheses in §6.2-6.3. 
 At this juncture, it appears that the explication of my theory of 
appositives is now complete. I have endeavoured to show that a binary and 
superordinate division must be made between appositives that are 
coordinated with their anchors in a low, WYSIWYG fashion (i.e. appositions), 
and appositives that are Force phrases (which can be reduced to form 
attributions) that adjoin to their host. 
 There are repercussions to advancing a binary division between 
appositive elements, however. One repercussion concerns appositive relative 
clauses (ARCs) such as who is my friend in (103) below. 
 
(103) John, who is my friend, is coming for dinner. 
 
The question that arises is this: are ARCs coordinated with their hosts in a 
low fashion (as appositions are), or are ARCs (derived from) Force phrasal 
adjuncts (as attributions are)? I endeavour to answer this question in 
following chapter. 
  4 
Appositive relative clauses 
In this chapter, I aim to locate the place of appositive relative clauses 
(ARCs) within the theory of appositives that I developed in chapters 
two and three. Do ARCs modify null nominal appositions or null 
nominal attributions, or are they stand-alone Force phrasal adjuncts? 
In §4.1, I introduce appositional and attributional relatives – which are 
regular restrictive relatives observed in parenthetical environments – 
and outline a syntactic analysis of them that serves as formal backdrop 
for later subsections. To test the hypothesis that ARCs are indeed 
restrictive relatives that are observed in parenthetical environments, I 
attempt to discover in §4.2 and §4.3 whether ARCs modify null 
appositions (§4.2) or null attributions (§4.3). Because ARCs pattern 
unlike appositional or attributional relatives, I conclude that ARCs 
modify neither null appositions nor null attributions. This entails that 
ARCs are stand-alone parenthetical clauses; an entailment I support 
with the theory of ARCs I outline in §4.4. 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
 
According to the conclusions of chapters two and three, appositions are 
coordinated with their anchors, while attributions are postcopular elements 
of reduced parenthetical copular clauses: 
 
(1) a. [&P [DP Lizzy Windsor], i.e. [DP the Queen]], drinks Dubonnet 
every day. 
 b. [DP [DP Lizzy Windsor], [ForceP (she’s) [DP a monarch of habit]]], 
drinks Dubonnet every day. 
 
As the examples in (1) show, noun phrases can be both conjuncts and 
postcopular items (among many other things). Noun phrases can also be 
optionally modified by restrictive relative clauses. Bearing these simple facts 
in mind, the fact that utterances like those in (2) are attested is rather 
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unsurprising. The relative clauses in these constructions are merely 
restrictive relatives that modify an apposition (2a) and an attribution (2b), 
and hence arise in a parenthetical environment. 
 
(2) Appositional relative clause 
a. [&P [DP Tom], i.e. [DP the man [CP that fixed our boiler]]], has sent 
us a Christmas card. 
 
Attributional relative clause 
b. [DP [DP Bob], [ForceP (he is) [DP someone [CP that always has too 
much to drink]]]], embarrassed himself last night. 
 
At first glance the appositive in (3a), which exemplifies the class of 
appositives known as appositive relative clauses (ARCs), looks like a 
restrictive relative that arises in a parenthetical environment whose external 
noun phrase is unpronounced, as in (3b) (De Vries 2002, 2006a, Šimík 2008, 
and Lassiter 2011). In this chapter, I test this ‘first blush’ hypothesis about 
ARCs. 
    
(3) a. Tom, who fixed our boiler, has sent us a Christmas card. 
 b. Tom, [DP (the man) [CP who fixed our boiler,]] has sent us… 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the remainder of this subsection 
(§4.1), I outline a syntactic and semantic analysis of the restrictive relative 
clauses displayed in (2). I do this in order to provide a formal backdrop for a 
comparison of appositional/attributional and appositive relative clauses in 
English.43 As such, the analysis of restrictive relatives that I adumbrate is not 
intended to be definitive, but merely sufficient for the sake of comparison.  
 After outlining my analysis of restrictive relatives in English, I will return 
to ARCs in §4.2 and §4.3 and test the abovementioned ‘first blush’ 
hypothesis. If the conclusions reached in chapters two and three are also 
correct, then ARCs must be a subclass of either appositional or attributional 
relative clauses, as the noun phrases to which they attach can only appear as 
                                                     
43  Because it does not display relativisation of the ‘operator-gap’ ilk (Lewis 1967), Turkish is not 
mentioned in this chapter. 
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appositives if they are either directly coordinated with their anchors (as 
nominal appositions are), or if they are postcopular nouns phrases of 
predicative or truncated cleft parenthetical clauses (as attributions are). 
Maintaining the assumption that they modify null appositive noun phrases, 
my aim in §4.2 and §4.3 is to discover whether ARCs modify null nominal 
appositions or null nominal attributions. However, because they behave 
unlike appositions or attributions, I will ultimately conclude that ARCs 
modify neither null appositions nor null attributions. This conclusion entails 
that ARCs are in vacuo parenthetical clauses (i.e. stand-alone parenthetical 
clauses that do not modify anything); an entailment that I argue is correct in 
§4.4. 
 To begin: let us, for the sake of concreteness and comparison, take a 
stance about the syntax of the restrictive relative clauses observed in (2). I 
adopt a variant of the matching analysis (Chomsky 1965, Sauerland 2003, 
Koster-Möller 2012).44 Internally, I assume that relative pronouns are 
definite descriptions that display the syntax that is exemplified by the schema 
in (4) (cf. Šimík 2008). In (4), X0 is a functional head that bears syntactic wh-
features. X0 is treated as a semantic identity function that concatenates with 
the predicate noun phrase thing. In (4), X0 is realised by which and D0 is 
occupied by a determiner that is obligatorily null in modern British English. 
 




 D0 whP 
 Øthe  λ𝑦[thing(𝑦)] 
 λPι𝑥[P(𝑥)]  
 
 X0 NP 
 which thing 
 λPλ𝑦[P(𝑦)] λz[thing(z)] 
 
                                                     
44  As far as I can tell, no aspect of the analysis that I advance in this chapter relies upon the 
adoption of the matching analysis of restrictive relatives. It is simply the case that a concrete comparison 
of restrictive and appositive relatives is more straightforward on the matching analysis than its raising 
(Kayne 1994, De Vries 2002) counterparts. 
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It appears that D0 in (4) can be morphologically realised in restrictive 
relatives in some varieties of English however (particularly in archaic 
English), as the examples procured from the internet in (5) and (6) 
demonstrate. 
 
(5) A book of contemplation the which is called The cloud of Unknowing.  
 (Underhill’s 1922 edition of the above-named treatise) 
 
(6) It is in no way an accurate description of the flourishing industry 
which is already planning its next round of drilling in 2015, nor the 
commitments the which are recognized as one of the highest 
standards of safety regulation anywhere in the world. 
 
What supresses the morphological realisation of D0 in restrictive relatives in 
standard English is unknown to me. Note that D0 can be realised in 
restrictive relatives in other languages, such as archaic registers of Dutch. 
This is shown in the example in (7), which is procured from the internet, in 
which the determiner het ‘the’ and relative element welk ‘which’ are fused. 
 
(7) Hij las het boek hetwelk hij van zijn vader geërfd had. 
 he read the book the.which he of his father inherited had 
 ‘He read the book which he inherited from his father.’ 
 
Following Jackendoff (1977) and Lassiter (2011), I propose that relative 
pronouns other than which are polymorphemic. As such, a relative pronoun 
like who realises the referential noun phrase [Øthe which person], while a 
relative pronoun like where realises the prepositional phrase [in Øthe which 
place]. 
 Upon extraction, relative pronouns like (4) are concatenated with TP by 
predicate modification (Heim & Kratzer 1998). The resulting CP, which is 
represented in (8), is therefore interpreted as a predicate. 
 
(8) [CP <e, t> [DP Øthe [whP which thing]]1 [TP Pete likes t1]] 
 
The relative clause in (8) then concatenates by predicate modification with 
an external predicate nominal, which is thing in (9a). Finally, the entire 
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construction is topped by a determiner, which converts it into a referential 
noun phrase (9b). 
 
(9) a. [NP thing [CP [DP Øthe [whP which thing]]1 [TP Pete likes t1]]] 
b. [DP the [NP thing [CP [DP Øthe [whP which thing]]1 [TP Pete likes t1]]]] 
 
In the case of which-relatives, the predicate noun within the whP is deleted, 
as (10a) shows. In the case of that-relatives, the entire whP is rendered 
unpronounced, as (10b) shows.  
 
(10) a. [NP thing [CP [DP Øthe [whP which thing]]1 [TP Pete likes t1]]] 
 b. [DP the [NP thing [CP [DP Øthe [whP which thing]]1 that [TP Pete likes 
t1]]]] 
 
The operation observed in (10) is called movement deletion, which is licensed 
locally by c-command, which is obligatory, and which targets erasable copies 
in Aʹ-chains. Movement deletion is also observed in comparative 
constructions such as (11), as Kennedy (2002) shows. 
 
(11) The Milky way contains more stars than [CP (*the amount of stars)1 the 
eye can see t1]. 
 
Having outlined an analysis of the restrictive relatives that are observed in 
the appositives in (2) (and restrictive relatives more generally) that will serve 
as a suitable backdrop for an investigation of appositive relative clauses, I 
now turn to the question of whether ARCs are indeed a subset of either 
appositional (such as 2a) or attributional (such as 2b) relative clauses. 
 
4.2 Appositive relatives as modifiers of null nominal appositions? 
 
In this section, I entertain the hypothesis that ARCs like (3a) modify null 
nominal appositions. In other words, I assess the plausibility of the claim that 
(3a) displays the coordinative syntax in (12). 
 
(12) [&P [DP Tom,] [DP (the man) [CP who fixed our boiler,]] has sent us… 
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The most straightforward way to tell if ARCs display the structure in (12) is 
to compare them to appositional relative constructions like (13), which 
definitely do display the structure in (12) (see chapter two). 
 
(13) Tom, i.e. the man {who/that} fixed our boiler, has sent us a Christmas 
card. 
 
In two important respects, appositional and appositive relatives do 
correspond. First, if contained within the same clause as their anchors, both 
appositional and appositive relative clauses must be right-adjacent to them, 
as the examples in (14) and (15) show (however, see footnote 47 in this 
chapter for important caveats). 
 
(14) Appositional relative clauses 
 a.  The Big Apple, i.e. the city that most people know as “New 
York”, is a huge place. 
 b. * The Big Apple is, i.e. the city that most people know as “New 
York”, a huge place. 
 
(15) Appositive relative clauses 
 a.  The Big Apple, which most people know as “New York”, is a 
huge city. 
 b. * The Big Apple is, which most people know as “New York”, a 
huge city. 
 
Second, both appositional and appositive relatives can occupy a position 
right-adjacent to the clause that immediately contains their anchor, as the 
examples in (16) and (17) demonstrate (De Vries 2002, contrary to the 
assumptions of McCawley 1998 and Potts 2005). Note that I will return to 
discuss the distribution of ARCs that are non-adjacent to their anchors in 
§4.4.2. 
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(16) Appositional relative clauses 
 a. John saw Jo yesterday, i.e. the woman that he often dreams 
about. 
 b. That John visited the Big Apple yesterday, i.e. the city that most 
people know as “New York”, is great news. 
 
(17) Appositive relative clauses 
 a. John saw Jo yesterday, who he often dreams about. 
 b. That John visited the Big Apple yesterday, which city most 
people know as “New York”, is great news. 
 
This is where the similarities between appositional and appositive relatives 
end. Problematically, ARCs do not reformulate or identify their anchors. 
Considering that appositions must do this by definition (§2.1), this is 
troubling for the association of ARCs with appositional relative clauses. To 
illustrate that ARCs do not identify their anchors, consider the examples in 
(18). Here, the anchor is a third person pronoun whose antecedent is not 
sufficiently salient in the prior discourse. To ensure that the hearer knows to 
whom her refers, the speaker appends an apposition (18a) or appositional 
relative construction (18b), which provides a more informative name for 
discourse referent in question. 
 
(18) a.  John saw her yesterday, his ex-wife. 
b.  John saw her yesterday, the woman he loves. 
 
If ARCs are appositional relative clauses, one expects them to display the 
same behaviour that is observed in (18). They do not, as (19) demonstrates. 
Here, the ARC fails to provide a more informative name for her, and 
incoherence arises because her cannot be bound (in discourse terms) to a 
salient discourse referent. 
 
(19) # John saw her yesterday, who he loves. 
 
One might claim that the appositive noun phrase in ARCs must be a null 
pronoun (De Vries 2006a:238). If this claim is correct, then the incoherence 
observed in (19) is expected. ARCs like (19) do not reformulate their anchors 
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for the same reason that appositional relative clause constructions that 
display pronouns and modify unbounded pronominal anchors such as (20) 
do not: they fail to provide more informative names for their anchors. 
 
(20) # John saw her yesterday, she who he loves. 
 
As I discussed in §2.2.6, appositions also exemplify their anchors, as the 
example in (21), which is repeated from (113) in chapter two, shows. 
 
(21) All politicians, but especially Cameron, are crooks. 
 
As one would expect, appositional relative constructions can exemplify their 
anchors too: 
 
(22) All politicians, but especially the man that lives in Downing Street, are 
crooks. 
 
If ARCs are derived from appositional relative constructions, then one 
expects them to be capable of exemplifying their anchors. This expectation is 
not met, as the examples in (23) show. This observation casts a shadow of 
doubt on the alignment of ARCs with appositional relative constructions. 
 
(23) a. * John likes music, especially which his dad introduced him to. 
 b. * John likes music, which his dad introduced him to, especially. 
 
Moreover, one cannot appeal to notion that ARCs modify null appositive 
pronouns rather than full referential expressions to explain why the example 
in (22) is acceptable while the examples in (23) are not. This is because 
pronouns make for suitable external noun phrases of appositional relative 
constructions that exemplify their anchors: 
 
(24) Mary hates all the villains in Harry Potter, especially he who cannot 
be named. 
 
Another hint that ARCs do not modify null appositions comes from data 
that concern extraction. Recall from §2.1 that extraction is licit in 
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appositional constructions only if it applies equally to both the apposition 
and its anchor, as per Ross’ (1967) coordinate structure constraint. This fact 
gives rise to the prediction that, if ARCs are akin to appositional relative 
clauses, extraction from within an ARC’s anchor alone should be illicit, as 
the anchor is the initial conjunct of a coordination phrase. 
 The prediction is not borne out, as the examples in (25) show. Note that 
(25a) is degraded because who is indefinite (while 25a comes from Citko 
2008: 648, the judgement reflects my informants’).  
 
(25) a. ? Who1 did John buy Picasso’s portrait of t1, which all his friends 
admired?  
 b.  It’s England1 that we hate the roads of t1, which are full of 
potholes. 
 
Further evidence that ARCs do not modify null appositions comes from 
finiteness. The relative clause in appositional relative constructions can be 
infinitival, as (26a) shows. If relative clauses in appositions are merely regular 
relatives that are observed in parenthetical environments (as I claim) then 
this fact is unsurprising, as regular relatives may display infinitival syntax 
too, as (26b) illustrates. 
 
(26) a. A holy day, that is to say a day on which to pray, is coming up 
next week. 
 b. A day on which to pray is coming up next week. 
 
If they modified null appositions, and hence patterned with regular 
restrictive relatives, one would expect that ARCs could display infinitival 
syntax. This expectation is not met, as (27) demonstrates (McCawley 1998). 
That this dissimilarity between ARCs and appositional relative constructions 
pertains provides an additional hint that ARCs do not modify null 
appositions. 
 
(27) * A holy day, on which to pray, is coming up next week. 
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Because appositional relative constructions are subclausal constituents, they 
cannot bear an illocutionary force that is dissimilar to their host clauses’, as 
(28) shows. 
 
(28) Appositional relative clause constructions 
 a. * Bob, i.e. the man from whom will we EVER receive a 
compliment?, is a curmudgeonly man. 
 b. * When the play is over, i.e. the point at which please remember to 
applaud!, we will be serving drinks in the reception area. 
 c. * Pete’s bid, i.e. the offer that I hereby gladly accept, was 
substantial. 
 
Nor can appositional relative constructions host dependent interrogative 
tags, which are reserved for Force phrases that are endowed with a QUESTION 
predicate: 
 
(29) * Bob, i.e. the guy that fixed our boiler, isn’t he?, sent us a Christmas 
card. 
 
If ARCs are appositional relative constructions whose external noun phrase 
is null, then one expects that ARCs cannot host independent illocutionary 
force either. This expectation is not met, as the examples in (30) and (31) 
demonstrate (Cinque 2008). In (30a), the ARC is a question inside a host 
assertion, in (30b) the ARC is a command inside a host assertion, while in 
(30c) the ARC is a performative inside a host assertion. In (31), the ARC 
successfully hosts a dependent interrogative tag. This discrepancy between 
ARCs and appositional relative constructions provides another hint that they 
should not be equated, as it suggests that ARCs are (derived from) Force 
phrases while appositional relative clauses are not. 
 
(30) a. Bob, from whom will we EVER receive a compliment?, is a 
curmudgeonly man. 
 b. When the play is over, at which point please remember to 
applaud!, we will be serving drinks in the reception area. 
 c. Pete’s bid, which I hereby gladly accept, is very generous.  
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(31) Marcia, who you wanted to meet, didn’t you?, has just arrived. 
   (McCawley 1998:447) 
 
A further hint that ARCs are (derived from) Force phrases comes from the 
observation that they may host discourse particles such as therefore (see 32a, 
modified from Burton-Roberts 1999), which establish rhetorical relations 
between Force phrases across the discourse. As appositive noun phrases that 
cannot bear independent illocutionary force, the fact that appositional 
relative constructions are unable to host discourse particles like therefore is 
expected (see 32b). Again, the contrast observed in (32) provides further 
evidence that ARCs do not modify null appositions.  
 
(32) a.  John gets on best with small firms, who therefore employ him 
frequently. 
 b. * The vice president gets on best with the Halliburton group, i.e. 
those firms who therefore employ him frequently. 
 
On the matching analysis of restrictive relatives outlined in §4.1, restrictor 
noun phrases that arise when the relative pronoun is which are obligatorily 
deleted, as the schema from (10a), which is repeated in a modified form in 
(33) below, shows.   
 
(33)  [DP the [NP book [CP [which (*book)]1 [TP I loathed t1 as a student]]]] 
 
Because appositional relative constructions are merely noun phrases like (33) 
that are observed in an appositional environment, the same obligatory 
deletion of restrictor noun phrases is observed: 
 
(34) Finnegan’s Wake, i.e. the book which (*book) I loathed as a student, 
starts halfway through a sentence. 
 
This obligatory deletion is not observed in ARCs, however, as the example in 
(35) shows (Fabb 1990, McCawley 1998). 
 
(35) Finnegan’s Wake, which (book) I loathed as a student, starts halfway 
through a sentence. 
130 Appositive relative clauses 
On the assumption that ARCs and appositional relative constructions 
correspond, it seems that deletion of the restrictor noun phrase is obligatory 
if the external noun phrase is present (as with restrictive and appositional 
relatives) but optional if the external noun phrase is null (as with ARCs). The 
matching analysis of relative clauses, which assumes movement deletion 
(Kennedy 2002), fails to account for the observation in (35). If movement 
deletion were optional when its licensor were absent, one would expect that 
the amount of stars in the comparative construction in (36B), which is 
derived by movement deletion, could undergo optional deletion too. This 
expectation is not met, as the amount of stars in (36B) must be deleted. 
Resultantly, the assumption that the absence of the external noun phrase 
licenses the pronunciation of the restrictor noun phrase in ARCs must be 
viewed with suspicion. More plausible is the simple hypothesis that ARCs do 
not contain an external noun phrase whatsoever.  
 
(36) A:  There are so many stars in the sky! 
 B:  Indeed. There are more stars than (*the amount of stars) the eye 
can see t1. 
 
Another indication that ARCs do not modify null appositions comes from 
data that concerns ‘split’ anchors. Because appositions function to 
reformulate their anchors, referential appositions cannot corefer with items 
other than those with which they are coordinated. This is shown in (37), 
where the apposition cannot be construed as coreferent with both Tom and 
Katie.  
 
(37) * Tomi met with Katiek, i.e. [my siblings]i+k. 
 
As expected, the same constraint that is observed in (37) is operative on 
appositional relative constructions, as (38) demonstrates. 
 
(38) * Paul uses whiskyi to dilute brandyk, i.e. [the two strong liquors]i+k 
that he likes to drink. 
 
If they are appositional relative constructions, then one expects that ARCs 
cannot modify ‘split’ anchors either. This expectation is not met. As the 
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example in (39) illustrates, ARCs can modify split anchors (McCawley 1998, 
De Vries 2002, Cinque 2008). 
 
(39) Paul uses whiskyi to dilute brandyk, whichi+k are both strong liquors. 
 
Another concern for the hypothesis that ARCs are appositional relative 
constructions comes from the observation that appositional relative 
constructions, but not ARCs, can host apposition markers: 
 
(40) a. Pete, (i.e.) the guy {who/that} fixed our boiler, sent us a 
Christmas card. 
 b. Pete, (*i.e.) who fixed our boiler, sent us a Christmas card. 
 
To account for the dissimilarity observed in (40), an advocate of the notion 
that ARCs modify null nominal appositions might suggest that apposition 
markers are only licit if external noun phrases of appositional relative 
constructions are pronounced. Evidence suggests that such an idea cannot be 
maintained however, as ‘complement of N’ appositional relatives such as 
those exemplified in (41) can host apposition markers regardless of whether 
or not the external noun phrase the rumour is pronounced. (That the 
constructions in 41 involve relativisation is demonstrated by Aboh 2005, 
Kayne 2010, Arsenjević 2009, and Haegeman 2012.) 
 
(41) The rumour, (i.e.) (the rumour) that John was fired, is nonsense. 
 
The last difference between ARCs and appositional relative constructions 
that I wish to discuss concerns massive pied-piping (Safir 1986). As the 
example in (42) shows, ARCs permit the massive pied-piping of phrases that 
contain appositive relative pronouns. 
 
(42) Doctor Smith, due in part to the cool-headedness of the father of the 
wife of whom I am alive today, is incompetent. 
 
This phenomenon is illicit in appositional relative constructions, however: 
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(43) * Doctor Smith, i.e. the man due in part to the cool-headedness of the 
father of the wife of whom I am alive today, is incompetent. 
 
On the matching analysis of relative clauses outlined in §4.1, the difference 
in acceptability between (42) and (43) cannot be accounted for. Regardless of 
whether or not the external noun phrase the man is pronounced, no 
movement deletion occurs in either (42) or (43), as the relative pronoun is 
polymorphemic (i.e. it realises which man). As such, one cannot appeal to 
locality constraints on movement deletion to explain the unacceptability of 
(43).45 
 To summarise: in this section (§4.2), I assessed the plausibility of the 
claim that ARCs modify null nominal appositions by comparing their 
behaviour to that of appositional relative constructions. Aside from the fact 
that they share the same distribution (i.e. both can only appear adjacent to 
their anchors or the clauses that immediately contain their anchors), ARCs 
and appositional relative constructions share no common properties. This 
conclusion casts a rather large shadow of doubt on the hypothesis that ARCs 
modify null nominal appositions. 
 
4.3 Appositive relatives as modifiers of null nominal attributions? 
 
In this section, I entertain the hypothesis that ARCs like (44a) modify null 
nominal attributions. In other words, I assess the plausibility of the claim 
that (44a) displays the syntax in (44b). 
 
                                                     
45  De Vries (2006b) notes that, in cases where the relative phrase is a prepositional phrase that 
contains a possessive noun phrase, massive pied-piping is licit in both restrictive and appositive relatives: 
(i) I know the man to the father of whose wife you spoke yesterday. 
(ii) Ben, to the father of whose wife you spoke yesterday, is coming for dinner. 
These data and those in (42) and (43) highlight that there are different degrees of ‘massiveness’ to pied-
piping, and that only ‘extreme’ massive pied-piping of the sort observed in (42) can occur in ARCs. About 
the extremely massive pied-piping exemplified in (42), Webelhuth (1992:130) says “the exceptional cases 
of pied piping are indeed instances of topicalisation in which what looks formally like a relative pronoun 
is interpreted as an indexical pronoun”. I will argue in §4.4 that Webelhuth’s characterisation is indeed 
correct for ARCs: the relative phrase in ARCs indeed undergoes obligatory topicalisation.  
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(44) a. Tom, who fixed our boiler, has sent us a Christmas card. 
 b. [DP [DP Tom,] [ForceP he is [DP (the man) [CP who fixed our 
boiler,]]]] has sent us… 
 
The most straightforward way to tell if ARCs display the structure in (44b) is 
to compare them to attributional relative constructions such as (45), which 
definitely do display the structure in (44b). 
 
(45) Tom, (he is) someone {who/that} is always late, has sent us a Christmas 
card. 
 
At first glance, the theory that ARCs modify null nominal attributions fares 
better than the theory that they modify null nominal appositions, which I 
assessed in §4.2. In that section, I showed that ARCs may modify split 
anchors while appositional relative constructions cannot: 
 
(46) a.  Paul uses whiskyi to dilute brandyk, whichi+k are both strong  
  liquors. 
 b. * Paul uses whiskyi to dilute brandyk, i.e. [the two strong 
liquors]i+k that he likes to drink. 
 
Like ARCs, attributional relative constructions may modify split anchors: 
 
(47) Paul uses whiskyi to dilute brandyk, (theyi+k are) drinks that are both 
strong liquors. 
 
As the subscripted indices in (47) indicate, attributional relative 
constructions can modify split anchors because they are postcopular items of 
parenthetical copular clauses whose null subjects can corefer with multiple 
precedent referents. The fact that ARCs can modify split anchors therefore 
provides an initial suggestion that they contain null subjects too, and hence 
that the schema in (44b) is correct for ARCs. 
 It was also mentioned in §4.2 that ARCs can host independent 
illocutionary force (see the examples in 30, which are repeated below). 
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(48) a. Bob, from whom will we EVER receive a compliment?, is a 
curmudgeonly man. 
 b. When the play is over, at which point please remember to 
applaud!, we will be serving drinks in the reception area. 
 c. Pete’s bid, which I hereby gladly accept, is very generous. 
 
Attributional relative constructions also display this property, but in a 
limited respect. More specifically, attributional relative constructions can be 
questions and performatives, but not commands: 
 
(49) a.  Bob (the guy that Mary likes?) is sitting over there. 
 b. * When the play is over, a point at which please remember to 
applaud!, we will be serving drinks in the reception area. 
 c.  Pete’s bid, an offer which I hereby gladly accept, is very 
generous. 
 
The limitations on the type of independent force that attributions may bear 
can be ascribed to their status as reduced copular clauses. Erotetic and 
performative attributions are permitted because the finite copular clauses 
from which they are derived can be interrogative and declarative (i.e. is he 
the guy that Mary likes? in the case of 49a; it is an offer which I hereby gladly 
accept in the case of 49b) but not imperative. If ARCs modified null nominal 
attributions, one would expect the same limitation observed in (49) to apply. 
That it does not (as 48 has demonstrated) hints towards the conclusion that 
ARCs and attributions do not obtain their status as independent speech acts 
by the same means. Resultantly, the data in (48) and (49) undermine the 
notion that ARCs modify null attributions, and imply that the similarity that 
pertains between ARCs and attributional relative constructions with respect 
to split anchors is accidental. 
 Further evidence that ARCs and attributional relative constructions 
obtain their status as speech acts by different means is provided by revisiting 
the data on interrogative tags from §4.2. When the clauses from which 
attributional relative constructions are derived are fully pronounced (as in 
50a) the subject of the tag cannot corefer with subject of the relative clause 
(you). Rather, it must corefer with the parenthetical clause’s matrix subject 
(that). When such parenthetical clauses are reduced down to form 
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attributions, as in (50b), a similar acceptability judgement is obtained, as 
expected. 
 
(50) a. Stilton, that’s the cheese that you like, {isn’t it / *don’t you}?, is 
on offer in the supermarket. 
 b. Stilton, that’s the cheese that you like, {isn’t it / *don’t you}?, is 
on offer in the supermarket. 
 
As mentioned in §4.2, ARCs can host dependent interrogative tags. If ARCs 
were akin to attributional relative constructions and were therefore derived 
from the schema in (44b), the distribution of tags that is observed in (50) 
would also be observed in ARCs. As (51) demonstrates, this is not the case.  
 
(51) Stilton, which you like, {don’t you / *isn’t it}?, is on offer in the 
supermarket. 
 
The fact that the interrogative tag isn’t it? is unavailable in (51) shows that 
the ARC in (51), unlike its attributional relative counterpart in (50b), is not 
dominated by an unpronounced subject that. This conclusion therefore 
provides evidence that ARCs do not modify null attributions. 
 Additional evidence that ARCs do not modify null attributions comes 
from finiteness. The relative clause in attributional relative constructions can 
be infinitival, as (52a) shows. If relative clauses in attributions are merely 
regular relatives that are observed in parenthetical environments (as I claim) 
then this fact is unsurprising, as regular relatives that modify postcopular 
noun phrases may display infinitival syntax too (see 52b). 
 
(52) a. The Dalai Lama, a man to whom to show respect, lives in India. 
 b. The Dalai Lama is a man to whom to show respect. 
 
If they modified null attributions, and hence equate with regular restrictive 
relatives, one would expect that ARCs could display infinitival syntax. This 
expectation is not met, as (53) demonstrates. This discrepancy provides 
another hint that ARCs do not modify null attributions. 
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(53) * The Dalai Lama, to whom to show respect, lives in India. 
 
Further evidence that ARCs do not modify null attributions comes from the 
observation that two particular subsets of ARCs cannot be derived from 
copular clauses. These are ARCs whose relative pronouns are contained 
within complements of nouns (see 54), and ARCs whose anchors are free 
relatives (see 55, from Del Gobbo 2007:193). 
 
(54) a.  The Romans are famous for their mosaics, fine examples of 
which are held at the museum. 
 b. * The Romans are famous for their mosaics, {there are/it is} 
(some) fine examples of which are held at the museum. 
 
(55) a.  I go there whenever I have time, which isn’t often.  
 b. * I go there whenever I have time, it is {something/a time/the 
time} which isn’t often. 
 
The fact that the ARCs in (54) and (55) cannot be derived from copular 
clauses demonstrates that the schema in (44b) is untenable for them. While 
this observation does not preclude that other ARCs modify null attributions, 
it undermines the worth of pursuing such a theory. If an alternative analysis 
can be advanced that captures the syntactic behaviour of all ARCs, this 
alternative analysis will be preferred to a theory that necessarily splits ARCs 
asunder. 
 Further evidence that ARCs are not attributional relative clauses comes 
from the types of quantified nominal anchors each may modify. I 
demonstrated in §3.4.2.2 that attributions can modify anchors whose 
quantifier is referential (i.e. a, three, some, several, many, few) or superfluous 
(every and all in certain contexts), but cannot modify strong quantified 
phrases. The relevant examples are repeated below. 
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(56) a.  Every chess set comes with a red pawn, a spare. 
 b. (Every) man, driven to it by his genetic predispositions, feels the 
need to dominate others. 
 c. (All) biologists, slaves to their ambition, wish to publish in 
Nature.  
 d. Mary has ({few / many}) friends, leftists no doubt. 
 e. {Several / some} students, a tenacious little bunch, still go to Dr. 
Brown’s lectures. 
 f. * {Every / no} climber, an experienced adventurer, was found 
sipping cocoa in the lodge. 
 
While ARCs pattern like attributions with respect to (56a-e), as (57) shows, 
they pattern dissimilarly to attributions with respect to strong quantified 
noun phrases like every x and no x, as (58) illustrates. 
 
(57) a.  Every chess set comes with a red pawn, which is a spare. 
 b. (Every) man, who is driven to it by his genetic predispositions, 
feels the need to dominate others. 
 c. (All) biologists, who are slaves to their ambition, wish to 
publish in Nature.  
 d. Mary has ({few / many}) friends, who are leftists no doubt. 
 e. {Several / some} students, who are a tenacious little bunch, still 
go to Dr. Brown’s lectures. 
 
(58) a. No properly trained linguist, who would have been taught 
phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake. 
 b. Every properly trained linguist, who would have been taught 
phonetics as part of her training, would have got that right. 
   (Arnold 2007:292) 
 
The ARCs in (58) can modify strong quantified anchors because the irrealis 
tense observed within them permits modal subordination (Roberts 1987), 
which renders the ARCs as equivalent to conditionals. This makes the 
quantified noun phrase properly trained linguist accessible for binding by the 
ARC pronoun (see Arnold 2007 for a formal implementation). Indeed, when 
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irrealis tense is removed, as in the stative copular clausal ARC below, 
incoherence is engendered (just as in 56f). 
 
(59) * {Every / no} climber, who was an experienced adventurer, was 
found sipping cocoa in the lodge. 
 
Thus, (56f) and (59) are unacceptable because they are derived from stative 
copular clauses that do not trigger modal subordination. If ARCs were 
derived from attributions (see 60a), which are themselves derived from 
stative copular clauses, one would incorrectly predict that the examples in 
(58) are unacceptable. Moreover, one cannot pursue the idea that ARCs are 
derived from attributions by arguing that reduction can apply to non-stative 
copular clauses (as in 60b). If it could, then the example in (56f) would be 
coherent (as it could be derived from 61), which it is not. 
 
(60) a. * No properly trained linguist, she is someone who would have 
been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have made 
that mistake. 
 b.  No properly trained linguist, she would be someone who would 
have been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have 
made that mistake. 
 
(61) {Every / no} climber, he would be an experienced adventurer, was 
found sipping cocoa in the lodge. 
  
To summarise: in this section (§4.3), I assessed the plausibility of the 
hypothesis that ARCs modify null nominal attributions. While ARCs and 
attributions share two commonalities, namely that both can display 
independent illocutionary force and modify split anchors, ARCs pattern 
unlike attributional relative constructions with respect to their ability to 
modify strong quantified anchors, their ability to display infinitival syntax, 
and their ability to host dependant interrogative tags that are non-
isomorphic to those tags that attributional relative constructions can host. 
Also, there exist two subclasses of ARCs that cannot be derived from copular 
clauses and hence cannot be attributional relative constructions. Taken 
together, I conclude from the data examined in this section that the 
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commonalities that are observed between ARCs and attributions are 
accidental, and that, ultimately, ARCs do not modify null nominal 
attributions. 
 
4.4 Appositive relative clauses as finite clausal Force phrasal 
adjuncts 
 
In §4.2 and §4.3, I assessed the plausibility of the hypotheses that ARCs 
modify null nominal appositions and attributions respectively. By comparing 
the behaviour of ARCs to the behaviour of appositional and attributional 
relative constructions, I demonstrated that ARCs act like neither. From this 
comparison, I conclude that ARCs do not modify null appositions or 
attributions. On the assumption that all appositive noun phrases are either 
appositions or attributions, this leads to the conclusion that ARCs are in 
vacuo parenthetical clauses: they do not modify a null external appositive 
noun phrase of any kind. 
 In this section, I advance an analysis of the syntax of ARCs that postulates 
precisely this – that ARCs are parenthetical clauses. Not only does this 
analysis straightforwardly capture the behaviour of ARCs that has been 
documented in §4.2 and §4.3, but it allows me to maintain the claim that 
appositive structures come in only two variants: either coordinated with 
their anchors (i.e. appositions), or Force phrasal adjuncts. ARCs are in the 
second group, and are therefore comparable to the Force phrasal adjuncts 
from which attributions are derived. 
  
4.4.1 The internal syntax of appositive relative clauses 
 
According to the matching analysis of relative clauses that I outlined in §4.1, 
fronted phrases in restrictive relative clauses display the internal syntax in 
(62), which is repeated from (4). 
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 D0 whP 
 Øthe  λ𝑦[thing(𝑦)] 
 λPι𝑥[P(𝑥)]  
 
 X0 NP 
 which thing 
 λPλ𝑦[P(𝑦)] λz[thing(z)] 
 
I claimed in §4.1 that phrases exemplified by (62) are extracted and then 
concatenated by predicate modification with the TP in which their base-
position is contained. Concatenation occurs via predicate modification in 
order to derive predicate that can undergo an additional instance of 
predicate modification with an external noun phrase:  
 
(63) man who man Lucy loves = λ𝑦[man(𝑦) ∧ loves(Lucy, 𝑦)] 
 
Because they do not concatenate with an external noun phrase, I suggest that 
ARCs’ fronted phrases need not concatenate with the TP in which their base-
position is contained via predicate modification. Rather, this concatenation 
can proceed via regular function application (Heim & Kratzer 1998). Aside 
from this difference, the fronted phrases in ARCs are identical to the fronted 
phrases observed in restrictive clauses (i.e. both display the internal syntax in 
62). 
 
(64) a. [〈e, t〉 [Øthe which (thing)][〈e, t〉 John likes t1 best]] (restrictive rels) 
b. [t [Øthe which (thing)][〈e, t〉 John likes t1 best]] (appositive rels) 
  
As with restrictive relatives that display which, D0 in (62) cannot be realised 
in ARCs in modern British English. However, the realisation of D0 was 
prevalent in earlier forms of English, as the examples in (65) show (the first 
two examples in 65 come from Lassiter 2011:83). 
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(65) a. The better part of valour is discretion; [in the which better 
part]1 I have saved my life t1. (Shakespeare’s Henry IV, V:I) 
 b. But a snark, [on the which]1 we might lovingly gaze t1, 
  We have never beheld till now!  
   (Carroll’s The Hunting of the Snark) 
 c. Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, [over 
the which]1 the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers t1.  
   (King James Bible, Acts 20:28) 
 
D0 in (62) can be pronounced in related languages however, such as archaic 
registers of Dutch: 
 
(66) De mannen, met dewelke ik gisteren nog gesproken heb,… 
the men with the.which I yesterday just spoke have 
‘The men, with which I conversed only yesterday,…’ (M. de Vries, p.c.) 
 
Like with fronted phrases in restrictive relatives, I claim that all appositive 
relative pronouns aside from which are polymorphemic. In other words, who 
realises the noun phrase [Øthe which person], while where realises the 
prepositional phrase [in Øthe which place], etc. 
 The analysis I have advanced above maintains that, aside from the 
manner in which they remerge, the fronted phrases of restrictive and 
appositive relative clauses are identical. Support for this hypothesis comes 
from extraction data. In both restrictive (and hence appositional and 
attributional) and appositive relatives, fronted phrases that are extracted 
from noun phrase positions (I include positions where pronouns can replace 
clauses and verb phrases under this heading) are insensitive to selective 
islands, which are permeable to entities (Cresti 1995). This is demonstrated 
in (67) to (69) below, where the a- to d-examples display restrictive, 
appositional, attributional, and appositive relative clauses respectively (cf. 
Potts 2002). 
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(67) a. I’ve lost [e the book]1 that Pete asked whether I’ve read yet t1. 
 b. Pnin, i.e. [e the book]1 that Pete asked whether I’ve read yet t1, is 
gathering dust on my bookshelf.  
 c.  Kerry, [e a teacher]1 that Pete always asks whether I like t1, is 
giving today’s class. 
 d. The prosecutor claimed that I dropped the murder weapon,  
[e which]1 the judge then asked whether I did drop t1. 
 
(68) a. [e The rumour about John]1 that I wonder whether he’ll deny t1 
is rather vicious. 
 b. The rumour – i.e. [e the one about John]1 that I wonder whether 
he’ll deny t1 – is rather vicious. 
 c. The rumour about John, [e something]1 that I wonder whether 
he’ll deny t1, is rather vicious.  
 d. The prosecutor claimed that I am guilty, [e which]1 the judge 
then asked whether I deny t1. 
 
(69) a. I will do [e the same thing]1 that Bill wonders whether Holly has 
done t1 in the past. 
 b. That action, i.e. [e the thing]1 that Bill wonders whether Holly 
has done t1 in the past, will have terrible consequences. 
 c. That action, [e something]1 that Abby wonders whether Holly 
has done t1 in the past, will have terrible consequences. 
 d. My lawyer said that I should plead guilty, [e which]1 the judge 
then asked whether I will do t1. 
 
Insensitivity to selective islands is not observed when relative pronouns are 
extracted from non-nominal positions, however: 
 
(70) a. * Bo is in that place [⟨e,t⟩ where]1 I wonder whether I saw Al t1. 
 b. * Bo is there, in the place [⟨e,t⟩ where]1 I wonder whether I saw Al t1. 
 c. * Bo is there, somewhere [⟨e,t⟩ where]1 I wonder whether I saw Al t1. 
 d. * The prosecutor claimed that I saw him in a movie, [⟨e,t⟩ where]1 
the judge then asked whether I did see him t1. 
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The examples in (67) to (69) demonstrate that in each of the relative 
constructions under investigation, the extracted phrase denotes a full-fledged 
referential noun phrase. Furthermore, the examples in (70) provide support 
for the notion that relative pronouns like where are polymorphemic and 
denote full-fledged prepositional phrases. 
 The claim that phrases that contain relative pronouns remain referential 
in ARCs receives support from the ‘split anchor’ data discussed in §4.2 and 
§4.3. In these sections I showed how, unlike appositional (see 71a) but like 
attributional (see 71b) relative constructions, ARCs can modify a multiplicity 
of precedent anchors (see 71c). 
 
(71) a. * Sarahi met with Amyk, i.e. [the girls]i+k that I know from 
university. 
 b.  Paul uses whiskyi to dilute brandyk, (theyi+k are) drinks that are 
both strong liquors. 
 c.  Paul uses whiskyi to dilute brandyk, whichi+k are both strong 
liquors. 
 
I claimed in §4.3 that attributional relative constructions can modify split 
anchors because they contain a null pronoun (i.e. they in 71b). On the 
current analysis, the relative pronoun which is equivalent to a pronoun, 
insofar as both are definite descriptions (Elbourne 2001) that can establish 
coreference with referential expressions in the preceding discourse. Thus, the 
observation that ARCs can modify split anchors accords with my claim that 
appositive relative pronouns remain referential. 
 While I associate appositive relative and regular pronouns, I do not wish 
to imply that both classes are identical. Indeed, there are marked distinctions 
between the two (see Del Gobbo 2007:185). First, regular pronouns are deep 
anaphora (Hankamer & Sag 1976), which can corefer with both salient 
linguistic or non-linguistic antecedents. In contrast, appositive relative 
pronouns are surface anaphora that can only corefer with linguistic 
antecedents (Lassiter 2011, LaCara 2012). This distinction is exemplified by 
(72A) and (72Aʹ).46  
                                                     
46  Like surface anaphors such as so and that, appositive relative pronouns permit sloppy readings 
(compare (i) to (ii) and (iii) below). Because such interpretations are usually associated with verb phrase 
ellipsis, LaCara (2012) has argued that appositive relative pronouns that denote verb phrases are actually 
144 Appositive relative clauses 
(72) [Context: The company boss approaches A and B. A murmurs to B:] 
A:  Watch out – it’s the boss! 
Aʹ: # Watch out – who’s the boss! 
 
Second, the ‘distance’ between a regular pronoun and its antecedent can be 
greater than with an appositive relative pronoun and its antecedent. Regular 
pronouns are governed by accessibility restrictions (see Kamp & Reyle 1993), 
while (in most situations) appositive relative pronouns must corefer with the 
linearly-closest salient potential antecedent to their left. This constraint 
appears to be so inviolable that it may force one to associate the closest 
potential antecedent with a class to which it does not conventionally belong. 
This is observed in (73). Here the regular pronoun he may corefer with 
Frank, while the appositive relative pronoun must corefer with a Porsche, the 
closest potential antecedent. Incoherence arises because who’s coreference 
with a Porsche requires one to anthropomorphise a car, and to ascribe 
pretention to it. 
 
(73) A:  Frank bought a Porsche yesterday. 
 B:  He’s so pretentious. 
 B′: # Who’s so pretentious. 
 
Thirdly, pronouns like it can be cataphors. When observed in parenthetical 
clauses, such pronouns can be licensed either from a position linearly before 
or within their anchor: 
 
(74) a. John – and everyone reckons he didn’t do iti – has been accused 
of [stealing a car]i. 
 b. [The senator told the public – and everyone now admits iti – 
many lies]i.   (Arnold 2007:283) 
 
                                                                                                                            
the morphological realisation of an ellipsis site. For me, sloppy readings arise due to indexical ambiguity 
(cf. Elbourne 2008).  
(i) Mary is careful with her money, which John never was. (Del Gobbo 2007:194) 
(ii) Mary is pretty [careful with her money]i. And John even more soi. 
 (sloppy reading: John is careful with HIS money, not Mary’s) 
(iii) Mary [bites her nails]i. Luckily, John never does thati.  
   (sloppy reading: John bits HIS nails, not Mary’s) 
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Appositive relative pronouns can only be cataphors in conjuncts, where they 
are immediately preceded by a coordinator, as (75a) shows (Lee-Goldman 
2012). In all other environments, appositive relative pronouns cannot be 
linearly succeeded or surrounded by their anchor, as (75b) and (75c) 
illustrate. 47 
 
(75) a.  It may have happened once, or, whichi is unlikely, twicei. 
 b. * Whichi everyone now admits, [the world is round]i.  
 c. * [The senator told the public, whichi everyone now admits, 
many lies]i. 
   (Arnold 2007:283) 
 
To summarise: in this subsection (§4.4.1), I outlined by analysis of the 
internal syntax of ARCs. Modulo the variation in the type of semantic 
concatenation that occurs when fronted relative phrases remerge with the TP 
in which their base-position is contained (predicate modification in 
restrictive relatives versus function application in ARCs), I claimed that the 
relative constructions under investigation in this chapter are internally 
identical. While I claimed that they are referential, I listed data that illustrate 
that appositive relatives have a much more limited coreference domain than 
                                                     
47  Interestingly, it appears that some ARCs that modify clauses can be surrounded by their anchors, 
as the examples in (i) and (ii) show (I mark these examples as degraded rather than acceptable because, 
for my informants, judgements vary widely).  
(i) ? Ben has, which has started to annoy his wife, developed a tendency to whistle in the shower.  
(ii) ? Bobby has, which is actually beginning to worry me, been absent from school for a week. 
Common to such examples is the fact that, if paraphrased as non-appositive structures, these utterances 
involve it-extraposition/sentential subjects, as (iii) and (iv) show. In other words, it seems that a 
prerequisite for the (roughly) acceptable host-medial interpolation of such ARCs is that which is extracted 
from a position other than the object of an embedding verb (if which is extracted from this object 
position, unacceptability arises, as (75c) in the main text shows). At current, I have no idea why this 
should be, or whether or not these constructions involve extraposition. 
(iii)  It is actually beginning to worry me that Bobby has been absent from school for a week. 
(iv)  That Bobby has been absent from school for a week is actually beginning to worry me. 
Mark de Vries (p.c.) points out that Dutch appears to allow for similar constructions: 
(v)  Jan heeft, wat vreemd is, een nieuwe auto gekocht. 
  John has which peculiar is a new car bought 
  ‘John has, which is peculiar, bought a new car.’ 
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regular pronouns. An explanation for the difference is no doubt found in 
differences between how the ‘formal link’ between appositive relatives and 
their anchors and pronouns and their antecedents is established; a factor that 
I have not discussed and therefore leave for future investigation (see Del 
Gobbo 2007 for pertinent remarks).  
 
4.4.2 The external syntax of appositive relative clauses 
 
With respect to their external syntax, I propose that ARCs are Force phrases 
that adjoin to a maximal projection within their host clause (Arnold 2007, 
Koev 2013). From this claim arises the prediction that ARCs do not 
participate in the narrow syntactic or semantic composition of their host (no 
scope, no c-command relations). The examples in (76) to (79) show that this 
prediction is borne out. The examples in (76) to (78) illustrate that c-
command relations cannot be established across the host/ARC boundary, 
while the examples in (79) show that extraction from within the ARC is illicit 
(cf. McCawley 1998, De Vries 2007). 
 
(76) NPI licensing 
 a. It’s not the case that Grant is all that smart. 
 b. * It’s not the case that Grant, who is all that smart, won the pub 
quiz. 
 
(77) Modal auxiliaries 
Bob might call Jenny, who is a plumber, for help with his broken 
boiler.  
Interpretation:  Bob might call Jenny, and Jenny is a plumber. 
  * Bob might call Jenny, and Jenny might be a plumber. 
 
(78) Sentential negation 
Pete won’t visit Sally, who is an old friend, at the weekend. 
Interpretation:  Pete won’t visit Sally, and Sally is an old friend. 
  * Pete won’t visit Sally, and Sally isn’t an old friend. 
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(79) a. * Where1 is Elizabeth, who is the queen of t1, the country’s longest 
reigning monarch? 
 b. * It is England1 that Elizabeth, who is the queen of t1, is the 
country’s longest reigning monarch. 
 c. * England1 Elizabeth, who is the queen of t1, is the country’s 
longest reigning monarch. 
 d. * Elizabeth, who is the queen t1, has just been crowned [of 
England]1. 
 
Thus, the analysis I adopt for ARCs is identical to the one I provided for 
parenthetical copular clauses in §3.2, as a comparison of the schemata in 
(80b) and (18b) from chapter three (repeated in 81b below) demonstrates.48 
 
                                                     
48  In V2 languages like Dutch, ARCs such as die mijn vriend is in (i) below display the verb-finality 
typically associated with subordinate clauses (ii), rather than the V2 word order associated with root 
clauses (iii). 
(i) Joop, die mijn vriend is, is ook mijn baas.  
Joop,  who my friend is is also my boss 
‘Joop, who is my friend, is my also boss.’ 
(ii) Ik denk dat [Joop mijn vriend is]. 
 I think that  Joop my friend is 
 ‘I think that Joop is my friend.’ 
(iii) Op zaterdag kocht ik een nieuw pak. 
 On Saturday bought I a new suit 
 ‘On Saturday I bought a new suit.’ 
If my claim that ARCs are Force phrasal adjuncts is correct, then the ARC in (i) is more closely related to 
the root clause in (iii) than the subordinate clause in (ii), even though the position of the verb in the 
sentences above suggests otherwise. To account for this discrepancy, I tentatively propose that the 
presence or absence of wh-features in the topicalised phrases die in (i) and op zaterdag in (iii) is 
responsible for the verb’s position. If the topicalised phrase is [+wh, -Q], then verb-finality arises, while if 
the topicalised phrase is [-wh, -Q], then verb-second arises. Consequently, I maintain that verb-finality 
and subordination are not causally related. 
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 has kissed 
 ForceP Miranda 
   DP 
 ASSERT CP 
 Pete 
 who1 TP 
 
 t1 is my friend 
 




 ASSERT TP 
 
 Ben TP 
 




 baked us a cake 
 (and) ForceP 
 
 ASSERT TP 
 
 he’s a nice guy 
 
The claim that ARCs are finite clausal Force phrasal adjuncts provides a 
straightforward explanation for why ARCs and (some) attributional relative 
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constructions can display independent illocutionary force: ARCs constitute a 
distinct Force phrase to their host clause, while attributional relative 
constructions are noun phrases contained within a Force phrase that is 
distinct from their host clause: 
 
(82) a. Bob, [ForceP from whom will we EVER receive a compliment?], is a 
curmudgeonly man. 
 b.  Bob ([ForceP [TP (is he) [DP the guy that Mary likes?]]]) is sitting 
over there. 
 
As Force phrases, ARCs can host main clause phenomena, just like regular 
root clauses can. Thus, ARCs can display massive pied-piping (see 83, which 
is repeated from 42) because regular root clauses can, as the example in (84), 
which is modified from Ross (1967), shows. 
 
(83) Doctor Smith, [ForceP [due in part to the cool-headedness of the father of 
the wife of whom]1 I am alive today t1], is incompetent. 
 
(84) [ForceP Apparently, [the height of the lettering on covers of these 
reports]1 the GOVERNMENT, rather the local authority, prescribes t1]. 
With this in mind, we must be extra careful when preparing our 
dossiers. 
 
The claim that ARCs are Force phrasal adjuncts also provides an explanation 
for why ARCs can exhibit restrictor noun phrases but restrictive (and hence 
appositional and attributional) relatives cannot (see 85). According to the 
matching analysis of restrictive relatives that I outlined in §4.1, an ellipsis 
operation called movement deletion mandatorily deletes isomorphic lexemes 
in Aʹ-chains under identity with the external noun phrase (see 86). This 
ellipsis operation is licensed by c-command. 
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(85) a. The man which (*man) fixed our boiler is standing over there. 
 b. Pete, i.e. the man which (*man) fixed our boiler, has sent us a 
Christmas card. 
 c. Pete, someone which (*person) always has too much to drink, 
embarrassed himself last night.  
 d. Nietzsche said that God is dead, with which (proposition) I am 
inclined to agree. 
 
(86) [DP the [NP man [CP [which man]1 [TP John recommended t1]]]] 
 
As Force phrasal adjuncts, ARCs are opaque to c-commanding elements in 
their host clauses. Consequently, movement deletion is not operative. This 
explains why pronunciation of the restrictor noun phrase is possible in ARCs 
but not restrictive relatives. 
 The fact that ARCs cannot display infinitival syntax (see 87a, repeated 
from 52a) is also straightforwardly explained on the Force phrase analysis: 
undominated clausal syntactic units must be finite. 
 
(87) a. * The Dalai Lama, to whom to show respect, lives in India. 
 b. * To show respect to him. 
 
As mentioned in §4.2-4.3, the subject of dependent interrogative tags must 
corefer with the matrix subject of a Force phrase, as the example in (88) 
illustrates. 
 
(88) John denies that Mary will kiss him, {doesn’t he / *won’t she}? 
 
The current analysis, which maintains that ARCs are Force phrases that 
display WYSIWYG syntax, thus provides a straightforward explanation for 
why ARCs can host interrogative tags (as they are Force phrases) and for 
why the tag and the ARC’s subjects must corefer (as the ARC’s subject is the 
matrix subject): 
 
(89) Stilton, which you like, {don’t you / *isn’t it}?, is on offer in the 
supermarket. 
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Note that the adjunction that connects the ARC to the host clause is 
unconstrained from both a syntactic and compositional semantic perspective 
(see §3.2 for details). For the parenthetical copula clauses discussed in 
chapter three this was a benefit, as such interpolations can appear in any 
niche within their host: 
 
(90) a.  Someone (and I think it was Pete) has eaten all of the éclairs. 
 b.  Someone has (and I think it was Pete) eaten all of the éclairs. 
 c.  Someone has eaten all of the éclairs (and I think it was Pete). 
  
Conversely, if an ARC is contained within the intonation phrase (ι) of the 
clause that immediately contains its anchor α, it must immediately succeed α 
(contra McCawley 1998) (the examples below are modified from an 
utterance Strunk 2007 procured from the internet). 
 
(91) a.  [Bill Wyman, who I'd known in the 1970s, was phoning me]ι. 
 b. * [Bill Wyman was, who I'd known in the 1970s, phoning me]ι. 
 c.  [Bill Wyman was phoning me]ι, who I'd known in the 1970s. 
 
That the same freedom of interpolation observed with parenthetical copular 
clauses is not observed with ARCs requires the following restrictions to be 
posited: 
 
(92) If α is the element with which the appositive relative pronoun co-
refers (i.e. the anchor), and β is the intonation phrase that 
immediately contains α, then an ARC must either: 
a.  immediately follow α, or; 
b.  immediately follow β. 
 
The generalisation in (92b) permits examples like (93a) and prohibits 
examples like (93b-c). 
 
(93) a.  [β That Jo met [α Ad] yesterday], who’s a dissident, is scandalous. 
 b. *  [β That Jo met [α Ad] yesterday] is scandalous, who’s a dissident. 
 c. *  [β That Jo met [α Ad] yesterday] is, who’s a dissident, scandalous. 
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The generalisations in (92) still hold in cases in which the complement of the 
head noun of the anchor undergoes extraposition (the examples below are 
from Arnold 2007:287 and Potts 2002:85 respectively): 
 
(94) a. Sam claims to have found [α a proof t1], which many believed 
could not exist, [of one of the most famous conjectures in the 
history of mathematics]1. 
 b. “I’d have a better chance of winning the MegaBuck lottery,” 
Miles said, sliding the platter onto the counter and [noticing t1], 
which he hadn’t for a long time, [the purple cyst that grew out 
of Horace’s forehead]1. 
 
Note that pragmatic considerations constrain the application of (92b). Non-
adjacent ARCs that provide information about their anchor that is tangential 
to topic under discussion (elaborative ARCs) are difficult to license, while 
non-adjacent ARCs that extend the topic under discussion (continuative 
ARCs) are not (see Holler 2005, Loock 2007, and references therein):49 
 
(95) Continuative ARCs 
 a. Russell was both a philosopher and an activist, who readily 
suffered imprisonment for his beliefs. 
 b. Che Guevara was the real hero of the Cuban uprising, who 
showed admirable bravery in front of his troops. 
 c. John tripped over a stone in the park yesterday, which he picked 
up and took home with him. 
 
(96) Elaborative ARCs 
 a. * Kristian’s bicycle has a flat tyre, which is a racer. 
 b. * Ben reads the book to Lucy every night, which is a hardback. 
 c. ? John stole a rose from Ben’s garden, which is the universal 
symbol for romance. 
 
                                                     
49  As an aside, note the example in (95c) demonstrates that ARCs need not modify definite 
anchors. Rather, they must modify specific ones (as (i) below shows). 
(i) * Everyone saw a lady yesterday, who was upset. (on the distributive interpretation of a lady) 
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If the referent of an ARC’s anchor becomes the topic under discussion, 
elaborative ARCs cease to provide tangential information. In such 
environments (particularly, where contrastive focus is observed), non-
adjacent elaborative ARCs are easier to license, as a comparison of (97a) and 
(97b) illustrates. 
 
(97) a. ?? John saw Mary yesterday, who she’s known since childhood. 
    (all-new context) 
 b. A: I heard that Bill saw Mary yesterday. 
  B: No, JOHN saw Mary yesterday, who she’s known since childhood. 
 
For some of my informants, a distinction pertains within the class of non-
adjacent elaborative ARCs. This distinction concerns pitch accents. For 
them, non-adjacent elaborative ARCs cannot be licensed unless no pitch 
accent intervenes between the anchor and the ARC. Thus, in all-new 
environments, verb phrase adjuncts may intervene between object anchors 
and ARCs if such adjuncts are prosodically ‘light’ enough to be parasitic on 
the pitch accent of the anchor. If such adjuncts bear their own pitch accent, 
they cannot intervene between object anchors and ARCs (where acute 
accents represent pitch accents in the examples below). 
 
(98) a.  Jóhn saw Máry yesterday, who’s my sister. 
 b. ?? Jóhn saw Máry yésterday, who’s my sister. 
 
I believe that both the pragmatic and the prosodic constraints discussed 
above are facets of a broader set of rules that govern how discourse is 
managed and how coreference is established across it. Precisely how these 
rules should be formulated, and what creates them, must be left for future 
investigation.  
 Note also that the Force phrase analysis of parenthetical copular clauses 
in §3.2 provided a syntactic locus for the act-initial coordinator, which I 
claimed is the specifier position of the Force phrase. However, such 
coordinators are illicit in ARCs, contrary to the predictions of my analysis. 
 
(99) John, (*and) who is my friend, baked me a cake.  
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Thus, an extraneous explanation must be obtained for why and is licit in 
parenthetical copular clauses but not ARCs. Aside from suggesting that left-
edge ellipsis (LE, see §3.2) is obligatory in ARCs, which would help to 
account for the restrictions on their interpolation freedom, I concede that 
this explanation escapes me.  
 To summarise: in this subsection (§4.4.2), I advanced my analysis of 
ARCs as finite clausal Force phrases that adjoin within their host clause. 
Because Force phrases are syntactically and semantically opaque, this 
analysis captures the fact that ARCs display opacity with respect to c-
command and extraction. It also explains why restrictor noun phrases are 
licit in ARCs: the movement deletion that mandatorily deletes restrictor noun 
phrases in restrictive relatives (see §4.1) is not licensed in ARCs because it 
requires c-command to pertain between the deleted restrictor noun phrase 
and the external noun phrase, which it does not in ARCs. The claim that 
ARCs are clausal Force phrases aligns them with regular root clauses, and 
therefore explains why both permit massive pied-piping and can bear 
independent illocutionary force. 
 Although my ‘Force phrase’ analysis captures the unique properties of 
ARCs described above, it does not explain the interpolational restrictions 
that ARCs (but not parenthetical copular clauses) display. This is because my 
analysis predicts that ARCs can adjoin anywhere within their hosts. While I 
failed to provide explanations for the interpolational restrictions ARCs 
exhibit, I demonstrated that, to a large extent, pragmatic and prosodic 
constraints dictate the linear position of ARCs. If this is true, then my ‘adjoin 
anywhere and let extra-syntactic factors decide whether it’s okay’ approach 
to the external syntax of ARCs is plausible after all. 
 I have now outlined my analysis of ARCs, which treats them as finite 
clause Force phrasal adjuncts. If this analysis is correct, it supports my 
overarching claim that, from a syntactic perspective, there exist two types of 
appositive constructions in English and Turkish: those that are coordinated 
with their anchor in a ‘low’, WYSIWYG manner (i.e. appositions), and those 
that adjoin to their host (i.e. ARCs and copular clauses from which 
attributions are derived). Adjunct appositives are always Force phrases, while 
conjunct appositives are not categorically restricted. 
 In the next chapter, I examine the pragmatic behaviour of appositives. 
The aim of this investigation is to provide additional support from the 
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pragmatic domain for the conclusions reached so far, that a bipartite division 
pertains between conjunct and adjunct appositives. 
 However, before I move into the area of pragmatics, I wish to conclude 
this chapter with a brief discussion of whether or not attributions can be 
derived from ARCs. 
 
4.5 Are attributions derived from copular clausal appositive relative 
clauses? 
 
In chapter three, I proposed that attributions are derived from parenthetical 
predicative and truncated cleft copular clauses: 
 
(100) a. Lucy, (she is) a secretive woman, works for MI5. 
 b. Someone, (it was) Bill no doubt, left the front door open.     
 
A number of previous scholars have claimed that attributions are derived 
from ARCs (Smith 1964, Burton-Roberts 1975, McCawley 1998, Potts 
2005:109, O’Connor 2008, Cardoso & De Vries 2010, among others). Is this 
claim plausible? 
 This hypothesis comes in ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ variants. The strong 
hypothesis excludes the possibility that attributions can be derived from 
sources other than ARCs. The weak hypothesis allows for the possibility that 
attributions can be derived from alternative sources, but maintains that 
ARCs are plausible sources for attributions nonetheless. 
 The strong hypothesis can be ruled out immediately. As I discussed in 
§4.4, appositive relative pronouns display the same underlying syntax as 
regular pronouns such as he, she, they, etc. Like regular pronouns, appositive 
relative pronouns make for unsuitable subjects of truncated clefts, as the 
example in (101B) shows. 
 
(101) A: Someone has stolen my laptop. 
 B:  {It/*He/*Who} was probably Bill. 
 
Because appositive relative pronouns make for unsuitable subjects of 
truncated clefts, ARCs cannot modify those anchors that parenthetical 
truncated clefts can: 
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(102) Someone, {it/*who} was probably Bill, has stolen my laptop. 
 
Consequently, ARCs cannot be sources for attributions like probably Bill in 
(103) below (cf. McCawley 1998). The only acceptable sources for 
attributions like these are truncated clefts. 
 
(103) Someone, ({it/*who} was) probably Bill, has stolen my laptop. 
 
The weak hypothesis fares better. Because regular pronouns and appositive 
relative pronouns are identical in all relevant respects, parenthetical 
predicational copular clauses and predicative ARCs are effectively the same. 
As such, both appear to provide suitable sources for non-referential 
attributions: 
 
(104) John, ({he/who} is) my friend, is coming for dinner. 
 
One may wonder whether there are any reasons to favour a predicational 
copular clausal analysis over an ARC analysis of such attributions. For 
English, these analyses appear equivalent: LE applies to he is or who is in 
(104) to derive the correct result. 
 However, in V2 languages like Dutch, the predicational copular clauses 
analysis seems more suitable. ARCs display verb-finality in this language, as 
(105) shows. 
 
(105) Joop, die mijn vriend is, is ook mijn baas.  
Joop, who my friend is is also my  boss 
‘Joop, who is my friend, is my also boss.’ 
 
One cannot use LE to cause reduction here, as LE targets a contiguous string 
and would therefore leave the string-final copula overt in the parenthetical in  
(105). Nor is sister ellipsis a feasible alternative (contrary to what Potts 
2005:109 claims), as the prerequisite topicalisation operation is unavailable 
inside Dutch ARCs:  
 
(106) * Joop, [mijn vriend]1 die t1 is, is ook mijn baas.  
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Consequently, the copular clausal source for attributions like mijn vriend in 
(107) seems more plausible (as per Heringa 2011), as LE can apply. 
 
(107) Joop, hij is mijn vriend, is ook mijn baas. 
 
Turkish cannot create the ARCs from which its attributions could be 
derived. This is because Turkish does not display relativisation in the 
Germanic ‘operator-gap’ sense: the Turkish equivalents of English restrictive 
relatives are participial attributive adjectives (Lewis 1967). One might 
conclude from this that Turkish does not display attributions at all, and 
those constructions that I have been calling ‘attributions’ in Turkish are 
fundamentally different from their English counterparts. While such a 
conclusion is logically viable, it is not supported by the evidence. Aside from 
how reduction is caused (LE in English versus pro subjects and zero copulas 
in Turkish), the parentheticals that I have been calling ‘attributions’ share the 
same properties in both languages, and thus it seems sensible to me to 
maintain that they arise from the same source, which is parenthetical 




  5 
The pragmatics of appositives 
In this chapter, I extend the analysis developed in chapters two to four 
into the domain of pragmatics. In §5.1, I outline a bespoke model of 
conversation that serves as platform for investigating the pragmatic 
import of appositions and Force phrasal adjuncts. In §5.2, I show that 
utterances that display attributions and appositive relative clauses 
display an almost identical pragmatic distribution to monologues. In 
§5.3, I demonstrate that the pragmatic import of appositions is 
correctly predicted by the syntactic analysis of appositions that I 
introduced in chapter two. In §5.4, I discuss two alternative accounts 
of the pragmatic import of appositives, and argue that the analysis 
developed in §5.1 and §5.2 confers greater parsimony than these. 
Potts (2005) proposes that, by virtue of being adorned with the semantic 
feature [COMMA], appositives are imbued with a conventionally implied 
meaning that is distinct from their host clauses’ purported at-issue meaning. 
The notion that appositives and their hosts convey distinct types of meaning 
arises from Potts’ syntactic and semantic analysis of appositives, which treats 
them as syntactically adjoined to their hosts but utilises separate at-issue and 
conventionally implied semantic types to account for the semantic opacity 
that he claims that all appositives display (for detailed discussion of Potts 
2005, see §5.4.1 and §6.1). While Potts’ syntactic analysis of appositions is 
eschewed in recent research (see De Vries 2006a, O’Conner 2008, Heringa 
2011, Döring 2014, and Ott 2014a, 2014b) his idea that appositives are 
imbued with an inherent type of meaning has proven influential, and is 
observed in more recent approaches to the pragmatic import of appositives 
such as AnderBois et al. (2013), who treat appositives as displaying inherent 
‘appositivity’. 
 The syntactic analysis of appositives that I developed in chapters two to 
four hints towards a conception of the pragmatic import of appositives that 
differs substantially to Potts’. Firstly, my analysis of appositions in chapter 
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two is suggestive of the notion that, as regular subconstituents of the host 
clause in which they are contained, non-Force phrasal appositions cannot 
display a different type of meaning to their host (as they constitute part of 
their host’s meaning). Secondly, I argued in chapters three and four that the 
opacity displayed by attributions and ARCs is caused by the fact that they 
comprise distinct assertions (or questions, or demands, etc.) to their 
assertoric (or erotetic, or directive) hosts. Thus, my position is weaker than 
Potts’ and AnderBois et al.’s, as I do not claim that Force phrasal appositives 
display an inherently dissimilar type of meaning to their hosts. Rather, my 
syntactic analysis gives rise to the expectation that assertoric appositives that 
are contained in assertoric hosts (see 1a) are, in terms of their impact on the 
discourse, roughly equivalent to two independent assertions sequentially 
uttered by a single speaker (i.e. a monologue, see 1b). 
 
(1) a. John, who is my friend, is coming over for dinner. 
b. John is my friend. He is coming over for dinner. 
 
Potts’ bidimensional semantic approach is not motivated solely to account 
for the opacity displayed by certain appositives, however. It also aims to 
account for the peculiar pragmatic properties that appositives display. On 
my approach to appositives, which treats appositive constructions like (1a) as 
composed of two assertions that display the same meaning-type, the peculiar 
pragmatic properties displayed by Force phrasal appositives must be 
explained by recourse to how the discourse is structured.  
  Thus, I simultaneously undertake two tasks in this chapter. I show that, 
once a suitable model of the discourse is in place (I will use an informal 
model of discourse structure of my own creation), the peculiar properties 
that appositives display can be accounted for without introducing a 
distinction between types of meaning. While doing this, I also demonstrate 
that non-Force phrasal appositions and Force phrasal adjuncts exhibit the 
dissimilar pragmatic behaviour that one would expect if the syntactic 
analysis that I advocated in chapters two to four is correct. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. I first outline my model of discourse 
(§5.1), and then discuss the distribution of attributions and ARCs within it 
(§5.2). In §5.3, I will investigate the pragmatic import of appositions, and 
show that they pattern as one would expect if the conclusions of chapter two 
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are correct. In §5.4, I discuss in more depth the two alternative analyses of 
the pragmatics of appositives mentioned above; namely, Potts (2005) and 
AnderBois et al. (2013). I aim to show in §5.4 that these analyses not only 
introduce a distinction in meaning-types that is unnecessary, but also that 
they make some incorrect empirical predictions. 
 Before I begin, let me first provide two disclaimers. First, the model of 
conversation advanced in §5.1 is not intended to supplant other compatible 
ones, regardless of whether such models are historical, contemporaneous, or 
nascent. Rather, its dissemination is intended merely to provide a stable 
foundation on which an investigation of the pragmatic import of attributions 
and ARCs (and indeed any other Force phrase parentheticals) can be 
conducted. Second, the model advanced in §5.1 was conceived, committed to 
paper, and presented at a conference in February 2014 without prior 
knowledge of Koev (2013), whose approach is similar in certain respects, 
although he does not take presuppositions into account.50  
 
5.1  Context sets, requests, and a structured discourse 
 
5.1.1 An introduction to the structured discourse 
 
In a work of fiction, the world in which the story is set becomes more 
detailed and precise as the plot unfolds. A consumer of fiction does not 
demand that the world in which the story is set is identical to the actual 
world. Provided that the law of cause and effect is obeyed, and provided that 
the story does not contain errors in continuity, a consumer of fiction is 
willing to suspend her disbelief. Conversation is similar in this respect, as the 
world in which a conversation is set is created by conversation itself. This 
world becomes more detailed and precise as the conversation progresses, 
and, like a work of fiction, it need not be identical to the world in which its 
creators reside. But whatever its topography, the law of cause and effect must 
be obeyed in this world, and continuity errors must be avoided. 
 The construction of a conversational world, which I will call the context 
hereafter, can be either a collaborative or competitive enterprise. If 
                                                     
50  Note that a shortened version of this chapter is presented in article format in Griffiths & De Vries 
(2014). 
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collaborative, its creators will cooperate to build a context that each finds 
agreeable. If competitive, its creators will compete to build the context that 
each individually favours. 
 My focus here is collaborative context construction, in which the building 
blocks of the context are requests, which I represent in ⟨chevrons⟩ hereafter, 
to alter (or update) the context from one state to another. The context itself 
can be envisaged as a set of possible worlds in which the law of cause and 
effect is obeyed (Stalnaker 1978). Requests to alter the context are therefore 
requests to reduce the context from a set of possible worlds w1 to a strict 
subset of these worlds w2. w2 is the set in which the propositional content 
contained in (or triggered from) the request in question is treated as true in 
all the possible worlds that comprise the context. Because the alteration of 
the context is effectively a process of world-reduction, a request α is 
considered as felicitous only if: 
 
(2)  The context that α aims to alter does not comprise solely of possible 
worlds in which α’s truth already holds.   
 
The structured discourse (SD) is the name I apply to the public record of 
requests to alter the context. With respect to the SD, requests are divided 
into two classes, the latter of which is itself split asunder: 
 
(3)  At conversational time t, 
a.  the current request is the propositional explicature of the most  
 recent utterance that invokes one;51 
b. a past request is a non-current request. 
 
(4) a. a successful past request has not been rejected; 
b. an unsuccessful past request has been rejected.  
                                                     
51  To maintain simplicity in my model, I must gloss over the (very important) distinctions 
pragmatists make between sentence meaning, what is said (see Recanati 2001), explicatures (in Sperber & 
Wilson’s 1986 sense), and implicitures (Bach 1994) such as (i). 
(i) John and Tom are in love.  (Impliciture: John and Tom are in love with each other) 
For me, the term explicature roughly equates with what Recanati (2001) calls the literal meaning of a 
sentence. This is the output of narrow semantics plus sufficient context for deictic expressions and 
resolving ellipsis. 
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The SD comprises of two sets. The first contains successful past requests, and 
is ordered according to the sequence in which the requests in question alter 
the context (the sequence runs from left to right). This first set also contains 
the current request, which bears the potential to alter the context. The 
second set contains unsuccessful past requests. This second set, which I call 
the bin, is unordered. Unsuccessful requests can be reused, but their reuse 
creates a violation of Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle. One might 
venture that contained within the Cooperative Principle is the axiom ‘file 
request α only once during the flow of conversation’. Consequently, reused 
rejected requests are usually employed in competitive conversational 
environments, such as quarrels or debates.  
 My representation of the SD is exemplified in (5), where I use ⟪double 
chevrons⟫ to delimit the SD from individual requests filed by one speaker or 
another. The current request is underlined, while past requests are not. Note 
that I will use the phrase ‘SD’ to refer to the ordered set exemplified in (5) 
alone hereafter, unless stated otherwise. Also, if the bin is empty, I do not 
represent it.   
 
(5) ⟪John loves his job, John kissed Mary⟫ 
BIN: {John kissed Sue, John baked a cake} 
 
In what follows, I will outline my model of conversation by examining 
simple discursive environments that involve only two interlocutors, speaker 
A (Amy) and speaker B (Bob). This is done for ease of exposition. The model 
could be scaled-up to include more interlocutors, but to do so and maintain 
the informal style of exposition that I wish to adopt quickly leads to unwieldy 
representations, as the reader will soon come to appreciate. 
 
5.1.2  Direct approval and opposition 
  
Let us begin by examining the simple dialogue in (6), which is uttered in an 
all-new context. 
 
(6) A: [α David baked a cake.] 
B: [β Okay.] 
 
164 The pragmatics of appositives 
Amy utters α, which expresses her request for the context to contain only 
those possible worlds in which David baked a cake is true. This engenders 
the SD in (7a), where the explicature of α is the current request. With β, Bob 
approves of Amy’s request in a direct manner. As an instance of direct 
approval, β itself does not extend the SD, as it does not constitute a request. 
However, Bob’s expression of β does alter the SD: it converts α from the 
current request into a past request, as (7b) illustrates. Thus, after β is uttered, 
the context is composed of only those possible worlds in which David baked 
a cake is true. 
   
(7) a. ⟪David baked a cake⟫ 
b. ⟪David baked a cake⟫ 
 
In (8), Bob directly opposes Amy’s request. After Amy utters α in (8), the SD 
is as represented in (9a), where the explicature of α is the current request. 
Bob then utters β. As an instance of direct opposition, β does not extend the 
SD, as β does not constitute a request. Rather, β reduces the SD to an empty 
set, as Amy’s α, although now a past request, is not a successful one. As such, 
this request is deposited into the bin, as (9b) shows. 
 
(8) A: [α David baked a cake.] 
B: [β No.] 
 
(9) a. ⟪David baked a cake⟫ 
b. ⟪⟫ 
 BIN: {David baked a cake} 
 
5.1.3  Monologues  
 
The dialogues in §5.1.2 exemplify how structured discourses are built by 
turn-taking (i.e. Amy says α, Bob says β, Amy says γ, Bob says δ, and so on). 
In this subsection (§5.1.3), I wish to highlight the fact that the atoms of an 
SD are not simply the totality of what Amy or Bob says when it is her or his 
turn to speak. A speaker’s ‘turn’ can be composed of more than one unit of 
the structured discourse. Such a turn can be described as a monologue. 
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 To see how monologues shape the SD, let us now consider the example 
monologue in (10). 
 
(10) A: [α David baked a cake.][β It’s a Battenberg.] 
 
First, Amy utters α, which creates a request to update the context with 
⟨David baked a cake⟩. Unlike in the turn-taking cases described in §5.1.2, 
Bob does not respond to Amy’s request in (10). He remains silent. At this 
juncture, Amy can respond to Bob’s reticence in one of two ways. Her first 
option is to ask Bob explicitly about whether he approves or rejects her 
request, which gives rise to a tangential dialogue like (11). If Bob responds 
with (11a), the situation equates to (6). However, if Bob responds with (11b), 
the situation equates to (8). 
 
(11)  A:  What’s wrong Bob? Don’t you believe that David baked a  
  cake? 
a. B: Yes! Please continue…   
b. B: No. 
 
Amy’s second option is this: file another request. If she files another request, 
her original request is converted into an unattended past request, as per the 
algorithm that builds SDs described in (3). Evidently, Amy chooses this 
second option in (10). By uttering β, she changes the SD from (12a) to (12b). 
 
(12) a. ⟪David baked a cake⟫ 




Let us consider (13), which is uttered in an all-new context. 
 
(13) A: [α David hates his job.] 
 
The request directly corresponding to (13) aims to reduce the context to only 
those worlds in which David has a job and David hates his job are true. 
Because reduction of the context is incremental, this request – if successful – 
166 The pragmatics of appositives 
triggers reduction of the context twice. According to the rule in (2), the only 
available order of reduction is this:  
 
(14) STEP 1: reduction to those worlds in which David has a job is true. 
 STEP 2: reduction to those worlds in which David hates his job is 
true. 
 
By virtue of expressing (13) then, Amy files two independent requests to 
update the context. The first, ⟨David has a job⟩, is not explicitly uttered, 
while the second, ⟨David hates his job⟩, is the explicature of (13). I will refer 
to the former type of requests as presuppositions. Like all requests, both the 
explicature and the presupposition corresponding to (13) are catalogued in 
the SD. Thus, (13) creates two requests simultaneously. These enter the SD 
as an ordered tuple that reflects the order in which reduction of the context 
must proceed: 
 
(15) ⟨David has a job, David hates his job⟩ 
 
In an all-new context, the complex request in (15) therefore creates the 
following SD:52 
 
(16) ⟪David has a job, David hates his job⟫ 
 
In (16), the presuppositional request ⟨David has a job⟩ enters the SD as an 
unattended past request. This is because, according to (3), the SD can 
contain only one current request at any one point in conversational time. 
 It appears then that monologues like (10) and presupposition-triggering 
utterances like (13) share a commonality. In both, a complex SD that 
contains a past request as well as the current request is formed during one 
                                                     
52  To maintain simplicity, I prohibit nesting in the SD. Resultantly, the addition of a complex 
request like (15) to a non-empty SD forms a monostratal ordered set. As such, the dialogue in (i) creates 
the SD in (ii), rather than (iii). 
(i) A: Larry deserves some happiness. 
 B: He hates his job, though. 
 A: He’s lucky to have one! 
(ii) ⟪L deserves some happiness, L has a job, L hates his job, L is lucky to have his job⟫ 
(iii) ⟪L deserves some happiness, ⟨L has a job, L hates his job⟩, L is lucky to have his job⟫ 
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speaker’s ‘turn’, as (12b) and (16) show. However, (10) and (13) also display 
an important difference. The creation of the SD in (12b) spanned two 
distinct points in conversational time: Amy first uttered α, to which Bob 
could have responded but chose not to, and then she uttered β. Thus, both α 
and β were, at different points in time, the SD’s current request. The creation 
of the SD in (16) occurs at a single point in conversational time, however. 
That is to say, there is no juncture at which the presuppositional request 
⟨David has a job⟩ is a current request.53 This presupposition is thus imposed 
upon the SD. It updates the context simply by being triggered (AnderBois et 
al. 2013).54 
 As the discussion above makes clear, my conception of presupposition 
includes accommodation phenomena (Lewis 1979). It makes no recourse to 
speakers’ private beliefs, which are extraneous to the composition of the SD. 
Presuppositions in my terms are necessarily inferred requests that a speaker 
has publicly filed, while private beliefs are not. Thus, in my model, the 
utterance David hates a job in (13) triggers the presuppositional request 
David has a job in an all-new context regardless of whether Amy and/or Bob 
privately believe that the content of this request is true already. Of course, if 
David has a job is already contained within the SD when Amy utters (10), 
then only the surface proposition of (10) is invoked as a new request. 
  
5.1.5 Types of response to a request 
 
In §5.1.2, I discussed how the SD is altered when Bob offers direct approval 
or opposition to a request that Amy files (i.e. yes and no responses). 
Evidently, yes and no (and variations thereupon) are not the only responses 
to requests. Thus, in this penultimate subsection of §5.1, I wish to provide an 
                                                     
53  As the reader is no doubt aware, I treat the length of time that it takes a speaker to fully articulate 
a speech act as the indivisible unit of conversational time. This done for brevity’s sake. In reality, a speaker 
seldom waits for her interlocutor to finish articulating a speech act before she begins to express a speech 
act of her own. 
54  At first glance it appears that self-verifying requests such as performatives (e.g. ‘I admit that I 
hate chocolate’) are also imposed upon the SD, as their veracity cannot be questioned. However, their 
‘imposition’ on the SD differs to that which is observed with presuppositions. When uttered, 
performatives are current requests: it is merely the fact that any request that follows them in 
conversational time will convert performatives into successful past requests that makes them seem 
‘imposed’. 
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exhaustive list of the relevant types of response that Bob may voice to Amy’s 
requests, and when each type is applicable.  
 
5.1.5.1  Indifference 
 
When Bob offers an indifferent response, he does not address Amy’s request. 
The result of Bob’s expression of an indifferent response is that Amy’s 
request is converted from a current to an unattended (and therefore, 
successful) past request. Direct indifferent responses neither provide approval 
or rejection of Amy’s request nor invoke a request of their own. Whatever in 
(17) is an example of this type of request. 
 
(17) a. A: [α Bob, your bedroom is untidy.] 
 B: [β Whatever.] 
 
b. ⟪Bob’s bedroom is untidy⟫ 
 
Indirect indifferent responses are, in themselves, requests. Examples 
containing indirect indifferent responses include topic-shifting responses 
such as (18a), which engenders the SD in (18b). 
 
(18) a. A: [α David baked cake.] 
 B: [β I baked a cake once.] 
 
b. ⟪David baked a cake, Bob baked a cake⟫ 
 
5.1.5.2  Approval 
 
The result of Bob’s expression of approval is that Amy’s request is converted 
from a current to a successful past request. Direct approval responses provide 
approval of Amy’s request without evoking a request of their own. Okay in 
(6) (repeated below in 19 with the SD that it engenders) has already provided 
an exemplary case. Other direct approval responses include fine, yes, sure, 
And?, so?, and right. 
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(19) a. A: [α David baked a cake.] 
 B: [β Okay.] 
 
b. ⟪David baked a cake⟫ 
 
Indirect approval responses are, in themselves, requests. Examples 
containing indirect approval responses include Bob’s response in (20a), 
which engenders the SD in (20b).  
 
(20) a. A: [α David baked a cake.] 
 B: [β Good for him!] 
 
b. ⟪David baked a cake, it is good for David that he baked a cake⟫ 
 
Responses like good for him in (20a) are considered as instances of ‘indirect’ 
approval because they do not directly approve Amy’s request. Rather, 
because they are deictic (see §5.1.5.4 below) as (20b) shows, they would 
invoke the complex request in (21) if uttered in an all-new context, which 
contains the request in (20aA) that Amy has offered for evaluation. 
Resultantly, Amy’s request is approved because Bob’s response in (20aB) 
assumes the content of her request to be true. 
 
(21) a. It’s good for David that he baked a cake. 
b. 〈David baked a cake, it is good for David that he baked a cake〉 
  
5.1.5.3  Opposition 
 
The result of Bob’s expression of opposition is that Amy’s request α, and any 
other request that is contingent upon α (see §5.2.2.2 for a discussion of 
contingency), is removed from the SD. Direct opposition responses provide 
opposition to Amy’s request without invoking a request of their own. No in 
(22) (repeated below from 8 with the SD that it engenders) provides an 
exemplary case. Other examples of direct opposition are difficult to find. 
This is perhaps because direct opposition is a likely conversation-killer, and 
the implementation of such devices of termination is hence to be avoided in 
the collaborative creation of conversation. 
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(22) a. A: [α David baked a cake.] 
 B: [β No.] 
 
 b. ⟪⟫ 
  BIN: {David baked a cake} 
 
Indirect opposition responses are, in themselves, requests. Examples 
containing include Bob’s response in (23). 
 
(23) a. A: [α David baked a cake.] 
 B: [β That’s impossible!] 
 
b. ⟪It’s impossible that David baked a cake⟫ 
 BIN: {David baked a cake} 
 
Recall that certain requests cannot be sensibly opposed. As mentioned in 
footnote 54, this class includes (at least) performatives. Requests that report 
its speaker’s mental disposition (e.g. ‘I think that God exists’) are difficult to 
oppose, but can be. Social factors, such as knowledge of one’s interlocutor, 
appear to dictate when requests of this type can be opposed. For example, I 
cannot respond to a chiliast that stands on my doorstep and says to me ‘I 
believe the New World is upon us!’ with ‘no you don’t’, but his psychiatrist 
perhaps can.  
 
5.1.5.4 Generic and specific responses 
 
Responses can be divided across another dimension: whether they are 
specific or generic. Specific responses target particular requests, while generic 
responses, as deictic expressions (Krifka 2013), can be expressed in response 
to any request. Direct responses are inherently deictic, while indirect generic 
responses are deictic because they contain the deictic expressions it, that or 
so, which can be coreferent with antecedent requests (Asher 1993), or 
repetitions of such antecedents. 
 The inherent deixis of direct responses demand that they can only be 
licensed ‘locally’. In other words, they are licit only as responses to current 
requests, as the example in (24) demonstrates. A direct response γ that 
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appears to apply to a direct response β that immediately precedes it is either 
emphatic or corrective, as shown in (25). 
 
(24) A: [α David baked a cake.] [β it’s a Battenberg] 
B: (referring to β):   [γ Okay.] 
B′: (referring to α but not β): # [γ Okay.] 
 
(25) a. A: [α David baked a cake.] 
b. B: [β Okay.] [γ Fine.] (emphatic) 
 B′: [β Whatever.] [γ Fine.] (corrective) 
 
The licensing constraints on indirect generic responses are much more 
complex than those that govern direct generic responses. This complexity 
arises from the fact that deictic elements such as it, that and so have complex 
licensing conditions, which, to be accurately described, require one to appeal 
the pragmatic salience of their licensor. 
 This complexity is particularly apparent in the case of indirect generic 
indifferent responses, as Asher (1993) demonstrates. As such, I will not 
discuss their licensing conditions further here, except to note that they are 
not only able to refer to past requests that have been approved by direct 
generic approval (as 26 shows), but also past requests that have been rejected 
by direct opposition (as 27 shows). 
 
(26) a. A: [α David baked a cake.] 
 B: [β Okay.] [γ That seems plausible enough to me.] 
 
b.  ⟪David baked a cake⟫ 
c.  ⟪David baked a cake⟫ 
d. ⟪David baked a cake, that David baked a cake seems plausible  
  enough to Bob⟫ 
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(27) a. A: [α David baked a cake.] 
 B: [β No.] [γ That’s preposterous.] 
 
b. ⟪David baked a cake⟫ 
c. ⟪ ⟫ 
 BIN: {David baked a cake} 
d. ⟪that David baked a cake is preposterous⟫ 
 BIN: {David baked a cake} 
 
Indirect generic approval and opposition exhibit dissimilar (but equally 
complex) licensing conditions to indirect generic indifference. An attempt to 
provide an accurate generalisation of the licensing conditions that govern 
such responses is tangential to my purposes, and as such I refer the interested 
reader to Asher’s (1993) work. Relevant here is the observation that, while 
indirect generic approval or opposition can target either the current request 
alone or an array of requests that includes the current request, such 
responses cannot target a past request alone or an array of requests that 
excludes the current request. This observation is encapsulated in (28) below, 
where (28b) should be understood as a necessary but insufficient condition 
for licensing. 
 
(28) An instance of indirect generic approval or opposition α is licensable 
only if: 
a. α targets the current request 
b. α targets an array of subsequent requests up to and including 
the current request. 
 
That the terms in (28) constrain the licensing of indirect generic approval or 
opposition is evidenced by the dialogue in (29), where Bob’s response can 
target either β or ⟨α, β⟩, but not α alone. As the examples show, this 
constraint holds regardless of whether or not β is contingent upon α. 
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(29) A:  [α David baked a Battenberg on Thursday.] [β He baked a carrot 
cake on Friday.] 
 Aʹ:  [α David baked a Battenberg on Thursday.] [β It was delicious.] 
 B: [γ That’s {wonderful/impossible}!] 
 
One sees from the example discussed above that indirect generic approval 
and opposition may create ambiguity. That is to say, there are cases when 
responses of these types may licitly refer to the current request or an array of 
requests. On the current model of conversation, which prohibits any appeal 
to a speaker’s intentions as a disambiguator (i.e. ‘Bob intended that’s 
wonderful to refer to α’), I deal with cases of ambiguity by positing the 
guideline in (30). 
 
(30) Maximisation:  
Create as detailed a context as possible. 
 
In the case of ambiguous indirect generic approval, the guideline in (30) 
suggests that Bob’s response in (31) creates the SD in (32a), and not the SD 
in (32b). 
 
(31) A: [α David baked a cake.] [β It’s a Battenberg.] 
B: [γ That’s fab!] 
 
(32) a. ⟪D baked a cake, it’s a Battenberg, it’s fab that D baked a cake 
and that it’s a Battenberg⟫ 
 b. ⟪D baked a cake, it’s a Battenberg, it’s fab that it’s a Battenberg⟫ 
 
In the case of ambiguous indirect generic opposition, the guideline in (30) 
suggests that Bob’s response in (33) creates the SD in (34a), and not the SD 
in (34b). 
 
(33) A: [α David baked a cake.] [β It’s a Battenberg.] 
B: [γ That’s impossible!] 
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(34) a. ⟪D baked a cake, it’s impossible that it’s a Battenberg⟫ 
 BIN: {D baked a Battenberg}   
b. ⟪it’s impossible that D baked a cake and that it’s a Battenberg⟫ 
 BIN: {D baked a cake, it’s a Battenberg} 
 
5.1.6  The structured discourse: a summary 
 
In §5.1, I provided the foundations for a theory of how the context in which 
a conversation is ‘set’ is built. According to this approach, the atoms of 
conversation are past and current requests. The totality of successful past 
requests at any juncture in conversational time equates with the context. 
Presuppositions are past requests, and can be treated as equivalent to 
assertions that entered the context at a previous point in conversational time. 
Unlike assertions, however, presuppositions are imposed upon the context. 
They are, at no point in conversational time, current requests. 
 
5.2  Force phrasal parentheticals and the structured discourse 
 
5.2.1  Linear position and the structured discourse 
 
All of the explicatures discussed in §5.1 were invoked by root clauses, i.e. 
Force phrases. If certain parentheticals, including appositives like attributions 
and ARCs, are Force phrases (as I claimed in chapters three and four), then 
one predicts that these parentheticals invoke propositional explicatures too. 
If this is true, Force phrase parentheticals and their host clauses invoke 
distinct requests. 
 In the discussion of monologues in §5.1.3, I showed that a single speaker 
may convert one of her own requests into an unattended (and therefore 
successful) past request simply by filing an additional successive request. This 
was observed in (10) (repeated below in 35a), which results in the SD in 
(35b). 
 
(35) a. A: [α David baked a cake.][β It’s a Battenberg.] 
b. ⟪David baked a cake, it’s a Battenberg⟫ 
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With respect to (35a), the request engendered by α precedes the request 
engendered by β in the SD for the simple reason that α is fully articulated 
before β is. From this fact one arrives at the generalisation that, in the SD, the 
order of the requests that are generated from explicatures is determined by 
the order in which the explicatures that generated them are fully articulated. 
 Following this logic, one arrives at the notion that utterances that contain 
Force phrasal parentheticals generate structured discourses that can match 
two possible schemata, which are represented in (37).  
 
(37) a. ⟪requestpar, requesthost⟫ 
b. ⟪requesthost, requestpar⟫ 
 
Utterances that contain parentheticals that linearly precede or are 
surrounded by their host clause (I call these interpolated parentheticals in the 
remainder of this chapter) generate SDs that fit the schema in (37a). The 
reason for this follows straightforwardly from the mechanics of the current 
model and the generalisation about explicatures that I have just introduced. 
In an utterance like (38a), the parenthetical is fully articulated (by this I 
mean that all the lexical items that comprise it are expressed) before the host 
clause is. Thus, the request generated from the explicature of the 
parenthetical (call it ‘α’) enters the SD first, as a current request. After this 
point, the host clause is fully articulated, and a request β is generated from its 
explicature. β then supplants α as the current request, and converts α into an 
unattended, and therefore successful, past request. The resulting SD is (38b), 
which fits the schema in (37a). Note that the process of supersession that 
creates (38b) is identical to that which creates the monologue SD in (35b). 
  
(38) a. John, who is my neighbour, lost his job. 
b. ⟪John is my neighbour, John lost his job⟫ 
 
Utterances that contain parentheticals that linearly succeed their host clause 
(I call these final parentheticals henceforth) generate SDs that fit the schema 
in (37b). Again, the reason for this follows straightforwardly from the 
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mechanics of the current model (this rationale is a repetition of explanation 
given for 38). In an utterance like (39a), the host clause is fully articulated 
before the parenthetical is. Thus, the request generated from the explicature 
of the host (call it ‘α’) enters the SD first, as a current request. After this 
point, the parenthetical is fully articulated, and a request β is generated from 
its explicature. β then supplants α as the current request, and converts α into 
an unattended, and therefore successful, past request. The resulting SD is 
(39b), which fits the schema in (37b). 
 
(39) a. John got a promotion, which is great. 
b. ⟪John got a promotion, that John got a promotion is great⟫ 
 
Abstracting away from the reality of conversation, in which speakers 
interrupt each other frequently, I mentioned in footnote 53 that I treat the 
time that it takes to fully articulate a speech act as the indivisible unit of 
conversational time. Thus, when extending the discourse model from §5.1 to 
parenthetical utterances like (38a) and (39a), one must make a decision: does 
an instance of conversational time elapse each time one of the speech acts in 
(38a) and (39a) is fully articulated (see 40), or is the entire utterance 
contained within one measure of conversational time (see 41)?  
 
(40) a. John, who is my neighbour,  found a new job. 
 
 t0 t1  t2   
 
 b. Man U got relegated today,  which is superb. 
 
(41) a. John, who is my neighbour, found a new job. 
 
 t0   t1 
 
 b. Man U got relegated today, which is superb. 
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The decision about how to carve up conversational time has non-trivial 
consequences for one’s approach to the pragmatics of parenthesis. If one 
maintains that (40) exemplifies the correct way to understand conversational 
time, then utterances like those in (38a) and (39a) are identical to two-
utterance monologues in all respects. Like with monologues, there is a point 
in conversational time (i.e. after t1 in 40) where the requests generated by the 
speech acts that are fully articulated first are current, and therefore can be 
(but in this scenario are not) approved or opposed in the same way that 
regular current requests can be. This conception of such utterances entails 
that, if Bob responds after t1 (as in 42, where I have included Bob’s response 
in brackets within the linear string of Amy’s utterance in order to best 
convey how conversational time passes), a regular turn-taking dialogue is 
observed: Amy says α, Bob says β, Amy says γ, and so on. 
 
(42) a. A: John, who is a fool, (B: {And? /That’s not true!}) hates me. 
  
t0   t1   t2 t3 
 
 b. A: John got fired, (B: {No! /That’s unexpected!}) which is sad. 
 
t0  t1   t2   t3 
 
However, if one maintains that (41) exemplifies the correct way to 
understand conversational time, then one abstracts away from – and 
therefore excludes – the possibility that Bob can respond to the ARC in (42) 
immediately after it is uttered. On this conception of conversational time, the 
requests engendered by the speech acts that are fully articulated first in 
utterances that contain parentheticals share a commonality with the 
presuppositional requests discussed in §5.1.4: they are both necessarily 
imposed upon the structured discourse. This is because there is no juncture 
in conversational time at which the requests engendered by the speech acts 
that are fully articulated first are current. 
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 The observation that Bob can indeed interrupt the articulation of the host 
clause to respond to the request generated by the interpolated parenthetical 
in (42a) demonstrates that (40) exemplifies the correct way to carve up 
conversational time. However, previous research on the pragmatic import of 
appositives has been concerned only with what kind of responses Bob can 
voice after both the parenthetical and host clause have been fully articulated. 
In other words, the past literature makes the implicit assumption that (41) 
exemplifies the correct way to carve up conversational time. This leads 
directly to the false conclusion that interpolated parentheticals are 
necessarily imposed on the discourse, and that this desire to impose arises 
from an inherent ‘secondary meaning’ that parentheticals display. According 
to the current model however, it is merely the case that, in a scenario where 
Bob voices his response after both the interpolated parenthetical and host 
clause have been fully articulated, the request generated from the explicature 
of the interpolated parenthetical has already been converted into an 
unattended and therefore successful past request.55   
 I have now described the place of utterances that contain Force phrasal 
adjuncts (i.e. attributions, ARCs, other clausal parentheticals) within the 
discourse model created in §5.1. In the next section, I provide empirical 
support for this pragmatic theory of parenthesis by reviewing the data 
discussed in previous literature on the pragmatics of appositives.56  
 
5.2.2  Parentheticals, presuppositions, and monologues 
  
5.2.2.1  Responses  
 
With respect to responses (see §5.1.7), the conclusions reached in the 
introductory paragraph of §5.2.1 give rise to the correct prediction that, as 
                                                     
55  While I contend that (40) exemplifies the best way to carve up conversational from a theoretical 
perspective, it seems clear from the presence of prosodic continuation tones at t1 in (42) that (41) best 
exemplifies how speakers intend conversational time to be carved up. 
56  Except for the data on contingency in §5.2.2.2, the data discussed in §5.2.2 are not novel. They are 
discussed in Potts (2005), Nouwen (2007), and AnderBois et al. (2013), among others. 
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past requests, presuppositions (43a),57 interpolated parentheticals (43b-c), 
the hosts of final parentheticals (43d-e), and initial assertions in two-
utterance monologues (43f) cannot be targeted in a generic fashion in the 
scenario in (43), either by direct or indirect approval or opposition, as none 
of these generic responses can target past requests alone (see §5.1.5). 
 
(43) a. A: David hates his job. 
b.  A: David, [who’s a psychologist]i, hates his job. 
c. A: Sally, [a blatant sadist]i, hit David. 
d. A: [David hit Sally]i, who then hit him back. 
e. A: [Sally hit David]i, a guy that deserves a good punch. 
f.  A: [David has a job]i. He hates it. 
 B: # {Thati’s not true! / Thati’s true! / Indeed! / No!} 
 
To run through an example: the utterance in (43c) creates the SD in (44) 
below. In the scenario depicted in (43), the generic responses in (43B), which 
can target current requests alone, cannot target the request ⟨Sally is a blatant 
sadist⟩, which is a successful past request. 
 
(44) ⟪Sally is a blatant sadist, she hit David⟫ 
 
The opposite prediction is also borne out in this scenario. As current 
requests, final parentheticals (45a-b) and final assertions of monologues 
(45c) can be targeted by generic responses, which are suitable as responses to 
current requests. 
 
(45) a. A: David hit Sally, [who then hit him back]i. 
b. A: Sally hit David, [a guy that deserves a good punch]i. 
c. A: David has a job. [He hates it]i. 
 B: {Thati’s not true! / Thati’s true! / Indeed! / No!} 
 
To run through an example: the utterance in (45a) creates the SD in (46) 
below. In the scenario depicted in (45), the generic responses in (45B), which 
                                                     
57  The generic response in (43B) intends to target the presuppositional request in (43a), which is 
⟨David has a job⟩. 
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can target current requests alone, may target the request ⟨she hit him back⟩, 
which is a current request. 
 
(46) ⟪David hit Sally, she hit him back⟫ 
 
5.2.2.2  Contingency and opposing oneself 
 
Let us consider again the utterance from (13), which is repeated in (47) 
below. 
 
(47) A: [α David hates his job.] 
 
If the SD prior to α’s expression contains the successful past request 〈David 
has a job〉, then α in (47) invokes the request in (48a). If the SD prior to α’s 
expression does not contain the successful past request 〈David has a job〉, 
then α in (47) invokes the complex request in (48b) (see §5.1.4). 
 
(48) a. 〈David hates his job〉 
b. 〈David has a job, David hates his job〉 
 
Thus, regardless of which of the two scenarios that I described above 
pertains, the request 〈David has a job〉 must be filed before the request 
〈David hates his job〉. We can therefore say that 〈David hates his job〉 is 
contingent upon 〈David has a job〉 (below, ‘α ⇴ β’ is used to mean ‘α is 
contingent upon β’). 
 My model correctly predicts that, while contingency can pertain between 
interpolated parentheticals and their hosts (see 49) and the initial and final 
assertions of a two-utterance monologue (see 50), it need not.58 These facts 
hence support the notion that parentheticals are not presuppositions, as 
presuppositions and their triggers always display a relationship of 
contingency (as 47 and 48 have shown). 
 
                                                     
58  That the host in (49a-b) is contingent upon its parenthetical dictates that, if the parenthetical 
were absent, the host would trigger a presupposition that files the same request as the absent 
parenthetical. 
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(49) a. David, who baked a cake, then iced it. (host ⇴ ARC) 
b. David, a judge, sentenced someone. (host ⇴ attribution) 
c. David, who’s a nice guy, baked a cake. (¬[host ⇴ ARC]) 
d. David, a policeman, baked a cake. (¬[host ⇴ attribution]) 
 
(50) a. David baked a cake. He then iced it. (final ass ⇴ initial ass) 
b. David baked a cake. He’s a nice guy. (¬[final ass ⇴ initial ass]) 
 
In the dialogue in (51), Amy requests that the context be reduced from its 
current state (w1) to only those worlds in which David is a bachelor is true 
(w2). Because Bob’s response is a request that cannot apply to w2 (as those 
worlds in which David is married do not comprise a strict subset of w2), Amy 
is informed that her request to move from w1 to w2 has been indirectly 
opposed.   
 
(51) A: [α David is a bachelor.] 
B: [β David is a married man.] 
 
The dialogue in (51) seems perfectly natural because speakers often disagree 
about how the conversational world should look. However, unless β is 
construed as supplanting α as a correction, the monologue in (52) seems 
highly unnatural. This is because speakers (of sound mind) do not indirectly 
oppose their own requests to update the context.  
 
(52) A: # [α David is a bachelor.][β He is a married man.] 
 
The same incoherence arises in utterances that contain ARCs and 
attributions, and for same the reason: 
 
(53) a. # David, who’s a bachelor, is a married man. 
b. #  David, a bachelor, is a married man. 
c. # Joel is married to Jack, who’s a bachelor. 
d. # Joel is married to Jack, a bachelor. 
 
Because conversation is collaborative, interlocutors are typically charitable to 
one another. As such, monologues that involve self-opposition are often 
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‘repaired’ so that a non-contradictory interpretation is obtained (Kehler 
2002). This is observed in those situations exemplified by (54), in which 
incoherence arises if the default stance that events described in α occur 
before events described in β is retained. To avoid interpreting (54) as an 
occurrence of self-opposition (as β cannot apply to a context in which α is 
true if the default temporal order is retained), the hearer interprets β as a 
reason clause or as containing a silent instance of previously (or some similar 
temporal adjunct).  
 
(54) A: [α David iced a cake.][β He baked it.] 
 
The same repair affect is observed in utterances that contain ARCs and 
attributions, and for the same reason: 
 
(55)  David, who iced a cake, baked it. 
 
Thus, the fact that parentheticals and assertions in two-utterance 
monologues pattern identically with respect to contingency and self-
opposition provides additional evidence for the pragmatic approach to Force 




The rule in (2) in §5.1.1 says that a request α is infelicitous if it attempts to 
apply to a context that is comprised solely of possible worlds in which α’s 
truth already holds (in other words, one cannot file superfluous requests). 
Potts (2005:34) calls this the antibackgrounding condition. This condition 
makes the correct prediction that, in all-new contexts, presuppositions, Force 
phrase parentheticals, and assertions whose veracity is guaranteed result in 
incoherent discourses, as they violate the rule in (2). 
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(56) a. # David hates his job. He has one. 
 b. # John’s my neighbour. We go fishing together. He’s my 
neighbour. 
 c. # John’s my neighbour. We go fishing together. John, who’s my 
neighbour, drinks beer. 
 d. # John’s my neighbour. We go fishing together. John, my 
neighbour, drinks beer. 
 
These data therefore demonstrate that Force phrase parentheticals, like both 
presuppositions and assertions, are atoms of the discourse structure, and as 




Because requests are necessarily engendered from their explicatures, initial 
assertions are never interpreted as contained within intensional 
environments such as mental or hypothetical worlds. In the terminology of 
Karttunen & Peters (1979), assertions are never plugged. This is illustrated 
below, where the interpretation of (57) must be (58a) and not (58b). 
 
(57) A: [α David has a job.][β Fred thinks that David baked a cake.] 
 SD: ⟪David has a job, Fred thinks that David baked a cake⟫ 
 
(58) Interpretation of (57A): 
a. David has a job and Fred thinks that David baked a cake. 
b. # Fred thinks that David has a job and that David baked a cake. 
 
The same situation pertains in the mirror of (57) in (59): 
 
(59) A:  [α Fred thinks that David baked a cake.][β David has a job.] 
 SD: ⟪Fred thinks that David baked a cake, David has a job⟫ 
 
(60) Interpretation of (59A): 
 a. Fred thinks that David baked a cake. David has a job. 
b. # Fred thinks that David baked a cake and that David has a job. 
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Because requests are also necessarily engendered from their surface meaning, 
interpolated and final Force phrasal parentheticals are expected to be 
unpluggable too. This expectation is met, as the examples in (61) to (64) 
demonstrate (Potts 2005). 
 
(61) A: [α Fred thinks that David, who has a job, baked a cake.] 
SD: ⟪David has a job, Fred thinks that David baked a cake⟫ 
 
(62) Interpretation of (61A): 
a. David has a job and Fred thinks that David baked a cake. 
b. # Fred thinks that David has a job and that David baked a cake. 
 
(63) A: [α Fred thinks that David kissed Sally, who has a job.] 
SD: ⟪Fred thinks that David kissed Sally, Sally has a job⟫ 
 
(64) Interpretation of (63A): 
a. Fred thinks that David kissed Sally. Sally has a job. 
b. # Fred thinks that David kissed Sally and that Sally has a job. 
 
5.2.2.5 Modal subordination 
 
Recall from §4.3 that appositive relative pronouns can refer to quantified 
noun phrase anchors if the ARC displays irrealis tense: 
 
(65) a. No properly trained linguist, who would have been taught 
phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake. 
 b. Every properly trained linguist, who would have been taught 
phonetics as part of her training, would have got that right. 
 
The same observation holds of appositive relative pronouns that appear to 
corefer with the hypothetical aspect of their anchors. This is demonstrated in 
(66a) (from Arnold 2007:299), which can be paraphrased as in (66b), where a 
car is understood as contained within a protasis. 
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(66) a. Sam doesn’t own a car, which she wouldn’t be able to drive 
anyway. 
 b. Sam doesn’t own a car. Even if she did own [a car]i, she 
wouldn’t be able to drive iti. 
 
Note that the same observation also holds of regular pronouns that are 
contained within clauses that display irrealis tense: 
 
(67) Sam doesn’t own [a car]i. She wouldn’t be able to drive iti anyway. 
 
A related phenomenon is observed in cases like (68a). Here, a regular 
pronoun within the ARC corefers with the entire protasis. The same 
situation is observed in (68b) with a finite clausal parenthetical. 
 
(68) a. If [Pete, who would be richer as a consequence of iti, were to sell 
his car]i, then he would have more disposable income. 
 b. If [Pete (and he would be richer as a consequence of iti) were to 
sell his car]i, then he would have more disposable income. 
 
In a simple model of discourse like the one advanced in §4.1, the 
phenomenon exemplified in (65) to (68), which is called modal 
subordination, must be handled in the following manner: the requests 
engendered by these modally subordinated structures must belie each’s 
surface simplicity. Thus the ARC in (66a) and the second assertion in (67) 
must engender the request in (69a), while the ARC in (68a) and the finite 
parenthetical in (68b) must engender the request in (69b). 
 
(69) a. 〈if Sam did own a car then she wouldn’t be able to drive it〉 
 b. 〈Pete would be richer as consequence of selling his car, if Pete 
were to sell his car then he would have more disposable income〉 
 
While more elaborate accounts of model subordination have of course been 
advanced, this explanation provided above must suffice for my purposes. 
What is important is that modally subordinated Force phrase parentheticals 
and assertions are treated the same. However such data are explained, the 
explanation will apply equally to assertions and Force phrase parentheticals. 
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5.2.3 Force phrase parentheticals and the structured discourse: a summary 
 
In this subsection (§4.2), I demonstrated that assertions that contain 
assertoric Force phrase parentheticals (in particular attributions and ARCs) 
display identical pragmatic behaviour to monologues composed of two 
assertions, just as my approach predicts. 
 
5.3 Appositions and the structured discourse 
 
Let us now revisit some of the conclusions reached in chapter two with 
respect to appositions, which I claimed are coordinated with their anchors. 
With respect their possible pragmatic import, the following constructions 
are relevant. 
 
(70) a. Pete, my boss that is to say, has asked me to work overtime. 
 b. Pete, i.e. the guy that we met last night, is coming over for 
dinner. 
 
(71) a. The Big Apple is a nice city; that is New York is a nice city. 
 b. John saw Mary yesterday; he saw his ex-wife yesterday, that is. 
 
(72) a. We’ve won the lottery, that is to say we needn’t worry about  
money anymore. 
 b. Sam is a procrastinator, that is to say he evidently spends far too  
much time running pointless errands when he should be working. 
 
The appositions in (70) exemplify those that are subclausal. Because this 
class are not Force phrases, one expects that these appositions cannot be 
used to commit speech acts and thus do not engender requests to update the 
context. 
 The appositions in (71) exemplify those that are clausal but semantically 
vacuous insofar as they do not bear illocutionary force (see §2.2.1). As such, 
one expects that these appositions cannot be used to commit speech acts and 
thus do not engender independent requests to update the context.   
 The appositions in (72) exemplify those that are assertoric (see §2.2.1). As 
such, one expects that they can be used to commit speech acts and hence do 
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engender requests to update the context. That assertoric conjuncts can 
engender requests is evidenced by constructions like (73). 
 
(73) [&P [α Jo entered the pub] and [β Bob served her a drink]]. (where β ⇴ α) 
 
I will now test these predictions by employing the first two diagnostics that 
were used for attributions and ARCs in §5.2.2 (pluggability has already been 




As (74) shows, neither interpolated nor final subclausal appositions can be 
targeted by a generic response, where the response is intended to be 
interpreted as that’s (not) true that the apposition is another name for the 
referent denoted the anchor.59 
 
(74) a. A: The Big Apple, i.e. New York, is a great place to live. 
b. A: Pete, i.e. the guy that we met in the pub, invited us to lunch. 
c. A: John’s been to the Big Apple, i.e. New York. 
d. A:  I just saw Pete, i.e. the guy that we met in the supermarket.  
 B: # {That’s not true! / That’s true! / Indeed! / No!} 
 
The same pattern is observed with semantically vacuous appositions, as (75) 
shows, where the response is again intended to be interpreted as that’s (not) 
true that the correlate is another name for the referent denoted by the 
subapposition. 
                                                     
59  Mark de Vries (p.c.) notes that the synonymy relationship that is established between anchors 
and subclausal appositions can be targeted by a specific response, as (iB) demonstrates.  
(i) A: The Big Apple, Chicago, is a great place to live.  
 B: It’s a mistake to associate the Big Apple with Chicago. 
That the synonymy relationship in question can be commented upon (iB) is expected, as other 
subsentential grammatical relationships can be commented upon too: 
(ii) A: The novelist Robert Burns is a hero in Scotland. 
 B: He’s more of a poet than a novelist.  
Resultantly, that fact that (iB) comments upon the synonymy relationship between the anchor and the 
apposition in (iA) does not entail that an SD-style request to establish the synonymy relationship in 
question is invoked from (iA). 
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(75) a. A: The Big Apple is a nice city; that is New York is a nice city. 
 b. A: John saw Mary yesterday; he saw his ex-wife yesterday. 
  B: # {That’s not true! / That’s true! / Indeed! / No!} 
 
With assertoric appositions, a different pattern is observed. Here, generic 
responses can be coherently employed. In each case, generic opposition (for 
instance) can be expressed towards the apposition alone. In other words, 
that’s not true can mean it’s not true that we needn’t worry about money 
anymore in (76a). However, my informants were divided with respect to 
whether or not generic opposition can target the synonymy relation that the 
speaker intends to establish. In other words, it is unclear whether for (76a) 
that’s not true can mean it’s not true that winning the lottery equates with not 
needing to worry about money. This complication aside, it is clear that these 
appositions may engender requests to update the context. 
 
(76) a. A: We’ve won the lottery, in other words we needn’t worry about 
money anymore. 
 b. A: Sam is a procrastinator, that is to say he evidently spends far too 
much time running pointless errands when he should be working. 
  B: {That’s not true! / That’s true! / Indeed! / No!} 
 
5.3.2  Contingency 
 
The diagnostic of contingency employed in §5.2.2.2 does not apply in any 
relevant sense to subclausal appositions. While the example in (77a) shows 
that hosts need not be contingent upon subclausal appositions contained 
within them, this does not entail that such appositions engender requests to 
update the context. Rather, it merely shows that additional information 
provided about a referent need not be relevant to the evaluation of the 
proposition in which this referent is contained. This is made clear by (77b). 
Because Plato could have written many dialogues without being a 
philosopher, the host is not contingent on the philosopher. However, the 
philosopher is a functional element of type 〈e, t〉 (Potts 2005:113), and as such 
is not a plausible candidate for request-engenderment. I maintain that the 
same is true of subclausal appositions. 
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(77) a. Obama, i.e. the president of the United States, is a Democrat. 
b. The philosopher Plato wrote many dialogues. 
 
The same argument works in reverse. At first glance the host clause in (78a) 
appears to be contingent upon the subclausal apposition, as only US 
presidents can order the deployment of that country’s nuclear arsenal. This 
apparent contingency is illusory however, as the absence of the apposition 
leads to the same interpretation. In other words, the truth of (78b) is 
contingent upon Obama being the US president (if the conversation world 
aims to reflect the real world). Thus the apposition in (78a) merely spells out 
a relationship of contingency that is already established.   
 
(78) a. Obama, i.e. the president of the United States, ordered the  
 deployment of US nuclear weapons. 
b. Obama ordered the deployment of US nuclear weapons. 
 
Contingency is irrelevant to semantically vacuous appositions too, for a 
similar reason. Again, the fact that Obama must be the US president in order 
to approve the deployment of nuclear weapons remains even when the 
apposition in (79) is removed. 
 
(79) Obama ordered the release of US nuclear weapons; in other words 
the president of the United States ordered the deployment of US nuclear 
weapons.  
 
Because a causal (as well as synonymy) relationship may pertain between 
assertoric appositions and their hosts, contingency is observed. This is 
observed in (80), where the abdication of the queen entails the coronation of 
a king (assuming again that the conversational world reflects the actual 
world). 
 
(80) The UK’s queen has abdicated, in other words the UK now has a king. 
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5.3.3  Appositions and the structured discourse: a summary 
 
In this subsection (§5.3), I demonstrated that subclausal and semantically 
vacuous appositions do not engender requests to update the context, while 
assertoric appositions do. This provides further evidence for the analysis in 
§2, which predicts this result. 
 
5.4 Alternative analyses of the pragmatic import of attributions and 
appositive relative clauses 
 
The approach advanced in §5.1 confers the benefit of treating attributions 
and ARCs with declarative syntax as regular assertions. This circumvents the 
need to venture that these parentheticals display an inherent semantic 
property that instructs the semantic module to treat them as different to 
regular at-issue content. 
 In this subsection (§5.4), I review two semantic approaches to 
attributions and ARCs that do precisely this. By reviewing these two 
analyses, I aim to show that the assignment of inherent ‘non-at-issueness’ to 
parentheticals is both conceptually and empirically disfavoured.  
 
5.4.1 Attributions and appositive relative clauses as implicatures 
 
As mentioned in the introductory paragraphs to this chapter, Potts (2005) 
invokes a bidimensional semantic account of parentheticals, which 
distinguishes between at-issue and conventionally implied (CI) material. For 
him, attributions and ARCs are generated as at-issue terms, but are type-
shifted to CI terms by the feature COMMA. When the time comes for 
utterances that contain attributions or ARCs to be interpreted, they 
constitute 2-tuples of propositions ⟨ta, {tc1, …, tcn}⟩, where the superscripted a 
and c denote at-issue and CI terms respectively. The ta term denotes the host 
clause, while tc terms denote attributions and ARCs interpolated within it. 
 One of the main motivations for Potts’ bidimensional approach comes 
from the independence of truth-values that utterances that contain 
attributions and ARCs appear to display. For instance, Potts (2005:32) notes 
about (81) that “I know that Armstrong is a Texan; the [attribution] is false. 
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But I can still recover from [(81)] the information that Lance won the 2002 
Tour”. For him, this requires that (81) be assigned the truth value ⟨1, 0⟩. 
 
(81) Lance Armstrong, an Arkansan, has won the 2002 Tour de France! 
 
Potts’ maintenance of independent truth values makes incorrect predictions, 
however. It incorrectly predicts that examples like those in (82), wherein the 
host and attribution/ARC engender contradictory propositions, should not 
create incoherence, as one should be able to assign truth values such as  
⟨1, 0⟩ or ⟨0, 1⟩ to them. 
 
(82) a. # David, who’s a bachelor, is a married man. 
b. #  David, a bachelor, is a married man. 
c. # Joel is married to Jack, who’s a bachelor. 
d. # Joel is married to Jack, a bachelor 
 
The approach outlined in §5.1 accounted straightforwardly for these facts. As 
discussed in §5.2.2.2, incoherence arises in such cases because the speaker 
opposes her own requests to update the context. In (82a) for instance, the 
request ⟨David is a bachelor⟩ is imposed upon the discourse by the same 
speaker that files the contradictory request ⟨David is married man⟩. 
Incoherence arises because there is no reason why interlocutors of sound 
mind would do this.60 
 AnderBois et al. (2013) point out that Potts’ bidimensional approach also 
predicts that dependencies between anaphors (83a) and other elements that 
are connected via a linear dependence (83b-c) across the host/parenthetical 
boundary should be impossible to establish, contrary to observation.    
  
(83) a. [Every speaker]i, all of themi PhD students, gave a great talk. 
 b. John kissed Mary, who kissed him too.  
 c. Mel lost three games of tennis to Betty, who lost six Δ to Jane. 
                                                     
60  As the current approach correctly predicts, the same incoherence observed in (82) arises with 
utterances that engender explicatures that contradict with existential presuppositions (see (i) and (ii) 
below). 
(i) # The bachelor is a married man. 
(ii)  ⟨xi is a bachelor, xi is a married man⟩ 
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The simple model advanced in §5.1 evidently ignores how such anaphoric 
relations are established across the discourse. A more complex model, such 
as a variant of discourse representation theory (Kamp & Reyle 1993), is 
required for this. However, my approach does not preclude these 
interactions. Because it treats attributions/ARCs and their hosts as occupying 
the same dimension of meaning, such interactions are indeed expected. 
 
5.4.2 Attributions and appositive relative clauses as impositions 
 
Like Potts (2005), AnderBois et al. (2013) maintain a fundamental 
distinction between at-issue and what they call appositive content (this is 
similar to Potts’ conventional implicature content). For them, at-issue 
material engenders requests to update the context, while appositive content 
updates the context without a request being engendered. Thus, appositive 
content is always imposed upon the context.  
 While their approach is closer to mine than Potts’, important 
dissimilarities pertain. For them appositivity is inherent, and therefore 
imposition is unrelated to conversational time or to a parenthetical’s linear 
position respective to its host in the string that they share. Thus, advocates of 
this approach cannot straightforwardly account for the fact that final 
parentheticals are not imposed on the context (see §5.2.2). To remedy this, 
one might suggest that final parentheticals are exceptional in that they do not 
bear appositive content (perhaps the proposition they engender is conjoined 
to the host clause proposition, and together they generate a single request). 
While this solution is plausible, it requires one to posit a dichotomy in 
interpretation between parentheticals based upon their linear position; a 
dichotomy that my approach does not require. 
 Regardless of whether or not they engender requests, questions never 
update the context. Thus, parenthetical questions (see 84 below) cannot be 
appositive for AnderBois et al., as they cannot update the context directly, 
which is the sole function of appositives. However it is unclear to me 
whether their account’s distinction between appositives (i.e. declarative 
Force phrase parentheticals) and non-appositives (i.e. non-declarative Force 
phrase parentheticals) has any advantages or disadvantages from a semantic 
perspective. 
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(84) A masked man (but who exactly?) kissed Miranda at the party. 
 
On my account, Force phrase parentheticals and independent sentences are 
identical, in that those that display declarative syntax can be used as 
assertions (which engender requests), while those that display non-
declarative syntax cannot be used as assertions (and therefore cannot 
engender requests). Thus, my account maintains the same distinction that 
AnderBois et al.’s does, except that for me this distinction is not particular to 
parentheticals (i.e. appositive vs. non-appositive), but is more universal (i.e. 
assertions vs. non-assertions). 
 As a final note, a diagnostic that AnderBois et al. (2013:21) introduce to 
support their claim that attributions and ARCs display inherent appositivity 
concerns their (in)ability to answer questions. They claim that B’s response 
in (85) below is infelicitous because only at-issue (i.e. non-appositive) 
material can answer questions. 
 
(85) A: Who had prostate cancer? 
 B: ?? Tammy’s husband, who had prostate cancer, was being treated 
at the Dominican Hospital. 
 
This diagnostic has gone unmentioned in the discussion about the 
pragmatics of appositives thus far, as it is difficult to ascertain exactly why 
(85B) is infelicitous. The utterance in (85B) cannot be infelicitous because of 
the ARC’s inherent ‘appositivity’ (contrary to what AnderBois et al. claim), 
as an increase in the salience of both interpolated and final Force phrasal 
appositives makes them capable of answering questions, as (86) shows. 
 
(86)  A: Does David have a job? 
 a. B: David, who indeed DOES have a job, now works for Google. 
 b. B: David seems able to pay the rent, which suggests to me that 
he indeed DOES have a job. 
 
I tentatively suppose that there exists a preference, which can be overridden, 
for speaker A’s question to be answered by whichever speech act speaker B 
starts uttering immediately after A’s question is asked. Such an explanation, 
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if feasible, would not only account for the data in (85) and (86), but also for 
the monologue data in (87) below, which patterns identically to (85) and 
(86). 
 
(87)  A:  Does David have a job? 
a. B:  He does. I’m proud of him 
b. B: # I’m proud of David. He has a job. 
c. B  Well, he’s paying his rent. So yes, David indeed DOES  
   have a job. 
  
5.5. Concluding remarks on the pragmatics of appositives 
 
In this chapter, I investigated the pragmatic import of the appositives whose 
syntax I examined in chapters two, three, and four. To accomplish this task, I 
created an informal model of discourse that captures how assertions and 
presuppositions (as defined in §5.1.4) behave within a structured discourse 
(SD). I demonstrated that attributions and ARCs behave like assertions in 
monologues. This conclusion therefore supports my syntactic analyses of 
attributions and ARCs as (derived from) finite clausal Force phrasal 
adjuncts, which, when declarative, may bear assertoric force and hence may 
engender requests to update the conversational context.  
 In §5.3, I analysed the pragmatic import of appositions. I showed that, 
unlike attributions and ARCs, subclausal and vacuous clausal appositions do 
not engender requests to update the conversational context. Assertoric 
clausal appositions do engender requests, however. These results therefore 
support my syntactic analysis of appositions from chapter two, which treats 
appositions as coordinated with their anchors in a low WYSIWYG fashion.  
  6 
Alternative analyses 
In this chapter, I provide critique of three alternative analyses of 
appositives. These are the bidimensional semantic approach (§6.1), the 
orphanage approach (§6.2), and the par-MERGE approach (§6.3). 
In this penultimate chapter, I outline and discuss the three alternative 
analyses of appositives that I believe are my analysis’ most plausible 
competitors. I aim to show that, in each case, the syntactic analysis advanced 
in chapters two to four confers greater empirical coverage and explanatory 
power than these. 
   
6.1 The bidimensional semantic approach 
 
In this section, I return to Potts (2005) bidimensional account of attributions 
and ARCs, which was briefly discussed in §5.4.1. In that subsection, I argued 
that semantic bidimensionality is unsuitable for a plausible analysis of the 
pragmatic import of attributions and ARCs. Below, I critique the syntactic 
mechanisms that Potts (2005) employs to make his bidimensional semantics 
work. 
 Let us first recall the relevant aspects of Potts’ account. Potts distinguishes 
between at-issue and conventionally implied (CI) material. When the time 
comes for utterances that contain attributions or ARCs to be interpreted, 
they constitute 2-tuples of propositions ⟨ta, {tc1, …, tcn}⟩, where the 
superscripted a and c denote at-issue and CI terms respectively. 
 Among the compositional rules that Potts introduces is (1), which states 
that the application of a function of the type ⟨σa, τc⟩ to an at-issue entity β 
returns a secondary proposition and the at-issue entity β unaltered. 
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(1)   β : σa (modified from Potts 2005:64) 
 • 
 α(β) : τc 
 
 β : σa α : ⟨σa, τc⟩ 
 
Syntactic constituents are converted from type ⟨σa, τa⟩ (their usual type) to 
type ⟨σa, τc⟩ by the syntactic feature COMMA, whose type for our purposes is 
⟨⟨σa, τa⟩, ⟨σa, τc⟩⟩. COMMA is applied to non-terminal syntactic nodes. An 
example of how Potts’ account works is provided in (2b) below. Here, the 
predicate nominal an actor is converted from an at-issue to a conventionally 
implied predicate by COMMA. The compositional rule in (1) then applies to 
George and an actor and returns the conventionally implied proposition 
George is an actor and the at-issue entity George. Regular function 
application then occurs, thus creating the at-issue proposition George loves 
Amal. 
 
(2) a. George, an actor, loves Amal. 
 
b. TP: ta 
 loves(George, Amal) 
 
 DP: ea VP: ⟨ea, ta⟩ 
 George λ𝑦[loves(𝑦, Amal)] 
 • 
 DP: tc loves Amal 
 actor(George) 
 
 DP: ea DP[+COMMA]: ⟨ea, tc⟩  
 George 
 DP: ⟨ea, ta⟩ 
 λ𝑥[actor(𝑥)] 
 
 an actor 
  




Potts himself only applies his system to nominal attributions, and in the 
process neglects the distinction between ‘true’ appositions (chapter two) and 
attributions (chapter three). Thus, I wish to make clear that this subsection 
(§6.1.1) does not provide a rebuttal of Potts’ own application of his system to 
appositions, but rather provides good reasons for why Potts’ system should 
not be extended to ‘true’ appositions. 
 First, I should say something about why the distinction between true 
appositions and attributions is often ignored. The most salient reason is that, 
in certain cases that were discussed throughout chapters two and three, 
‘appositions’ are ambiguous between true appositions and attributions.  
 Second, the desire to distinguish regular (or loose) appositions from close 
appositions such as those in (3a) can easily lead to the erroneous conclusion 
that true appositions and attributions form a natural class. After all, all loose 
appositions seem prosodically isolated from their host, unlike close 
appositions.  
 
(3)  a. [The poet Rab Burns] is renowned throughout Scotland. (close) 
b. [Rab Burns, the poet,] is renowned throughout Scotland. (loose) 
 
Indeed, Potts (2005:113) uses examples like (4) to argue that loose and close 
appositions form distinct natural classes. His argument runs as follows. The 
sentences in (4a) form an incoherent discourse because the Texan and the 
Ohioan are understood as properties, and, as properties, they are mutually 
exclusive (i.e. the individual Armstrong cannot be Texan and Ohioan 
simultaneously). This incoherence does not arise in (4b) because the parts 
that form close appositions are not referential themselves, rather they form a 
referential noun phrase when they concatenate. Thus, the two instances of 
Armstrong in (4b) are necessarily interpreted as distinct individuals. 
Therefore, he concludes, all loose appositions are non-referential noun 
phrases of type ⟨e, t⟩. 
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(4) a. Armstrong, the Texan, is a cyclist. # Armstrong, the Ohioan, is 
an astronaut. 
 b. Armstrong the Texan is a cyclist. Armstrong the Ohioan is 
astronaut. 
 
This argument is fallacious because Potts’ example sets up an environment in 
which the non-referential attributional interpretation of the parenthetical is 
forced. If amended to force a referential reading, the incoherence of (4a) 
disappears, and one is left with the ‘true’ apposition interpretation (though 
the oddness of talking about two distinct people called Armstrong remains). 
 
(5)  Armstrong, (that is) the Texan standing over by the window, is a 
cyclist. And Armstrong, (that is) the Ohioan sitting at the table, is an 
astronaut. 
 
Thus, while one can indeed maintain a distinction between loose and close 
appositions, one should also distinguish between ‘true’ appositions and 
attributions. 
 Having provided some comments about why one might incorrectly lump 
appositions and attributions together, I now show how Potts’ bidimensional 
semantics is unsuitable for ‘true’ appositions. 
 Firstly, the inputs for the feature COMMA must be functions. However, as 
already discussed, appositions can be entities. Thus, type-shifting must occur 
to provide COMMA the correct input. While not impossible, I envisage that 
independent justification for such type-shifting is difficult to ascertain. 
Secondly, ceteris paribus, conventionally implied propositions are always 
speaker-oriented: they cannot be ‘plugged’ by attitudinal verbs, conditional 
operators, etc. (Potts ibid.). As I demonstrated in §2.1.5, appositions can be 
plugged, contrary to Potts’ (2005) expectation. 
 In sum, the application of Potts’ multidimensional approach to 
appositions fails to provide the required degree of explanatory or descriptive 
adequacy. 
  
 Alternative analyses 199 
 
6.1.2 Attributions and appositive relative clauses 
 
When attempting to apply Potts’ approach to attributions, four issues arise. 
The first concerns the realisation of morphological case. Potts claims that 
attributions arise with either (A) the same case as their anchor, (B) the same 
case that is realised on postcopular items, or (C) an idiosyncratic case. With 
respect to B, Potts postulates that such attributions are realised with 
predicative case because they are derived from reduced ARCs (ibid.:109); a 
claim that is unlikely to be true when one considers the cross-linguistic 
evidence against it that I advanced in §4.5.  
 The second issue arises from the first. Once the notion that attributions 
are derived from reduced ARCs is discarded, Potts’ approach has no means 
by which to account for the existence of referential noun phrase attributions 
like (6). This is because only functions are suitable inputs for COMMA, while 
referential noun phrases are atomic elements of type e.61 Thus, the account 
undergenerates.  
 
(6)  A masked man, probably Pete, kissed Miranda at the party. 
  
The third issue concerns the opposite problem: overgeneralisation. As 
discussed in §3.2, current syntactic theory in the Chomskyan vein assumes 
that syntax is blind: it merely takes any two syntactic objects and MERGEs 
them (Chomsky 2008). The eventual output of MERGE (call it ‘α’) is 
constrained only by the interfaces, which assess α’s well-formedness. A 
consequence of this view is that phrases of any syntactic type can be adjuncts, 
and that if (say) a verb phrase adjoins to a determiner phrase, it will create 
unacceptability in the semantic module by virtue of the fact that it does not 
create a legitimate semantic object. 
 
                                                     
61  To resolve the problem, one could suggest that Pete in (6) is type-shifted to a predicate, as I 
mentioned in §6.1.1. An issue arises from this resolution, however: the proposition that results from the 
application of the type-shifted predicate to the anchor a masked man is unacceptable in non-appositional 
environments, as (i) shows, in contravention to what Potts’ account predicts. 
(i) * A masked man is probably Pete. 
 (on an individual, rather than generic, reading of a masked man)   
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(7)  ??? 
 
 DP: t VP: ⟨e, t⟩ 
 hates(B, J) λ𝑦[loves(𝑦, F)] 
 
 DP: e VP: ⟨e, t⟩ loves Fred 
 Bob λ𝑥[hates(𝑥, J)] 
 
 hates John 
 
On Potts’ approach, any unary predicate of type ⟨ea, ta⟩ can be type-shifted by 
COMMA to ⟨ea, tc⟩. Thus, provided that COMMA is present, verb phrase 
adjuncts should be permitted: no syntactic or semantic constraints prevent it. 
This leads to overgeneralisation, as it predicts that derivations like (8a) give 
rise to licit attribution constructions. As (8b) shows, this prediction is 
incorrect. 
 
(8) a. TP: ta 
 hates(B, F) 
 
 DP: ea VP: ⟨ea, ta⟩ 
 Bob λ𝑦[loves(𝑦, F)] 
 • 
 DP: tc loves Fred 
 hates(B, J) 
 
 DP: ea VP[+COMMA]: ⟨ea, tc⟩  
 Bob 
 VP: ⟨ea, ta⟩ 
 λ𝑥[hates(𝑥, J)] 
 
 hates John 
 
 b. * Bob, hates John, loves Fred. 
 
The fourth issue concerns extensibility. Potts’ account cannot be 
straightforwardly extended to cover attributions that have non-nominal 
anchors. One might suppose such anchors are nominalised and then 
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verbalised by type-shifters (as in 9b below, which is modelled on Potts 
2002:84, and which employs a world variable but uses simple extensional 
notation for types). While this approach is tenable, my analysis, which 
permits coreference across the discourse with enlightened as a concept, is 
theoretically simpler.62    
 
(9) a. Siddhartha is enlightened, a state of bliss that few experience. 
 
 b. TP: ta 
  λ𝑤[enlightened𝑤(Siddhartha)] 
 
 DP: ea VP: ⟨ea, ta⟩ 
 Siddhartha λ𝑤λ𝑥[enlightened𝑤(𝑥)] 
 
 ∪f VP: ea 
 [ENLIGHTENED] 
 • 
 VP: tc 
 λ𝑤[SoB𝑤([ENLIGHTENED])] 
 
 VP: ea DP[+COMMA]: ⟨ea, tc⟩ 
 [ENLIGHTENED] 
 DP: ⟨ea, ta⟩ 
 ∩f VP: ⟨ea, ta⟩ λ𝑤λ𝑦[SoB𝑤(𝑦)] 
 λ𝑤λ𝑥[enlightened𝑤(𝑥)] 
 a state of bliss that 
 is enlightened few experience 
 
                                                     
62  Note that attributions can sometimes modify inferred anchors. This occurs in (i) below, where 
the apposition is interpreted as modifying Poland, which is inferred from the anchor Polish. 
(i) Mary is Polish, a country I hope to visit one day. 
On the ‘reduced copula’ analysis of attributions that I advocated in chapter four, (i) displays the syntax in 
(ii). As such, (i)’s acceptability is expected, as pronouns like it in (ii) may sometimes corefer with inferred 
antecedents, as shown by (iii). As far as I can tell, the type-shifting approach exemplified by (9) is entirely 
unable to account for (i)’s acceptability. 
(ii) Mary is Polish, (it is) a country I hope to visit one day. 
(iii) Polish people are really friendly. It’s a country I’d to visit one day. 
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As Potts (2005:104) makes clear, his approach demands that ⟨ea, tc⟩ terms 
adjoin adjacent to their anchors. While adjacency must be maintained with 
attributions in English (§3.4.1), non-adjacency is permitted with Turkish 
attributions and English ARCs (§4.4.2). This latter fact is also unaccounted 
for by Potts’ approach. 
 To summarise: it appears that Potts’ bidimensional semantic analysis of 
appositives (or supplements in his terminology) does not provide the 
required degree of descriptive and explanatory adequacy. Syntactically, it 
over- and undergenerates with respect to attributions and ARCs, and cannot 
be extended to ‘true’ appositions. Pragmatically, it incorrectly predicts that 
no interaction is permitted across the parenthetical/host boundary (see 
§5.4.1), and it fails to account for the similarities between attributions/ARCs 
and assertions that comprise monologues. 
 
6.2 The orphanage approach  
 
6.2.1 The orphanage approach to attributions and appositive relative 
clauses 
 
In this section I discuss the orphanage approach to parenthesis, particularly 
its application to attributions and ARCs. It should be noted that I do not 
consider the application of the orphanage approach to appositions in this 
subsection, as I have already demonstrated in §2.2.3 that an orphanage 
analysis of appositions is infeasible. 
 Let me begin by outlining the structure of this subsection (§6.2.1). Many 
scholars have proposed that parenthetical clauses are orphans (Haegeman 
1991, Burton-Roberts, 1999, 2006, Peterson 1999, Döring 2014, Ott 2014a, b, 
among others). Because orphanage is a rather fractured notion within 
syntactic theory (for instance, compare Espinal 1991 with Burton-Roberts 
1999), I must first reserve some space to outline what I believe to be the most 
charitable Minimalist formulation of it. At first sight, this formulation of 
orphanage appears to confer greater theoretical elegance than the Force 
phrase approach to attributions and ARCs that I advocated in chapters three 
and four, insofar as orphanage appears able to account for the semantic 
opacity that attributions/ARCs display without recourse to sui generis 
mechanisms like Force predicates. In arguing against orphanage, I will first 
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show that this theoretical advantage is illusory, and that, if one wishes to 
retain an orthodox conception of the architecture of grammar, orphanage 
requires a sui generis secondary linearisation mechanism to account for 
opacity. By exposing this illusion, I level the playing-field: I show that both 
the orphanage and the Force phrase approach utilise sui generis means to 
guarantee that attributions and ARCs are interpreted as semantically opaque. 
Once the playing-field is levelled, I show that the use of Force phrases, rather 
than the use of a secondary linearisation procedure, confers greater 
theoretical parsimony, and that the Force phrase approach is therefore 
favoured over the orphanage approach. 
 I start by outlining my conception of orphanage. To begin, consider the 
example in (10), where each lexeme precedes and/or follows another lexeme. 
These planar relations are called precedence relations. All the syntactic 
theories that I know of, whether derivational or monostratal, maintain that 
these precedence relations should be understood as (derived from) syntactic 
relations. 
 
(10) Tom is my brother. 
 
Syntactic theories are built to model a finite amount of linguistic information 
at any one time. For the sake of clarity, I will call these finite ‘chunks’ of 
information syntactic units (SUs). SUs usually correspond to the 
pretheoretical notion of a sentence, which, in terms of orthography, is the 
grammatical unit that starts with a capital letter and ends with a full-stop in 
English.63 
 On this simplistic notion that SUs equate with sentences, one is assured 
that at least one precedence relation exists in language that should not be 
understood as a syntactic relation. This is the precedence relation that 
pertains between the final lexeme of one SU (brother in 11) and initial 
lexeme of the next SU (he’s in 11). 
                                                     
63  One might suggest that the phase theory initiated within the Minimalism program by Chomsky 
(2001a) treats subsentential phenomenon as SUs (i.e. ‘phases’). I disagree: phases are merely (partially) 
opaque domains within SUs. To my knowledge, phase theorists do not treat the two sentences in (11) in 
the main text as phases that are contained within a larger phase (as in (i) below). Thus, the largest phase 
that can be created is the root clausal phase, and this is therefore phase theory’s ‘SU’. 
(i) [PHASE-1 [PHASE-2 Tom is my brother.] [PHASE-3 He’s a social worker.]]  
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(11) Tom is my brother. He’s a social worker. 
 
The precedence relation between brother and he’s in (11) can instead be 
attributed to articulatory time.64 In other words, brother precedes he’s in the 
linear string in (11) because the speaker articulates the SU Tom is my brother 
before she articulates the SU he’s a social worker. 
 Non-syntactic precedence relations like the one that persists between 
brother and he’s in (11) are an inevitable consequence of two factors: 
maintenance of the assumption that syntax operates on SUs, and the fact that 
spoken, signed, and written language is (and must be) articulated along one 
dimension, which is time. The assumption that syntax deals in SUs could of 
course be discarded, and one could instead maintain that syntactic 
connexions persist across sentential and even speaker boundaries (see Neijt 
1979). Such an approach requires that syntactic representations are never 
fully encapsulated, and that a syntactic node is always available to which 
incoming syntactic information can attach. While not pursued in theories 
like Minimalism, this idea is not impossible to implement, though for 
Minimalism it would require a different conception of phases and a rejection 
of the numeration, which is necessarily finite. 
 The demand for sequentiality that I mentioned above constrains the 
articulation of language, but not the mental representation of it. In 
Minimalist terms, one can maintain that syntax operates on SUs (i.e. it builds 
finite trees from finite numerations) while also maintaining that the syntax 
can deal with many SUs simultaneously (i.e. it builds more than one finite 
tree from more than one finite numeration at the same time). These views 
are not incompatible. For instance, the notion of multiple derivational 
‘workspaces’ is often used as an explanatory tool in the Minimalist 
framework, as Nunes (2004) exemplifies. 
 If the mental representation of language is not subjected to the 
sequentiality constraint that articulation is, then it is feasible that convergent 
SUs (i.e. those SUs that obey the ‘interface’ constraints imposed by the sound 
and meaning components of the mind) can stack up in an articulatory cache, 
ready to be articulated. Provided that the linear order of lexemes internal to 
                                                     
64 Note that the verb ‘articulation’ is not limited to vocal expression or written inscription here. 
Any SU that is available to the conscious mind is ‘articulated’. 
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a particular SU is maintained (as each SU has been independently 
linearised), these stacked-up SUs can be articulated in a manner that 
replicates synchronous articulation as best as the articulatory system allows, 
where SUs completely linearly precede/follow one another (12a), or where 
certain SUs are fully linearly contained within others (12b), or where SUs are 
linearly interlaced (12c).65 
 
(12) a. [SU1 A B C D] [SU2 E F G H] 
 
b. [SU1 A B [SU2 E F G H] C D] 
 
c.  SU1 SU2 
 
 A B E F C D G H 
  
In the situation represented in (12b), for example, the precedence relation 
between B and E is not a syntactic relation, but rather a relation established 
by articulatory time. Thus, if one permits the notion of an articulatory cache, 
more non-syntactic precedence relations can be present in language than 
those observed at the boundaries of sequentially-ordered sentences. 
 An orphanage approach to attributions and ARCs that is grounded in 
Minimalism requires that the situation described above pertains. According 
to this approach to orphanage, those SUs that appear as interpolated into 
other SUs are orphans. Because they are syntactically derived and assessed 
for their interpretative and phonological well-formedness in complete 
isolation to the SUs into which they interpolate, orphans show syntactic and 
semantic opacity with respect to their ‘hosts’. 
 From the description above it appears that the orphanage approach is 
compatible with the Minimalist conception of grammar, provided that one 
permits the existence of an articulatory cache. Because the ascription of the 
status of ‘orphan’ to parenthetical clauses accounts for their semantic and 
syntactic opacity straightforwardly (and without the need to posit additional 
syntactic or semantic machinery such as the ‘Force phrases’ I invoked to 
                                                     
65  Note that the possibility represented in (12c) is not attested in natural language; a fact to which I 
return later in this subsection. 
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account for the opacity of attributions and ARCs in chapters three and four), 
the orphanage approach seems like an elegant and therefore conceptually 
attractive theory. 
 It is important to realise however that the theoretical parsimony 
conferred by the orphanage approach rests upon the notion that any 
grammatical mechanism that operates upon two intertwined SUs (i.e. the 
representations in 12b-c) applies in synchrony with articulatory time. If on 
the other hand such mechanisms must ‘see’ the intertwined SUs before 
articulation occurs then one cannot appeal to articulatory time to explain the 
alleged non-syntactic relations of precedence that are exhibited between 
intertwined SUs. Instead, an advocate of orphanage must concede that her 
system involves two distinct linearisation operations; one that establishes 
precedence relations within SUs (this is the regular linearisation mechanism 
with which practitioners of Minimalism are familiar), and another that 
establishes precedence relations across intertwined SUs. Once this 
concession is made the orphanage approach loses its elegance and hence 
conceptual attractiveness. Like the ‘Force phrase’ approach outlined in 
chapter three, the orphanage approach requires a unique mechanism (in its 
case, a secondary linearisation operation) to explain how orphans are 
pronounced in the linear position that they are. 
 To provide a concrete example, let us consider prosody. Most 
prosodicians assume that syntactic trees are prosodically parsed at the PF 
interface of grammar (Embick & Noyer 2001), where ‘parsing’ refers to the 
action of adding prosodic instructions for the articulatory system such as 
“intonate the left edge of this phrase with a high tone” onto syntactic heads 
and maximal projections. In English, the default right edge intonation phrase 
tone for declarative sentences is L!, which is a low tone. If two SUs are 
computed independently, and if both are clausal, both should receive an L! 
tone by default. Thus, in the articulatory cache, both should look like this: 
 
(13) ([SU1 Tom is a social worker])L!  
([SU2 He’s my brother])L! 
 
However, when the two SUs in (13) are intertwined during articulation, the 
actual right edge intonation phrase tone displayed on SU2 in (14) is H!, 
which is a continuation tone: 
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(14) ([SU1 Tom ([SU2 he’s my brother])H! is a social worker])L!  
 
The intonation pattern depicted in (14) is not expected on the orphanage 
approach as currently formulated. Rather, SU2 is expected to be intonated 
with L!, as (13) shows. That SU2 exhibits a continuative H! tone informs us 
that the prosodic parser knows that SU2 is interpolated into SU1. 
 To account for the pattern of intonation observed in (14), an advocate of 
orphanage must propose that the prosodic parser knows that SU1 is 
interpolated into SU2 because prosodic parsing happens at the same time 
that articulation does: SUs are not prosodically parsed before they are 
articulated. Such a claim must be made because if the prosodic parser applied 
before articulation then all of the precedence relations observed in (14) must 
be established before articulation, which undermines the appeal to 
articulatory time as the means of establishing the non-syntactic precedence 
relation that purportedly holds between Tom and he’s in (14). 
 Taking all of the above into account, it appears that the conceptual 
feasibility of the orphanage approach is best assessed by first adumbrating 
the grammatical operations that take as their input intertwined SUs like (14), 
and then evaluating whether it is justified to claim that these operations are 
applied in synchrony with articulation. 
 With respect to morphophonological operations, it appears that an 
advocate of the orphanage approach must maintain that not just prosody but 
also vocabulary insertion and cliticisation must occur in synchrony with 
articulation. That such a claim must be maintained is demonstrated by 
examining the relationship between attributions/ARCs and contracted 
auxiliaries and the Saxon genitive in English. 
 Cliticisation of the Saxon genitive takes as its input intertwined SUs. In 
the case of attributions and ARCs, the Saxon genitive is cliticised to the most 
rightward attribution/ARC that modifies a possessor noun phrase anchor (cf. 
Arnold 2007). This is illustrated in (15a), where the Saxon genitive is 
cliticised to mine and pronounced as /z/, as per the allophony rule that 
demands that such sibilants are pronounced as voiced if they immediately 
follow a voiced segment. As (15b) shows, the Saxon genitive cannot be 
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cliticised to the possessor phrase Mark in these environments, and thus 
cannot be pronounced as the unvoiced /s/.66 
 
(15) a. Mark, a friend of mine,’s new car was expensive.  
b. * Mark’s, a friend of mine, new car was expensive. 
 
Since Halle & Marantz (1993), there has been general accordance in the 
literature that syntactic lexical heads are composed of bundles of syntactic 
features. After ‘spell out’ of an SU to the phonological component of the 
grammar, a process called vocabulary insertion superimposes vocabulary 
items onto these lexical heads. Because clitics like the Saxon genitive show 
allophonic variation that is determined by their phonetic environment, 
cliticisation must occur after (or concurrent with) vocabulary insertion, 
otherwise allophony rules could not be applied. 
 On the orphanage approach, the cliticisation of the Saxon genitive to the 
attribution in (15a) must occur in synchrony with articulation. Because 
cliticisation is sensitive to its phonological surroundings, vocabulary 
insertion must occur in synchrony with articulation too. To claim that 
vocabulary insertion and cliticisation apply before articulation requires that 
the precedence relations that are observed in (15a) are established before 
articulation – a claim that undermines any appeal to articulatory time as the 
creator of the precedence relations between mine and the genitive clitic in 
(15a). 
 The same argument applies with contracted auxiliaries. For me and my 
British English informants, the prosodic intonation phrase boundaries that 
typically separate attributions and ARCs from their hosts can be absent if 
speech is rapid enough. In such cases, attributions/ARCs and their anchors 
share a phonological phrase, where the phrase accent (represented by small 
caps below) falls within the parenthetical: 
 
(16) a. (John a NEIGHBOUR of mine)φ 
b. (John who I WORK with)φ 
 
                                                     
66  Other instances of the Saxon genitive cliticising to appositives have already provided in this 
thesis: see examples (35c) and (83b) in chapter two. 
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When attributions/ARCs and their anchors display the prosodic 
configuration exemplified in (16), contracted auxiliaries may cliticise to the 
final word in the parenthetical, as the examples in (17) demonstrate, where 
the commas that usually surround attributions and ARCs are absent so that 
the intended prosodic integration is conveyed. Note that, in each case, 
unacceptability arises if the contracted auxiliary is cliticised onto the anchor 
John instead.67 
 
(17)  A. We need an extra player for the football match on Saturday. 
a. B: John who I work with’ll fill in, I bet. 
b. B: John who I work with’d fill in, I bet. 
c. B: John who I work with’s been asking about it. He’ll fill in. 
 
Like with the Saxon genitive, the cliticisation of the contracted auxiliaries to 
the ARCs in (17) must occur in synchrony with articulation on the 
orphanage approach. 
 As a syntactician, I cannot say with any confidence whether or not the 
deferral of the application of the three morphophonological operations 
mentioned above (i.e. prosodic parsing, vocabulary insertion, and 
cliticisation) until the point of articulation is justifiable. I simply note here 
that advocates of the orphanage approach must adopt an explicit stance 
towards morphophonological operations that treats them as applied in 
synchrony with articulation. Note however that this stance clashes with the 
basic tenets of morphophonological theories like Distributed Morphology 
(DM), which maintains that prosodic parsing, vocabulary insertion and 
cliticisation each occur before SUs are assessed for their phonological well-
formedness (Embick & Noyer 2001:566). If the tenets of DM are correct, 
                                                     
67  McCawley (1998:486, en.36) notes that “combinations of non-restrictive clause and a contracted 
auxiliary ’s … are syntactically acceptable, though they have no acceptable written form.” He provides (i) 
below as an example, where I assume that commas represent prosodic breaks. I agree with McCawley that 
this example is acceptable. Resultantly, it appears that, although an absence of pauses is required to 
contract auxiliaries onto appositives in most cases, the prosodic integration of appositives is not a 
prerequisite for auxiliary contraction. 
(i) John, who I can’t stand,’s been given a promotion. 
Interesting, McCawley (ibid.:471) judges examples like (15a) in the main text to be rather degraded. 
Arnold (2007), my informants, and I disagree. Further research is required to discover why judgements 
about such examples diverge.  
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then the morphological dependencies observed in (15) and (17) cannot be 
established in synchrony with articulatory time across SUs after all. Rather, 
they must be established within one SU. This suggests that 
attributions/ARCs and their host clauses share an SU, just as the ‘Force 
phrase’ approach to attributions and ARCs that was outlined in chapters 
three and four suggests. 
 An advocate of orphanage could suggest that SUs are intertwined at some 
point before articulation, and that the sequential application of 
morphophonological operations that Distributed Morphologists call the ‘PF-
branch’ targets the occupants of the articulatory cache. This suggestion 
amounts to a concession that a secondary linearisation operation – which 
targets SUs rather than the lexemes that comprise them – applies at some 
juncture between the construction of SUs and their articulation. As 
mentioned previously, the postulation of a secondary linearisation operation 
eliminates the conceptual advantage that the orphanage approach appears to 
possess over its rivals; as the orphanage approach, just like the Force phrase 
and bidimensional semantic approaches, requires a sui generis means of 
capturing the syntactic and semantic opacity that attributions and ARCs 
display. 
 Whether justifiable or not, the claim that morphophonological operations 
apply in synchrony with articulation is conceptually viable in Minimalism, 
which in its core form (i.e. Chomsky’s work since his 1995 The Minimalist 
Program) is ambivalent towards the timing of post-syntactic grammatical 
operations. However, the claim that syntactic operations apply in synchrony 
with articulation is conceptually unviable for Minimalism, which maintains a 
strict separation between the creation of SUs and their articulation (this 
division can be traced back to Chomsky’s 1965 distinction between 
competence and performance). As such, evidence that syntactic operations 
take as their input intertwined SUs provides robust opposition to the 
implication (inherent in the orphanage analysis) that SUs are intertwined at 
the point of articulation. Because one cannot justifiably claim that syntactic 
operations occur in synchrony with articulation, one must concede that SUs 
are intertwined before articulation, and hence undermine the main reason to 
adopt orphanage.  
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 To see that certain syntactic operations take as their input apparent 
intertwined SUs, consider the example in (18) below, which is repeated from 
example (94) in chapter four.  
 
(18) Sam claims to have found [a proof t1], which many believed could not 
exist, [of one of the most famous conjectures in the history of 
mathematics]1.  
 
I have represented the construction in (18) as involving extraposition, which 
is an extraction operation that moves constituents rightward. However, it is 
possible that (18) involves no extraction at all. Rather, the ARC could be 
interpolated within the anchor. 
 Evidence that (18) does involve extraposition comes from the behaviour 
of appositive relative pronouns. I demonstrated in §4.4.2 that such relative 
pronouns, except in certain exceptional circumstances, cannot corefer with 
an anchor that surrounds them. 
 
(19) * [The senator told the public, whichi everyone now admits, many  
 lies]i. 
 
One could claim here that ARCs can be surrounded by noun phrase anchors 
but not clausal ones. This claim cannot be maintained however, as it 
incorrectly predicts that the example below, where extraposition cannot have 
occurred, is acceptable. Thus, extraposition must indeed occur in (18).  
 
(20) * [John, whichi is a Jaguar,’s car]i is brand new. 
 
On the assumption that extraposition is a syntactic operation (Ross 1967, 
Guéron 1980, Koster 2000, among others), the example in (18) hints towards 
the conclusion that the proposal that SUs are intertwined at the point of 
articulation is wrong. Because the syntax must know that the ARC is present 
in order to extrapose a phrase around it, it seems implausible that the linear 
precedence relations that pertain between the ARC and its host in (18) can 
be established post-syntactically, and especially not as articulation takes 
place.  
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 It is worth mentioning here that Truckenbrodt (1995) and Göbbel (2007) 
have claimed that extraposition is an extraction operation that occurs post-
syntactically, as part of the sequence of operations that occur along the PF-
branch of grammar. Even if this is true, the argument against intertwining at 
the point of articulation still stands. (More specifically, the argument 
becomes a repetition of what I said with respect to cliticisation, prosody and 
vocabulary insertion in the preceding paragraphs.) 
 Furthermore, it appears that, in certain environments, syntactic selection 
(MERGE) traverses purportedly interwined SUs. This is observed with right 
node raising (RNR) constructions. As mentioned in chapter two, RNR is not 
a unitary phenomenon. For instance, Barros & Vicente (2011) claim that 
certain RNR constructions are derived from backwards deletion, while 
others involve multidominance. An RNR construction like (21a), which 
displays a ‘cumulative’ shared constituent, must involve multidominance, as 
(21a) is semantically incoherent on the backwards deletion analysis provided 
in (21b). 
 
(21) a.  Sam killed and Laura wounded a collective total of 200 badgers. 
 b. # Sam killed a collective total of 200 badgers and Laura wounded 
a collective total of 200 badgers. 
 
As (22a) demonstrates, cumulative shared constituents are also observed in 
constructions that contain appositives (cf. Arnold 2007). 
 
(22) a. I know Sam, who killed, and you know a girl that wounded a 
collective total of 200 badgers. 
 b. # I know Sam, who killed a collective total of 200 badgers, and you 
know a girl that wounded a collective total of 200 badgers. 
 
As the incoherence of (22b) demonstrates, the utterance in (22a) cannot be 
derived by backwards deletion. As such, I will assume that the shared 
constituent in (22a) is multidominated, following Barros & Vicente (2011). If 
this assumption is correct then a syntactic connexion must pertain between 
the host clause and the ARC, as both killed in the ARC and wounded in the 
host clause select for the same noun phrase. This entails that, at the very 
least, the utterance (22a) is derived from one multi-rooted SU (see 23) 
 Alternative analyses 213 
 
(though see De Vries 2009:358 for arguments that multi-rooted SUs are 
conceptually infeasible). How these roots are ordered with respect to 
precedence cannot be decided by articulatory time, which only acts across 
(and not within) SUs. As such, utterances like those in (22) not only suggest 
that SUs are interwined between before articulation, but also suggest that 
orphanage’s claim that all appositives constitute independent SUs to their 
hosts is incorrect.68 
 
(23)   CPARC CPHOST 
 
 who1 TP … 
 
 t1 VP VP 
 
 killed wounded DP 
 
 a collective total  
 of 200 badgers 
 
To summarise so far: I outlined what I perceive to be a plausible Minimalist 
conception of the orphanage approach to parenthesis. I emphasised that, in 
order to retain a conceptual advantage over competing theories, the 
orphanage approach must maintain that the precedence relations that persist 
between elements contained within parentheticals and their hosts must be 
established at the point of articulation. Using morphological, prosodic, and 
syntactic data from English, I demonstrated that the notion that 
parentheticals and their hosts are only related at the point of articulation is 
infeasible, as a number of grammatical operations, which apply before 
                                                     
68  In chapter three, I claimed that non-local dependency relationships can only be established 
between binders and bindees that are relativised to the same Force0. As such, dependency relationships 
like anaphoric binding, compositional semantic scope, and extraction (which I claim does not involve a 
transformational operation such as COPY or INTERNAL MERGE, despite its name; cf. Gazdar 1981, Koster 
2003, 2007, contra Chomsky 1995, 2001b) cannot be established across ForceP boundaries, as was 
illustrated in chapters three and four. On the multidominance analysis adopted in §2.1.1, RNR is not a 
dependency relationship that involves a binder (the shared constituent) and a bindee (the purported 
‘gap’). Rather, RNR constructions merely involve shared structure. As such, the fact that the shared 
constituent in (22a) is relativised to two Force0s on the current approach (namely, the ARC and the host 
clause) is unproblematic, and does not result in unacceptability because the shared constituent does not 
enter into a non-local dependency relationship.  
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articulation, take intertwined appositives and hosts as their input. At best, 
orphanage can account for these observations by claiming that appositives 
and their hosts are intertwined before the point of articulation but after the 
narrow syntactic compositional procedure is complete. However, such a 
claim amounts to a concession that a secondary linearisation procedure 
occurs that establishes the precedence relations that persist between 
parentheticals and their hosts. Because this secondary linearisation 
procedure is effectively a sui generis means by which to capture the syntactic 
and semantic opacity of parentheticals, it reduces the potential conceptual 
elegance of the orphanage approach, and renders it equivalent to the Force 
phrase approach to attributions and ARCs that was discussed in chapter 
three, which posits the existence of force predicates to ensure that 
attributions’ and ARCs’ opacity is captured. 
 Now that I have levelled the playing-field by showing that both the 
orphanage and the Force phrase approach make recourse to a sui generis 
mechanism to ensure that opacity is captured, the following question can be 
addressed: which method of ensuring that opacity is captured is more 
parsimonious, secondary linearisation or force predicates? 
 In order to answer this question, recall from my description of orphanage 
earlier in this subsection that there are three potential ways in which cached 
SUs could be articulated: successively, nested, or interlaced. These options 
were respectively represented in (12), which is repeated in (24) below. 
 
(24) a. [SU1 A B C D][SU2 E F G H] 
 
b. [SU1 A B [SU2 E F G H] C D] 
 
c.  SU1 SU2 
 
 A B E F C D G H 
 
In the discussion on orphanage so far, I have ignored the possibility that SUs 
could be interlaced. I ignored this possibility because it seems infeasible: 
attributions/ARCs (and indeed, all parentheticals) are unable to interlace 
with their hosts: 
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(25) * Frankie – that’s – is a megalomaniac – my boss. 
 (intended: Frankie, that’s my boss, is a megalomaniac.) 
 
On the orphanage assumption that the host clause and the parenthetical 
that’s my boss are indeed separate SUs, the unacceptability displayed in (25) 
can only be explained by banning the secondary linearisation that is required 
on the orphanage approach from creating sequences that match the schema 
in (24c). As far as I can see, this ban must be enforced by stipulation: one 
must simply state that the secondary linearisation mechanism may nest SUs 
but may not interlace them.  
 No such stipulations are required to account for why attributions/ARCs 
and their hosts cannot be interlaced on the Force phrase approach, however. 
For interlacing to arise, elements contained within the appositive Force 
phrase must extract to a position with the host Force phrase, as the 
representation in (26) shows. As I demonstrated in (§3.5.1), such extraction 
is illicit, as Force phrases are inherently opaque domains for extraction. 
Thus, the ban on interlacing falls out naturally.  
 




 w x  
  G H 
  A B ForceP2 y 
    
 E F t1  C D 
 
 
Resultantly, the Force phrase approach can take advantage of the hierarchy 
that is created from syntactic concatenation to account for why succession 
and nesting, but not interlacing, is observed in utterances that contain 
attributions and ARCs (and parentheticals more generally). The orphanage 
approach cannot rely on the syntax in the same way, and consequently must 
stipulate that secondary linearisation cannot result in interlaced structures. 
That such a stipulation is required therefore makes the orphanage approach 
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conceptually inferior to the Force phrase approach that I outlined in chapter 
three. 
 
6.2.2 Invalid arguments for and against the orphanage approach 
 
In the last section, I raised what are to my knowledge the totality of valid 
extant arguments against the orphanage analysis of attributions and ARCs. 
However, a number of invalid empirical arguments for and against 
orphanage have been advanced in the past. In this somewhat tangential 
subsection, I will address and discard five invalid arguments in a stepwise 
manner, in the hope that this prevents them from being programmatically 
repeated in future research. 
 One: The right-adjacent rule, which assumes orphanage and which 
Arnold (2007) attributes to Espinal (1991), demands that ARCs immediately 
follow their anchor. That extraneous material may intervene between an 
ARC and its anchor (interveners can be host clause material (see §4.4.2), or 
parentheticals such as additional ARCs (see 27)) demonstrates that this rule 
is spurious. Note that showing that the right-adjacent rule is incorrect does 
not weaken those orphanage analyses that do not assume it (such as Ott 
2014a, b), however. 
 
(27) The King, who is our leader, for whom I would gladly give my life, is 
due to abdicate soon. 
 
Two: Arnold (2007) notes that verb phrase ellipsis can be licensed within the 
host clause by an antecedent within an ARC, or vice versa: 
 
(28) a. Someone that [supports the war]i insulted Kim, who doesn’t Δi. 
 b. Kim, who [supports the war]i, insulted someone that doesn’t Δi. 
 
Arnold (ibid.:290) says “assuming that VP-ellipsis to be an operation on 
grammatical structures (i.e. LFs), data like [those provided in (28) above] are 
entirely unexpected, because no grammatical process should be able to access 
[ARCs] and [restrictive relatives contained within host clauses] at the same 
time.” 
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 While Arnold is correct that ellipsis targets LFs, he is incorrect to assume 
that grammatical processes are incapable of targeting separate LFs 
simultaneously. Because ellipsis is licensable across sentences and speakers, 
as in (29), one must assume that ellipsis can be licensed by items of 
discourse. If this is true then the ellipsis data in (28) do not provide evidence 
against orphanage approaches that maintain that sentences that contain 
attributions and ARCs are equivalent to two independent sentences modulo 
the non-syntactic interpolation of one sentence into the other. 
 
(29) A:  Kim [supports the war]i. 
B:  I know! I just saw him insult someone that doesn’t Δi! 
 
Four: Another invalid argument concerns anaphora. Consider the data 
below from Arnold (2007:290). 
 
(30) a. The people who saw [the film]i were deeply affected by iti. 
b. The people who saw iti were deeply affected by [the film]i. 
c. * Iti deeply affected the people that saw [the film]i. 
 
(31) a. My parents, who saw [the film]i, were deeply affected by iti. 
b. My parents, who saw iti, were deeply affected by [the film]i. 
c. * Iti deeply affected my parents, who saw [the film]i. 
 
In (30a-b) the referential noun phrase the film is not bound by the pronoun 
it, while in (30c) it is. Unacceptability arises in (30c) because Principle C of 
the Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981) is violated. Arnold claims that, because 
the same judgements hold of the ARC constructions in (31), ARCs must 
share a syntactic connexion with their hosts. 
 This is a false analogy, as the same distribution of acceptability observed 
in (30) is observed across sentences, as shown in (32) below. If utterances 
that contain ARCs are the intertwined variants of the examples below, as 
advocates of orphanage maintain, then the judgements observed in (31) are 
expected.   
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(32) a. My parents saw [the film]i. They were deeply affected by iti. 
b. My parents saw iti. They were deeply affected by [the film]i. 
c. * Iti deeply affected my parents. They saw [the film]i. 
 
Five: The final argument provides false evidence for orphanage. Burton-
Roberts (1999) and Lassiter (2011) discuss relatifs de liaison, which are ARCs 
that are uttered by speaker B to ‘supplement’ speaker A’s utterance (to use 
Arnold’s 2007 term). Burton-Roberts claims that the existence of relatifs de 
liaison is evidence that ARCs are orphans. 
 
(33) A: Frank bought a Porsche yesterday. 
B: Which is an expensive car. 
 
Unless reasons are advanced for why phrases that can be uttered in isolation 
are not syntactically integrated when observed in environments in which 
they are not uttered in isolation, this argument is baseless. Note that if the 
argument is somehow substantiated, it must apply to other phrases that act 
like relatifs de liaison, such as restrictive relatives and verb phrase adjuncts:  
 
(34) a. A: There are no problems with my car. 
 B: That you know of! 
 
b. [context: speaker A & B are relaying an anecdote to speaker C] 
 A: John was on the roof. 
 B: With a hammer! 
 B′: Waving a hammer around!  
 
To summarise: by demonstrating that the majority of arguments against the 
orphanage approach are invalid, I have in this subsection (§6.2.2) 
emphasised that the decision to adopt the Force phrase or orphanage 
analysis of attributions and ARCs is based largely upon theory-internal 
considerations. Adherents to the organisation of grammar as currently 
conceived by Minimalism and Distributed Morphology will find the Force 
phrase approach to attributions and ARCs more plausible, while those that 
support the notion that morphophonological rules apply to SUs that await 
articulation (i.e. E-language tokens of I-language SUs) will find the 
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orphanage approach more plausible. As discussed in §6.2.1, however, a 
decisive reason to favour the Force phrase approach is that it readily 
accounts for why attributions/ARCs and their hosts cannot be interlaced, 
while this observation must be attributed to a stipulative ban on secondary 
linearisation on the orphanage approach. 
 
6.3 The par-MERGE approach   
 
The par-MERGE approach to parenthesis captures the syntactic and semantic 
opacity exhibited by parentheticals by adding a unique syntactic 
concatenation operation to the grammar, which is called par-MERGE in De 
Vries (2012).69  
 On the par-MERGE approach, all parentheticals are complements of a 
functional head called Par0. The concatenation of parentheticals and Par0 is 
not performed by regular MERGE (Chomsky 1995), but by par-MERGE. Par-
MERGE is permitted only when one of its inputs is Par0. Unlike with regular 
MERGE, the output of par-MERGE does not dominate its input. Resultantly, 
the syntactic – and hence compositional semantic – opacity of parentheticals 
is obtained because neither the output of par-MERGE, nor any node that 
dominates it, dominates the parenthetical. 
 De Vries (2007) suggests that Par0 comes in two variants, bivalent and 
monovalent. Bivalent Par0 is treated as a coordinator. As such, the maximal 
projection of bivalent Par0 is a coordination phrase whose second conjunct is 
undominated (35a), assuming that coordination is best represented by an Xʹ-
schema (Johannessen 1998). The output of par-merger of monovalent Par0 
and its parenthetical complement is ParP, which freely adjoins to its host 
(35b). 
 
                                                     
69  The par-MERGE approach to parenthesis was initiated by De Vries (2002) and adopted and 
extended by De Vries (2003 et seq.), Heringa (2011), Kluck (2011), Griffiths & De Vries (2013), Griffiths 
& Güneş (2014), and Griffiths (2015), among others. 
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(35) a. … b. … 
 
 WPHOST WPHOST 
 
 ParP YPHOST ParP WPHOST 
   
 XPANCHOR Parʹ Par0 ZPPARENTHETICAL 
 
 Par0 ZPPARENTHETICAL (where           represents par-Merge) 
 
Because they do not display syntactic and semantic opacity (as I illustrated in 
detail in chapter two), neither of the schemata in (35) are suitable for 
appositions. The bivalent schema in (35a) is also unsuitable for attributions 
and ARCs. Under the assumption that both attributions and ARCs are 
(derived from) parenthetical clauses, adoption of the schema in (35a) 
demands that coordination with Par0 can be semantically imbalanced (as 36 
shows), something that certain adopters of the schema in (35a) permit 
(Heringa 2011, Kluck 2011) but others do not (De Vries 2002: 240). 
 
(36) a. [ParP [e John,] [Parʹ Par0 [t (he’s) my boss,]]]… 
b. [ParP [e John,] [Parʹ Par0 [t who’s my boss,]]]… 
 
As a coordination structure, the adoption of the ‘bivalent Par0’ schema in 
(35a) for attributions and ARCs also gives rise to the prediction that 
attributions must maintain linearly adjacency with their anchors. This 
prediction is not borne out, as the Turkish data from chapter three (repeated 
below) demonstrates. 
 
(37) Ali  Bey  Mine-yi,  ki  evli  bir  adam,  taciz  et-ti.  
Ali  Mr. Mine-ACC LINK  married  a  man harassment  make-PST 
‘Mr. Ali, a married man, harassed Mine.’ 
 
Lastly, adoption of the schema in (35a) for attributions and ARCs gives rise 
to the prediction that extraction from ParP, like extraction from other 
coordination phrases, must occur ‘across the board’. This prediction is not 
borne out either, as the examples in (38), which are repeated from §3.5.1. 
and §4.2 respectively, demonstrate. In these examples, licit extraction from 
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the anchor but not the attribution/ARC takes place. This suggests that 
attributions and ARCs are not coordinated with their anchors. If they were, 
the coordinate structure constraint (Ross 1967), which enforces ‘across the 
board’ extraction in coordination phrases, would render the examples in (38) 
unacceptable. 
 
(38) a. It’s [the Labour party]1 that Miliband is leader of t1, a difficult  
  job by anyone’s standards. 
b. It’s England1 that we hate the roads of t1, which are full of  
 potholes. 
 
Let us now turn to the monovalent variant of par-MERGE that is represented 
in (35b). Aside from the mechanism used to capture their syntactic and 
semantic isolation, the Force phrase and the ‘monovalent Par0’ (i.e. 35b) 
approach to attributions and ARCs make identical empirical predictions. 
This is because both theories treat attributions and ARCs as clausal adjuncts 
that display opacity and can adjoin anywhere within their host clause. 
 This being the case, any comparison made between the Force phrase and 
monovalent Par0 approaches to attributions and ARCs must focus upon their 
conceptual differences. Which confers more parsimony – the use of Force 
predicates like ASSERT to ensure opacity, or the use of the concatenation 
mechanism par-MERGE? 
 The use of neither is ad hoc, as both Force phrases and par-MERGE are 
invoked to capture the behaviour of phenomena unrelated to parenthesis. 
Thus, neither account can be favoured on the grounds of extensibility. That 
par-MERGE has, to my knowledge, one additional use (in regular 
coordination environments, see De Vries 2003) while Force phrases have 
many (see Krifka 2014 for an overview) is irrelevant. 
 The reason why I think that the use of Force predicates confers greater 
theoretical elegance than the use of par-MERGE concerns the theoretical 
viability of par-MERGE. Recall that, when par-MERGE applies, the output of 
par-MERGE does not dominate its input. This differs from regular MERGE, 
where the output of MERGE also dominates its input. Thus, the possibility 
that par-MERGE can exist as a concatenation operation rests upon the 
assumption that output and domination are two distinct notions. To my 
mind, this distinction seems redundant. In terms of derivational syntax, the 
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most parsimonious view to uphold is that ‘dominates’ is merely a synonym 
for ‘is the output of’ (this view can be traced back as least as far as Epstein 
1998). In other words, “Z dominates X and Y” means “Z is the output of X 
and Y’s merger”. If domination is dissociated from output, then it becomes 
difficult to ascertain what hierarchical relationship domination intends to 
describe, and how domination is established in the first place. Furthermore, 
this dissociation of domination and output requires one to provide an 
extraneous reason for why dominance is established when regular MERGE 
applies. If domination is equated with output however, then par-MERGE 
cannot exist, as it is nonsensical to claim that a syntactic concatenation 
operation can have an output that does not dominate its input. 
 The theoretical viability of force predicates like ASSERT and DEMAND 
cannot be brought into question in the same manner, as the relativisation of 
variables to particular operators is a routine occurrence (e.g. Relativised 
Minimality, Rizzi 1990).  
 To summarise: in this section (§6.3), I outlined and critiqued the par-
MERGE approach to parenthesis, which maintains that a sui generis syntactic 
concatenation operation creates the syntactic and semantic opacity displayed 
by parentheticals. I showed that the ‘bivalent Par0’ approach to attributions 
and ARCs, which treats them as coordinated with their anchors, fails to 
capture a number of properties that these appositives display. The 
‘monovalent Par0’ approach, on the other hand, provides equal empirical 
coverage as the Force phrase approach advocated in chapters three and four. 
Consequently, whether to use Force predicates or par-MERGE to explain 
parentheticals’ opacity becomes a conceptual choice. I suggested that the use 
of Force predicates confers greater theoretical parsimony, as the existence of 
par-MERGE rests upon questionable assumptions about notion of syntactic 
dominance. 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks on alternative analyses 
 
In this chapter, I compared the analyses of appositives outlined in chapters 
two, three, and four to its most serious competitors; the bidimensional 
semantic approach of Potts (2005), the orphanage approach, and the par-
MERGE approach of De Vries (2002 et seq.). Because the ‘true’ appositions 
from chapter two are not ‘parenthetical’ in any relevant sense (as I conclude 
 Alternative analyses 223 
 
in that chapter), none of these alternative analyses can account for their 
distribution, as each incorrectly assumes that they display the syntactic and 
semantic opacity that is observed in ‘proper’ parentheticals, such as 
attributions and ARCs. Except for the bidimensional semantic approach, 
whose account of attributions and ARCs is flawed in a number of respects, 
the alternative analyses I have discussed provide equal empirical coverage of 
attributions and ARCs as the ‘Force phrase’ analysis I advanced in chapters 
three and four. This is because all of these analyses treat attributions and 
ARCs as (derived from) parenthetical clauses. The difference between the 
Force phrase, orphanage, and par-MERGE analyses concerns how they 
capture the syntactic and semantic opacity that is displayed by attributions 
and ARCs, and these differences cannot be easily tested from an empirical 
standpoint. Consequently, I examined theory-internal reasons for favouring 
one analysis over another. I concluded that the orphanage approach is 
disfavoured because it requires a drastic reorganisation of the order of 
grammatical operations, while the par-MERGE approach is disfavoured 
because the feasibility of the concatenation operation ‘par-MERGE’ rests upon 
questionable assumptions about what syntactic domination is. Resultantly, 
the Force phrase analysis, which does not require the grammar to be 
reorganised and is not founded upon questionable assumptions, comes out 
as the favoured analyses of attributions and ARCs. 

  7 
Conclusion 
This study of appositives in English and Turkish has revolved around two 
syntactic schemata, (low) coordination and Force phrasal adjunction. I 
employed these schemata as definientia that bifurcate appositives. I claimed 
that appositives that match the coordination schema are appositions, while 
those that match the Force phrase adjunction schema are ‘elsewhere’ cases. 
 From a historical perspective, my syntactic definition of appositions 
incorporates a number of definientia proffered in the literature. Hockett 
(1955) demands that appositions be endocentric (in a Structuralist sense), 
while Quirk et al. (1972) say that “two units in apposition are constituents of 
the same [syntactic – J.G.] level”. Burton-Roberts (1975) adds that 
appositions must display the same semantic function as their anchors. 
Because coordination is endocentric (insofar as the coordination phrase 
fulfils the same function as its conjuncts), semantically balanced, and flat (in 
terms of feature percolation), these three definientia are straightforwardly 
captured by my claim that appositions are defined by the coordinative 
relationship that they share with their anchors. 
 Regular coordination is distinguished from appositional coordination by 
synonymy (and exemplification, which I set aside hereafter). Conjuncts 
denote distinct signifié in regular coordination but the same signifié in 
appositional coordination. Synonymy is another defining characteristic of 
apposition for Hockett (1955) and Burton-Roberts (1975). However, for 
Burton-Roberts (1975:392), the fact that synonymy pertains in appositional 
constructions indicates that appositions and their anchors are not conjoined, 
as the conjunction of synonymous elements is “logically incompatible” with 
coordination. This remark is heeded by Cardoso & De Vries (2010) and 
Heringa (2011), who invoke a bespoke specificational (Koster 2000) form of 
coordination for appositional constructions to ensure that regular and 
appositional coordination are treated as distinct. In this thesis, I rejected 
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Burton-Robert’s remark and I denied that the discrepancy in patterns of 
synonymy – namely, appositions and their anchors are synonymous while 
regular conjuncts are not – provides a priori justification for dismissing a 
coordination analysis of appositions. Because regular conjuncts and 
anchor/apposition combinations pattern identically in almost all respects 
except for those that pertain to their (non-)synonymy, I concluded in 
chapter two that apposition is a syntactic exaptation of coordination. The 
dissimilarly in interpretation that pertains between regular and appositional 
coordination is therefore created by pragmatic repair mechanisms. 
 As I discussed in chapter three, Force phrases are the syntactic 
representation of constructions that are used to commit illocutionary acts. 
Such constituents are semantically and syntactically opaque (Koev 2013). If 
they arise as optional modifiers (i.e. adjuncts), their position of attachment 
within their host clause is syntactically and semantically unconstrained. The 
two exemplars of Force phrasal adjuncts that I discussed in chapter three and 
chapter four were and-parentheticals (Kavalova 2007) and appositive relative 
clauses (ARCs). I claimed that copulative and-parentheticals (and perhaps, 
for English, some ARCs too) can be reduced down to their postcopular 
element to form attributions. 
 A number of complicating factors conspired to conceal the fact that my 
straightforward structural dichotomy between appositions (i.e. second 
conjuncts) and Force phrasal adjuncts sufficiently captures the data within its 
remit. 
 One such complicating factor was structural ambiguity. Many occasions 
arise on which appositive constructions are syntactically ambiguous. The 
sentence in (1) is an exemplar, which is ambiguous between an appositional 
and attributional derivation (compare the schemata in 2) when the context 
does not provide sufficient disambiguation. 
 
(1) London, the capital of England, is a nice city. 
 
(2) a. [&P [DP London,] [DP the capital of England,]] is a nice city. 
 b. [DP [DP London,] [ForceP it is the capital of England,]] is a nice city. 
 
Another complicating factor was the inexact correlation between function 
and syntactic form. As discussed in chapter one, my point of departure for 
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this thesis was the functional distinction between reformulative and 
attributive appositions, which I used to motivate my structural division 
between appositions and attributions. Simply put, the function distinction 
delimits appositive noun phrases that provide alternative descriptions of 
referents denoted by their anchors (these are reformulative, see 3a) from 
appositive noun phrases that predicate properties of their anchors (these are 
attributive, see 3b). 
 
(3) a. The Big Apple, New York, is huge city. (reformulative) 
 b. The Big Apple, a magical place, is a huge city. (attributive) 
 
This functional distinction correlates with my structural division between 
appositional conjuncts and Force phrasal adjuncts on almost all occasions. 
For instance, the functional notion of attributive appositions correlates with 
my structural definition of attributions exactly, as the attributive function of 
these appositive noun phrases is caused by their structural position as 
postcopular items of predicational copulative Force phrasal adjuncts (see 
2b). An exact correlation does not pertain between reformulative appositions 
and my structural definition of appositions, however. This is because an 
appositive noun phrase’s identificational function is not indicative of its 
structural role as the second conjunct in an appositional coordination 
phrase, as postcopular items of truncated cleft Force phrasal adjuncts can 
perform the same identificational function. More concretely, an example like 
(4), which performs a reformulative function, is structurally ambiguous 
between an apposition (see 5a) and an attribution (see 5b) for me. 
 
(4) Someone, Pete, keeps leaving the door open. 
 
(5) a. [&P [DP Someone,] [DP Pete,]] keeps leaving the door open. 
 b. [DP [DP Someone,] [ForceP it is Pete,]] keeps leaving the door open. 
 
These complicating factors and others were surmounted with the aid of 
syntactic disambiguators. For instance, I used apposition markers like or and 
i.e. to uncover appositions (Burton-Roberts 1975) (see 6 and 7), and 
temporal adverbs like now and often to uncover attributions (Quirk et al. 
1985) (see 8 and 9) in chapter two and chapter three. 
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(6) a. London, or the capital of England, is a nice city.  
 b. Someone, i.e. Pete, keeps leaving the door open. 
 
(7) For (6a) and (6b) respectively: 
 a. [&P [DP London,] or [DP the capital of England,]] is a nice city. 
 b. [&P [DP Someone,] i.e. [DP Pete,]] keeps leaving the door open. 
 
(8) a. London, now the capital of England, is a nice city.  
 b. Someone, often Pete, keeps leaving the door open. 
 
(9) For (8a) and (8b) respectively: 
 a. [DP [DP London,] [ForceP it is now the capital of England,]] is a nice 
city. 
 b. [DP [DP Someone,] [ForceP it is often Pete,]] keeps leaving the door 
open. 
 
Once these complicating factors (and others) were adequately controlled for, 
the fact that my dichotomy between appositions and Force phrasal adjuncts 
could capture the data within its remit was straightforwardly demonstrated 
with syntactic, semantic, (see chapter two, three, and four) and pragmatic 
(see chapter five) diagnostics. 
 With respect to pragmatics, I introduced in chapter five an informal 
model of the discourse and discussed the place of appositions, attributions, 
and appositive relative clauses within it. I showed that the structural division 
between appositional conjuncts and Force phrasal adjuncts is echoed in the 
discourse: Force phrasal adjuncts act identically to regular speech acts with 
respect to the discourse (as expected on the current approach), while 
subclausal appositional conjuncts act like regular subclausal constituents. 
 In this thesis I have only discussed in depth what Acuña-Fariña (1999, 
2000) considers to the paradigmatic cases of appositives: appositions (to use 
this term informally) and appositive relative clauses. As such, the extent to 
which my syntactic bifurcation of appositives is suitable for the outlier cases 
of appositives remains to be investigated. Such outlier cases include 
corrections (10), which look similar to appositions (Blakemore 2007), 
exclamative epithets (11), which look similar to Force phrasal adjuncts 
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(Güneş 2015), and ‘reduced’ prepositional phrases (12) and floating 
infinitival clauses (13), which look like regular adjuncts and hence should be 
excluded from the class of ‘appositive’ constructions proper (if my 
bifurcation is adopted, of course).  
 
(10) John listed the sound effects, or rather the gadgets for MAKING sound 
effects, that we had in stock.  (modified from Meyer 1987:104) 
 
(11) Frank, has, the lucky bastard, won the lottery. 
 
(12) a. (As) a tall guy, Harry always has an unobstructed view at gigs. 
 b. (With) lunch finished, the delegates resumed their talks.  
 
(13) a. Being an Englishman, Brendan is good at cricket. 
 b. The monarch having finally arrived, the feast began. 
 
These outlier cases aside, the main message I have endeavoured to 
communicate in this thesis is that, provided extraneous factors are controlled 
for, analyses that employ conservative syntactic structures such as 
coordination and adjunction can capture the vast majority of peculiar 
properties that appositives exhibit. 

 References 
Abels, K. 2012. Phases: An Essay on cyclicity in Syntax. Berlin: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Aboh, E. 2004. Deriving relative and factive clauses. In L. Brugè, G. Giusti, N. 
Munaro, W. Schweikert & G. Turano (eds.), Contributions to the 
thirtieth Incontro di Grammatica Generativa. Venice: Cafoscarina, 
265-285.  
Ackema, P. & K. Szendrői. 2002. Determiner sharing as an instance of 
dependent ellipsis. Journal of Comparative Germanic Linguistics 5: 3-
34. 
Acuña-Fariña, J. C. 1999. On apposition. English Language and Linguistics 
3(1): 59-81. 
Acuña-Fariña, J. C. 2000. Reduced Relatives and Apposition. Australian 
Journal of Linguistics 20(1): 5-22. 
Aelbrecht, L., L. Haegeman & R. Nye. 2012. The privilege of the root. In L. 
Aelbrecht, L. Haegeman & R. Nye (eds.), Main Clause Phenomena: 
New Horizons. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1-20. 
Alston, W. P. 1964. Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall. 
AnderBois, S., A. Brasoveanu & R. Henderson. 2013. At-issue Proposals and 
Appositive Impositions in Discourse. Journal of Semantics. 
 [jos.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/11/25/jos.fft014, accessed 09/14] 
Arnold, D. J. 2007. Non-Restrictive relatives are not orphans. Journal of 
Linguistics 43(2): 272-309. 
Arsenjević, B. 2009. Clausal Complementation as Relativization. Lingua 119: 
39-50. 
232 References 
Asher, N. 1993. Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer. 
Asher, N. & A. Lascarides. 2003. Logics of conversation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Bach, K. 1994. Conversational Impliciture. Mind and Language 9: 124-162. 
Barros, M., P. Elliott & G. Thoms. 2014. There is no island repair. 
Manuscript, University of Edinburgh, University College London & 
Rutgers University. 
 [ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/002100, accessed 09/14]  
Barros, M. & J. van Craenenbroeck. 2013. Tag questions and ellipsis. Paper 
presented at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Sprachwissenschaft 35, 
University of Potsdam, March 2013. 
 [jeroenvancraenenbroeck.net/s/handout_dgfs_tags.pdf, accessed 09/14]  
Barros, M. & L. Vicente. 2011. Right Node Raising Requires both Ellipsis and 
Multidomination. University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in 
Linguistics 17(1)/2. 
Blakemore, D. 1993. The relevance of reformulations. Language and 
Literature 2(2): 101-120 
Blakemore, D. 1996. Are apposition markers discourse markers? Journal of 
Linguistics 32: 325-347 
Blakemore, D. 2007. ‘Or’-parentheticals, ‘that is’-parentheticals and the 
pragmatics of reformulation. Journal of Linguistics 43: 311-339. 
Bogal-Allbritten, E. 2013. Modification of DPs by epistemic modal adverbs. 
In M. Aloni, M. Franke & F. Roelofsen (eds.), Proceedings of the 19th 
Amsterdam Colloquium, 51-58. 
 [illc.uva.nl/AC/AC2013/Proceedings, accessed 09/14] 
Burton-Roberts, N. 1975. Nominal apposition. Foundations of language 13: 
391-419. 
 References 233 
 
Burton-Roberts, N. 1993. Apposition. In R. E. Asher & J. M. Y. Simpson 
(eds.), Encyclopaedia of language and linguistics, volume 1. Oxford: 
Pergamon, 84-187. 
Burton-Roberts, N. 1999. Language, linear precedence and parentheticals. In 
P. Collins & D. Lee (eds.), The Clause in English: In honour of Rodney 
Huddleston. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 33-52. 
Burton-Roberts, N. 2006. Parentheticals. In K. Brown (ed.-in-chief), 
Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2nd 
edition, 179-182.  
Cardoso, A. & M. de Vries. 2010. Internal and External Heads in Appositive 




Carlson, G. 1977. Reference to kinds in English. Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst. 
Carrera Hernández, A. 2007. Gapping as a syntactic dependency. Lingua 117: 
2106-2133. 
Chomsky, N. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Chomsky, N. 1981. Lectures in Government and Binding. Studies in 
generative grammar 9. Dordrecht: Foris. 
Chomsky, N. 1995. The Minimalist Program. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Chomsky, N. 2001a. Derivation by Phase. In M. Kenstowicz (ed.), Ken Hale: 
A Life in Language. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1-52. 
Chomsky, N. 2001b. Beyond explanatory adequacy. MIT Occasional Papers 
in Linguistics 20: 1-28 
Chomsky, N. 2008. On phases. In R. Freidin, C. P. Otero & M. L. Zubizarreta 
(eds.), Foundational Issues in Linguistic Theory: Essays in Honor of 
Jean-Roger Vergnaud. Cambridge: MIT Press, 133-166.  
234 References 
Cinque, G. 2008. Two Types of Nonrestrictive Relatives. In O. Bonami & P. 
Cabredo Hofherr (eds.), Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 7. 
Paris: University of Paris 7, 99–137. 
 [cssp.cnrs.fr/eiss7/cinque-eiss7.pdf, accessed 09/14] 
Citko, B. 2008. An Argument against Assimilating Appositive Relatives to 
Coordinate Structures. Linguistic Inquiry 39:  633-655. 
Cresti, D. 1995. Extraction and reconstruction. Natural Language Semantics 
3: 79-122. 
Cooper, R. 1979. The interpretation of pronouns. In F. Heny & H. Schnelle 
(eds.), Syntax and Semantics 10: Selections from the Third Groningen 
Round Table. New York: Academic Press, 61–92. 
Cuba, C. de. 2007. On (non)factivity, clausal complementation and the CP-
Field. Doctoral dissertation, Stony Brook University. 
Çağrı, I. 2005. Minimality and Turkish Relative Clauses. Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Maryland. 
Dayal, V. 2004. The universal force of free choice any. In J. Craenenbroeck, J. 
Rooryck & P. Pica (eds.), Linguistic Variation Yearbook 4. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins, 5-40 
Dehé, N. & Y. Kavalova. 2007. Parentheticals: An introduction. In N. Dehé & 
Y. Kavalova (eds.), Parentheticals. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1-22. 
Dehé, N. 2014. Parentheticals in Spoken English: The Syntax-Prosody Relation 
(Studies in English Language). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Del Gobbo, F. 2007. On the syntax and semantics of appositive relative 
clauses. In N. Dehé & Y. Kavalova (eds.), Parentheticals. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins, 173-202. 
Doron, E. 1994. The discourse function of appositives. In R. Buchalla & A. 
Mittwoch (eds.), Proceedings of the ninth annual conference of the 
Israel Association for Theoretical Linguistics and of the workshop on 
discourse. Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 53-65. 
 References 235 
 
Döring, S. 2014. Parentheticals are - presumably - CPs. In M. Kluck, D. Ott 
& M. de Vries (eds.), Parenthesis and Ellipsis. Cross-linguistic and 
Theoretical Perspectives. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 109-145. 
Embick, D. & R. Noyer. 2001. Movement Operations after Syntax. Linguistic 
Inquiry 32(4): 555-595. 
Emonds, J. 1970. Root and Structure-Preserving Transformations. Doctoral 
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   
Emonds, J. 1979. Appositive Relatives Have No Properties. Linguistic Inquiry 
10(2): 211-243. 
Emonds, J. 1985. A Unified Theory of Syntactic Categories. Dordrecht: Foris. 
Elbourne, P. 2001. E-type Anaphora as NP-Deletion. Natural Language 
Semantics 9: 241–288. 
Elbourne, P. 2005. Situations and Individuals. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Elbourne, P. 2008. Ellipsis sites as definite descriptions. Linguistic Inquiry 
39(2): 191–220. 
Epstein, S. 1998. Un-principled Syntax: The Derivation of Syntactic 
Relations. In S. Epstein & N. Hornstein (eds.), Working Minimalism. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 317-345. 
Erguvanlı, E. 1981. A Case of Syntactic Change: ki constructions in Turkish. 
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi Cilt 8: 111-140. 
Ernst, T. 2002. The Syntax of Adjuncts. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Espinal, M. T. 1991. The representation of disjunct constituents. Language 
67(4): 726-762. 
Fernández, J. 2013. The syntax of PredNPs. Master’s thesis, University 
College London. 
Fox, D. & H. Lasnik. 2003. Successive cyclic movement and island repair: 
The difference between Sluicing and VP Ellipsis. Linguistic Inquiry 34: 
143-154. 
236 References 
Gazdar, G. 1979. Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition and Logical Form. 
New York: Academic Press. 
Gazdar, G. 1981. Unbounded Dependencies and Coordinate Structure. 
Linguistic Inquiry 12: 155-184. 
Geurts, B. 1997. Good news about the description theory of names. Journal 
of Semantics 14: 319-348. 
Göbbel, E. 2007. Extraposition as PF Movement. In E. Bainbridge & B. 
Agbayani (eds.), Proceedings of Western Conference on Linguistics 17. 
Fresno: Department of Linguistics at California State University, 132-
145. 
Göksel, A. & C. Kerslake. 2005. Turkish: A comprehensive grammar. London: 
Routledge. 
Grice, P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax 
and semantics 3: Speech acts. New York: Academic Press, 41–58. 
Griffiths, J. 2015. Parenthetical verb constructions, fragment answers, and 
constituent modification. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 
33(1): 191-229. 
Griffiths, J. & G. Güneş. 2014. Ki issues in Turkish. Parenthetical 
coordination and adjunction. In M. Kluck, D. Ott & M. de Vries 
(eds.), Parenthesis and Ellipsis. Cross-linguistic and Theoretical 
Perspectives. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 173-217. 
Griffiths, J. & A. Lipták. 2014. Contrast and island sensitivity in clausal 
ellipsis. Syntax 17(3): 189-234. 
Griffiths, J. & M. de Vries. 2013. The syntactic integration of appositives: 
evidence from fragments and ellipsis. Linguistic Inquiry 44(2): 332-
344. 
Griffiths, J. & M. de Vries. 2014. Parenthesis and presupposition in 
discourse. Linguistics in the Netherlands 31: 39-52. 
Guéron, J. 1980. On the syntax and semantics of extraposition. Linguistic 
Inquiry 11: 637-678. 
 References 237 
 
Gundel, K. 1988. The Role of Topic and Comment in Linguistic Theory. 
London: Garland. 
Gülich, E. & T. Kotschi. 1995. Discourse production in oral communication. 
In U. Quasthoff (ed.), Aspects of oral communication. Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 30–66. 
Güneş, G. 2015. Deriving prosodic structures. Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Groningen. 
Güneş, G. & Ç. Çöltekin. To appear. Prosody of Parentheticals in Turkish. In 
S. Schneider, J. Glikman & M. Avanzi (eds.), Parenthetical Verbs. 
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Haegeman, L. 1991. Parenthetical Adverbials: The Radical Orphanage 
Approach. In S. Chiba, A. Ogawa, Y. Fuiwara, N. Yamada, O. Koma 
and T. Yagi (eds.), Aspects of Modern English Linguistics. Tokyo: 
Kaitakusha, 232-254. 
Haegeman, L. 2012. Adverbial Clauses, Main Clause Phenomena, and the 
Composition of the Left Periphery. The Cartography of Syntactic 
Structures 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Halle, M. & A. Marantz. 1993. Distributed Morphology and the Pieces of 
Inflection. In K. Hale & S. J. Keyser (eds.), The View from Building 20. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 111-176. 
Hankamer, J. & I. Sag. 1976. Deep and surface anaphora. Linguistic Inquiry 
7:391-426. 
Harris, J. & C. Potts. 2009. Perspective-shifting with appositives and 
expressives. Linguistics and Philosophy 32(6): 523-552. 
Heim, I. & A. Kratzer. 1998. Semantics in generative grammar. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Heringa, H. 2011. Appositional constructions. Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Groningen. 
Heringa, H. & M. de Vries. 2008. Een semantische classificatie van 
apposities. Nederlandse Taalkunde 13: 60-87. 
238 References 
Heycock, C. 2006. Embedded root phenomena. In M. Everaert & H. van 
Riemsdijk (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Syntax volume 2. 
Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 174-209. 
Hockett, C. F. 1955. Attribution and apposition in English. American speech 
30(9): 99-102. 
Holler, A. 2005. Expressing Communicative-Weight Assignment Discourse 
Structurally. In C. Sidner, J. Harpur, A. Benz & P. Kühnlein (eds.), 
Proceedings of the Workshop on Constraints in Discourse 6. Dortmund: 
University of Dortmund, 88-94. 
Hooper, J. & S. Thompson. 1973. On the applicability of root 
transformations. Linguistic Inquiry 4: 465-497. 
Horn, L. R. 1972. On the Semantic Properties of Logical Operators in English. 
Doctoral dissertation, University of California Los Angeles. 
Jackendoff, R. 1977. Xʹ Syntax: A Theory of Phrase Structure. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Johannessen, J. B. 1998. Coordination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kamp, H. & U. Reyle. 1993. From Discourse to Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Karttunen, L. & S. Peters. 1979. Conventional implicature. In C.-K. Oh & D. 
Dinneen (eds.), Syntax and Semantics 11: Presupposition. New York: 
Academic Press, 1-56. 
Kayne, R. S. 1994. The Antisymmetry of Syntax. Linguistic Inquiry 
Monograph 25. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Kayne, R. S. 2010. Comparisons and Contrasts. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
Kavalova, Y. 2007. And-parenthetical clauses. In N. Dehé & Y. Kavalova 
(eds.), Parentheticals. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 145-172. 
Kehler, A. 2002. Coherence, Reference, and the Theory of Grammar. Stanford:  
Center for the Study of Language and Information. 
Kennedy, C. 2002. Comparative Deletion and Optimality in Syntax. Natural 
Language and Linguistic Theory 20(3): 553-621. 
 References 239 
 
Klavans, J. 1982. Some problems in a theory of clitics. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Linguistics Club. 
Klein, M. 1976. Appositionele NP’s in het Nederlands. De nieuwe taalgids 69: 
139-153. 
Kluck, M. 2011. Sentence amalgamation. Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Groningen. 
Koev, T. 2013. Apposition and the Structure of Discourse. Doctoral 
dissertation, Rutgers University. 
Koster, J. 2000. Extraposition as parallel construal. Manuscript, University of 
Groningen.  
 [odur.let.rug.nl/koster/papers/parallel.pdf, accessed 09/14] 
Koster, J. 2003. Move, Merge and Percolate are One! On the Elimination of 
Variables in Grammar. In L.-O. Delsing, C. Falk, G. Josefsson & H. Á. 
Sigurðsson (eds.), Grammar in Focus: A Festschrift for Christer 
Platzack. Lund: Lund University Department of Scandinavian 
Languages, vol. 2, 227-233. 
Koster, J. 2007. Structure-Preservingness, Internal Merge, and The Strict 
Locality of Triads. In S. Karimi, V. Samiian, W. Wilkins (eds.), Phrasal 
and Clausal Architecture: Syntactic Derivation and Interpretation. John 
Benjamins: Amsterdam, 188-205. 
Koster-Möller, J. 2012. Internal DP heads in restrictive relative clauses. In C. 
Constantinescu, B. Le Bruyn & K. Linke (eds.), Proceedings of ConSOLE 
17. Leiden: Student Organisation of Linguistics in Europe, 209-30. 
 [media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/console17-koster-moeller.pdf, accessed 09/14] 
Krifka, M. 2001. Quantifying into question acts. Natural Language Semantics 
9: 1-40. 
Krifka, M. 2013. Response particles as propositional anaphors. In T. Snider 
(ed.), Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory 23: 1-18. 
Krifka, M. 2014. Embedding speech acts. In T. Roeper and P. Speas (eds.), 
Recursion: Complexity in Cognition. Studies in Theoretical 
Pyscholinguistics 43. Dordrecht: Springer, 59-87. 
240 References 
LaCara, N. 2012. Predicate Which-Appositives. In J. Choi, E. A. Hogue, J. 
Punske, D. Tat, J. Schertz & A. Trueman (eds.), Proceedings of the 
Poster Session of the West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics 
2011. Tucson: Coyote Papers, 46-54. 
Lasnik, H. 2001. When can you save a structure by destroying it? In M. Kim 
& U. Strauss (eds.) Proceedings of the North East Linguistic Society 
31(2). Amherst, Graduate Linguistic Student Association of the 
University of Massachusetts, 301-320. 
Lassiter, D. 2011. Anaphoric Properties of which and the Syntax of 
Appositive Relatives. In, J. Wood & N. Myler (eds.), New York 
University Working Papers in Linguistics 3, 33-50. 
Lee-Goldman, R. 2012. Supplemental relative clauses: Internal and external 
syntax. Journal of Linguistics 48(3): 573-608. 
Levy, R. & C. Potts. 2015. Negotiating lexical uncertainty and expertise with 
disjunction. Poster presented at the 89th Annual Meeting of the 
Linguistic Society of America, Portland, January 2015. 
Lewis, D. 1979. Scorekeeping in a Language Game. Journal of Philosophical 
Logic 8: 339-359. 
Lewis, G. 1967. Turkish Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Loock, R. 2007. Appositive relative clauses and their functions in discourse. 
Journal of Pragmatics 39: 336-62. 
Loock, R. & K. M. O’Connor. 2013. The discourse functions of non-verbal 
appositives. Journal of English Linguistics 41: 332-358. 
Maier, E. 2014. Mixed Quotation: The grammar of apparently transparent 
opacity. Semantics & Pragmatics 7(7): 1-67.  
Matthews, P. 1981. Syntax. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Matushansky, O. 2008. A case study of predication. In F. Marušič & R. 
Žaucer (eds.), Studies in formal Slavic linguistics. Contributions from 
Formal Description of Slavic Languages 6.5. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 213-
239. 
 References 241 
 
McCawley, J. D. 1998. The Syntactic Phenomena of English. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2nd edition. 
McCawley, J. D. 1982. Parentheticals and Discontinuous Constituent 
Structure. Linguistic Inquiry 13: 91-106. 
McNally, L. 1994. Adjunct Predicates and the Individual/Stage Distinction. 
In E. Duncan, D. Farkas & P. Spaelti (eds.), The Proceedings of the 
Twelfth West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics. Stanford: Center 
for the Study of Language and Information, 561-576. 
Merchant, J. 2001. The syntax of silence: Sluicing, islands, and the theory of 
ellipsis. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Merchant, J. 2003. Remarks on stripping. Manuscript, University of Chicago. 
[home.uchicago.edu/merchant/pubs/stripping.pdf, accessed 09/14] 
Merchant, J. 2004. Fragments and ellipsis. Linguistics and Philosophy 27(6): 
661-738. 
Merchant, J. 2008. Variable island repair under ellipsis. In K. Johnson (ed.), 
Topics in ellipsis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 132-153. 
Merchant, J. 2013. Ellipsis: A survey of analytical approaches. Manuscript, 
University of Chicago. 
 [home.uchicago.edu/merchant/pubs/ellipsis.formatted.pdf, accessed 09/14] 
Meyer, C. F. 1987. Apposition in English. Journal of English Linguistics 20: 
101-121. 
Mikkelsen, L. 2005. Copular Clauses: Specification, Predication and Equation. 
Linguistik Aktuell 85. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Molitor, F. 1979. Zur Apposition im heutigen Deustsch. Eine Vorstudie. 
Doctoral dissertation, University of Cologne. 
Morgan, J. 1973. Sentence Fragments and the Notion ‘Sentence’. In B. 
Kachru, R. Lees, Y. Malkiel, A. Pietrangeli & S. Saporta (eds.), Issues in 
Linguistics: Essays in Honor of Henry and Renée Kahane. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 719-751. 
242 References 
Motsch, W. 1966. Untersuchungen zur Apposition im Deutschen. Studia 
Grammatica 5: 87-132. 
Neijt, A. 1979. Gapping: a Contribution to Sentence Grammar. Dordrecht: 
Foris. 
Nouwen, R. 2007. On appositives and dynamic binding. Research on 
Language and Computation 5(1): 87-102. 
Nouwen. R. 2014. A note on the projection of appositives. In E. McCready, 
K. Yabushita & K. Yoshimoto (eds.), Formal approaches to semantics 
and pragmatics: Japanese and Beyond. Studies in Linguistics and 
Philosophy 95. Dordrecht: Springer, 205-222. 
Nunes, J. 2004. Linearization of Chains and Sideward Movement. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
O’Connor, K. M. 2007. Adverbs as evidence for functional structure in 




O’Connor, K. M. 2008. Aspects de la syntaxe et de l’interprétation de 
l’apposition à antécédent nominal. Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Lille 3. 
O’Connor, K. M. 2012. On the positions of subjects and floating quantifiers 
in appositives. In J. Błaszczak, B. Rozwadowska & W. Witkowski 
(eds.), Current issues in generative linguistics: Syntax, semantics and 
phonology. Wroclaw: Center for General and Comparative Linguistics 
at the University of Wroclaw, 76-89. 
Oirsouw, R. van. 1987. The syntax of coordination. New York: Croon Helm. 
Ott, D. 2014a. Ellipsis in appositives and the syntax of parenthesis. Paper 
presented at Generative Linguistics in the Old World 37, Catholic 
University of Leuven, Brussels campus, April 2014. 
 [amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~ottdenni/handouts/glow37.pdf, accessed 09/14] 
 References 243 
 
Ott, D. 2014b. Parenthesis and the boundaries of sentence grammar: 
Evidence from appositives. Paper presented at Outside the Clause, 
University of Vienna, July 2014. 
Ott. D. 2014c. Ellipsis in appositives. Manuscript, Humboldt University of 
Berlin. 
Ott, D. & M. de Vries. 2012. Thinking in the right direction: an ellipsis 
analysis of right-dislocation. Linguistics in the Netherlands 29: 123-
133. 
Ott, D. & M. de Vries. 2014. A biclausal analysis of right-dislocation. In H.-L. 
Huang, E. Poole & A. Rysling (eds.), Proceedings of North East 
Linguistic Society 43,. Amherst: Graduate Linguistic Student 
Association, 41-54. 
Partee, B. H. 1987. Noun phrase interpretation and type-shifting principles. 
In J. Groenendijk, D. de Jongh & M. Stokhof (eds.), Studies in 
Discourse Representation Theory and the Theory of Generalized 
Quantifiers. Dordrecht: Foris, 115-143. 
Peterson, P. 1999. On the boundaries of syntax: Non-syntagmatic relations. 
In P. Collins & D. Lee (eds.), The Clause in English: In honour of 
Rodney Huddleston. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 229-250. 
Postal, P. 1966. On So-called “Pronouns” in English. In F. P. Dinneen (ed.), 
Report of the Seventeenth Annual Round Table Meeting on Linguistics 
and Language Studies. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 177-206. 
Postal, P. 1974. On raising. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Potts, C. 2002. The lexical semantics of parenthetical-as and appositive-
which. Syntax 5(1): 55-88. 
Potts, C. 2005. The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Potts, C. 2007. The dimensions of quotation. In C. Barker & P. Jacobson 
(eds.), Direct Compositionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 405-
431. 
244 References 
Poutsma, H. 1904. A Grammar of Late Modern English. Groningen: 
Noordhoof. 
Quirk, R., S. Greenbaum, G. Leech, & J. Svartvik. 1972. A Grammar of 
Contemporary English. London: Longman. 
Quirk, R., S. Greenbaum, G. Leech & J. Svartvik. 1985. A Comprehensive 
Grammar of the English Language. London: Longman.  
Recanati, F. 2001. What is Said. Synthese 128: 75-91. 
Richards, N. 2010. Uttering trees. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Rizzi, L. 1990. Relativized Minimality. Linguistic Inquiry Monographs 16. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Rizzi, L. 1997. The fine structure of the left periphery. In A. Beletti (ed.), 
Structures and beyond: The Cartography of syntactic structures. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 223-252.   
Roberts, C. 1987. Modal Subordination, Anaphora, and Distributivity. 
Doctoral dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst. 
Ross, J. R. 1967. Constraints on variables in syntax. Doctoral dissertation, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Ross, J. R. 1984. Inner Islands. In C. Brugman & M. Macaulay (eds.), 
Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics 
Society. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society, University of 
California, 258-265. 
Safir, K. 1986. Relative Clauses in a Theory of Binding and Levels. Linguistic 
Inquiry 17: 663–689. 
Sailor, C. 2009. Tagged for deletion: a typological approach to VP ellipsis in tag 
questions. MA thesis, University of California Los Angeles.  
Sauerland, U. 1998. The meaning of chains. Doctoral dissertation, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Sauerland, U. 2003. Unpronounced heads in relative clauses. In K. Schwabe 
& S. Winkler (eds.), The Interfaces: Deriving and Interpreting Omitted 
Structures. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 205-226. 
 References 245 
 
Sauerland, U. & Elbourne, P. 2002. Total reconstruction, PF-movement, and 
the derivational order. Linguistic Inquiry 33: 283–319. 
Searle, J. R. 1969. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Selkirk, E. 2011. The Syntax-Phonology Interface. In J. Goldsmith, J. Riggle, 
& A. Yu. The Handbook of Phonological Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 
345-484. 
Smith, C. S. 1964. Determiners and Relative Clauses in a Generative 
Grammar of English. Language 40: 37-52. 
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson. 1986. Relevance: Communication and Cognition. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Stalnaker, R. 1978. Assertion. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics 9: 
Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press, 315-332.  
Strunk, J. 2007. Extraposition Mythbusting. Paper presented at the Stanford 
Syntax Workshop, March 2007. 
 [linguistics.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/~strunk/ExtrapositionMythBusting.pdf, 
accessed 09/14] 
Šimík, R. 2008. The source of wh-morphology in questions and relative 
clauses. S. Blaho, C. Constantinescu & E. Schoorlemmer (eds.), 
Proceedings of ConSOLE XV. Leiden: Leiden University Center for 
Linguistics, 273-294. 
Tancredi, C. 1992. Deletion, deaccenting, and presupposition. Doctoral 
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
Temmerman, T. 2013. The syntax of Dutch embedded fragment answers. 
Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 31(1): 235-285. 
Truckenbrodt, H. 1995. Extraposition from NP and Prosodic Structure. In 
J.N. Beckman (ed.), Proceedings of the North East Linguistics Society 
25. Amherst: Graduate Linguistic Student Association, 503-517. 
Truckenbrodt, H. 2014. Intonation phrases and speech acts. In M. Kluck, D. 
Ott and M. de Vries (eds.), Parenthesis and ellipsis: cross-linguistic and 
theoretical perspectives. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
246 References 
Valmala, V. 2013. On Right Node Raising in Catalan and Spanish. Catalan 
Journal of Linguistics 12: 219-251. 
Vries, M. de. 2002. The syntax of Relativization. Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Amsterdam. 
Vries, M. de. 2003. Three-Dimensional Grammar. Linguistics in the 
Netherlands 20: 201-212. 
Vries, M. de. 2006a. The Syntax of Appositive Relativization. On Specifying 
Coordination, False Free Relatives and Promotion. Linguistic Inquiry 
37: 229-270. 
Vries, M. de. 2006b. Possessive Relatives and (Heavy) Pied Piping. Journal of 
Comparative Germanic Linguistics 9: 1-52. 
Vries, M. de. 2007. Invisible Constituents? Parentheses as B-Merged 
Adverbial Phrases. In N. Dehé & Y. Kavalova (eds.), Parentheticals. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 203-234. 
Vries, M. de. 2009. On Multidominance and Linearization. Biolinguistics 3: 
344-403. 
Vries, M. de. 2012. Unconventional Mergers. In M. Uribe-Etxebarria & V. 
Valmala (eds.), Ways of Structure Building. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 143-166. 
Vries, M. de. 2013a. Locality and right-dislocation. Linguistics in the 
Netherlands 30: 160-172. 
Vries, M. de. 2013b. Multidominance and Locality. Lingua 134: 149-169. 
Wang, L., B. Reese & E. McCready. 2005. The projection problem of nominal 
appositives. Snippets 10:13–14. 
Webelhuth, G. 1992. Principles and Parameters of Syntactic Saturation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Weir, A. 2012. Left edge deletion in English and subject omission in diaries. 
English Language and Linguistics 16(1): 105–29. 
Weir, A. 2014. Fragments and clausal ellipsis. Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst. 
 References 247 
 
Wilder, C. 1997. Some Properties of Ellipsis in Coordination. In A. 
Alexiadou (ed.), Studies on Universal Grammar and Typological 
Variation. Benjamins, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 59-107. 
Williams, E. 1981. Transformationless grammar. Linguistic Inquiry 16: 247-
289. 
Williams, E. 1997. Blocking and anaphora. Linguistic Inquiry 28: 577–628. 
Zhang, N. 2010. Coordination in Syntax. Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 
Series 123. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zwart, J.-W. 2005. Some notes on coordination in head-final languages. 
Linguistics in the Netherlands 22: 232-241. 
Zwart, J.-W. 2009a. Relevance of typology to minimalist inquiry. Lingua 199: 
1589-1606. 
Zwart, J.-W. 2009b. Prospects for top-down derivation. Catalan Journal of 
Linguistics 8: 161-187. 
Zwart, J.-W. 2011. Recursion in language: a layered-derivation approach. 
Biolinguistics 5(1-2): 43-56. 

 Samenvatting in het Nederlands 
In traditionele grammatica’s wordt de term appositie (of bijstelling) gebruikt 
om een concept van familiegelijkenis weer te geven, waarbij er een prototype 
is, zoals geïllustreerd in (1) (Matthews 1981:236). In (1) is Brugge een 
uitbreidende appositie bij Bruges. 
 
(1) Bruges, Brugge, is een prachtige stad. 
 
Voor generatief-taalkundigen ligt er een taak in het geven van een formele 
definitie voor de term appositie, die, hoewel hij niet exact kan overeenkomen 
met het informele concept van de familiegelijkenis, toch intuïtief en ook 
empirisch en theoretisch gerechtvaardigd moet zijn. Ik streef ernaar om hier 
een dergelijke definitie te geven. De focus van dit proefschrift ligt dus bij 
apposities en verwante constructies, die ik samen appositieven (Eng. 
appositives) noem. 
 In pogingen om de term appositie te definiëren is het functionele 
onderscheid tussen herformulerende en attributieve apposities invloedrijk 
geweest. Herformulerende apposities bieden extra en vaak meer informatieve 
namen voor hun ankers, zoals in (1), terwijl attributieve apposities 
eigenschappen toewijzen; zie (2): 
 
(2) Brugge, een populaire vakantiebestemming, is een prachtige stad. 
 
Recente analyses hebben gesteld dat het functionele onderscheid tussen 
herformulerende en attributieve apposities ook een indicatie is voor 
syntactische verschillen tussen deze twee apposities. McCawley (1998) en 
Cardoso & De Vries (2010) stellen dat herformulerende apposities een 
transparante syntaxis hebben waarin geen structuur aanwezig is behalve de 
zichtbare appositie, maar dat attributieve apposities zijn afgeleid uit 
appositieve relatiefzinnen. Met andere woorden, ze beargumenteren dat 
Brugge in (1) slechts een referentieel naamwoord is, maar dat een populaire 
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vakantiebestemming in (2) een predicaatnomen is dat onderdeel is van een 
appositieve relatiefzin. In deze analyses blijven het koppelwerkwoord en het 
relatieve voornaamwoord van de appositieve relatiefzin onuitgesproken (zie 
3, waar het onuitgesproken materiaal tussen haakjes staat). 
 
(3) Brugge, <dat> een populaire vakantiebestemming <is>, is een 
prachtige stad. 
 
Andere analyses geven deze vermeende syntactische verschillen op andere 
manieren weer. Heringa (2011) stelt bijvoorbeeld dat herformulerende 
apposities onderdeel zijn van beknopte zinnen waarvan het onderwerp 
verplicht onuitgesproken blijft (4a), terwijl attributieve apposities van 
onderliggende parenthetische finiete zinnen met een koppelwerkwoord 
worden afgeleid (4b). 
 
(4) a. Bruges, <het> Brugge, is een prachtige stad. 
 b. Brugge, <het is> een populaire vakantiebestemming, is een 
prachtige stad. 
 
Hiertegenover stellen Döring (2014) en Ott (2014a, b) dat zowel 
herformulerende als attributieve apposities afgeleid zijn van onderliggende 
parenthetische finiete zinnen en dat de verschillen tussen deze twee groepen 
apposities kunnen worden toegeschreven aan hun positie binnen de 
onderliggende zin: herformulerende apposities en hun ankers hebben beide 
dezelfde basispositie in hun respectievelijke zinnen (zie 5), terwijl 
attributieve apposities hun basispositie hebben na het koppelwerkwoord in 
een finiete parenthetische copula-zin (zie 4b). 
 
(5) Bruges, Brugge <is een prachtige stad>, is een prachtige stad. 
 
Bovenstaande analyses hebben een gemeenschappelijk kenmerk: hoewel ze 
een verschillende interne syntaxis toeschrijven aan herformulerende en 
attributieve apposities (deze term verwijst naar de interne structuur van 
apposities), schrijven ze hun dezelfde externe syntaxis toe (deze term verwijst 
naar de relatie tussen een appositie en de zin waar deze in staat, de 
zogenaamde gastzin). Bij Cardoso & De Vries (2010) en Heringa (2011) 
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hebben beide soorten apposities een speciaal soort ‘parenthetische 
coördinatie’-relatie met hun ankers. (Om het eenvoudig te houden, heb ik 
deze relatie in de voorbeelden 6 en 7 als &P gepresenteerd en is de 
parenthetische coördinator weggelaten.) Voor Döring (2014) en Ott (2014a, 
b) zijn de onderliggende parenthetische zinnen waarin herformulerende en 
attributieve apposities staan syntactisch gezien niet verbonden met hun 
gastzin. In plaats daarvan zijn deze zinnen zogenaamde weeszinnen, die door 
middel van niet-syntactische middelen verbonden zijn met de gastzin. 
 
(6) Cardoso & De Vries (2010) 
 a. [&P [Bruges,][Brugge,]] is een prachtige stad. 
 b. [&P [Brugge,][ <dat> een populaire vakantiebestemming <is>,]] 
is een prachtige stad. 
 
(7) Heringa (2011) 
 a. [&P [Bruges,][<het> Brugge,]] is een prachtige stad. 
 b. [&P [Brugge,][ <het is> een populaire vakantiebestemming,]] is 
een prachtige stad. 
 
Ik zal in mijn zoektocht naar een geschikte definitie voor het begrip appositie 
ook aannemen dat het functionele onderscheid tussen herformulerende en 
attributieve appositie een indicatie is van syntactische variatie. Echter, in 
tegenstelling tot de hierboven besproken analyses, zal ik aantonen dat er 
verschillen zijn in de interne en de externe syntaxis van herformulerende en 
attributieve apposities. Met andere woorden, ik laat zien dat deze twee 
soorten apposities noch hun interne, noch hun externe syntaxis gemeen 
hebben. 
  In het geval van de herformulerende apposities zal ik syntactische en 
semantische diagnostiek gebruiken om te laten zien dat ze op syntactische 
wijze aan hun ankers gecoördineerd zijn. De coördinatie (of nevenschikking) 
die ik voorstel is niet de speciale soort parenthetische coördinatie van 
Cardoso & De Vries (2010) en Heringa (2011), maar het is reguliere 
coördinatie van het type dat gebruikt wordt om naamwoorden in een zin, 
zoals Jaap en Joop sliepen, te coördineren. Hoewel eerdere analyses 
terughoudend waren om het idee te accepteren dat herformulerende 
apposities gebruik maken van reguliere coördinatie (voor relevante 
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opmerkingen over dit onderwerp, zie Burton-Roberts 1975), zal ik aantonen 
dat herformulerende apposities alle syntactische kenmerken van reguliere 
coördinatie vertonen. Ik stel dus voor dat herformulerende appositie een 
syntactische exaptatie van coördinatie is, en dat het pragmatische factoren 
zijn die zorgen voor de prosodische en betekenis-gerelateerde verschillen 
tussen reguliere en appositionele coördinatie. 
 In het geval van attributieve apposities gebruik ik syntactische en 
semantische diagnostiek om aan te tonen dat Heringa (2011) en anderen 
gelijk hebben met hun stelling dat attributieve apposities elementen zijn die 
na het koppelwerkwoord staan in parenthetische finiete zinnen waarin al het 
andere materiaal onuitgesproken is (zie 4b). In het bijzonder stel ik dat deze 
zinnen met koppelwerkwoord zogenaamde Force phrases zijn (Rizzi 1997). 
Dit zijn syntactische eenheden die gebruikt worden om taaldaden uit te 
drukken. Met betrekking tot hun externe syntaxis, beargumenteer ik dat deze 
parenthetische zinnen aanhechten aan een maximale syntactische projectie 
binnen hun gastzin (zie 8).  
 
(8) [DP [DP Brugge,] [ForceP <het is> een populaire vakantiebestemming,]] is 
een prachtige stad. 
 
Ik beweer dat de status van onafhankelijke Force phrases ervoor zorgt dat 
deze parenthetische zinnen opaak zijn: syntactische of compositioneel-
semantische relaties kunnen niet worden gelegd over de grens heen tussen 
een parenthetische zin en zijn gastzin (hoe het kenmerk Force zorgt voor 
opaciteit wordt in meer detail uitgelegd in §3.2). Door dit kenmerk is 
adjunctie van een parenthese binnen de gastzin vrij van syntactische of 
compositioneel-semantische beperkingen. Alle restricties die van toepassing 
zijn op de keuze aan welke maximale syntactische projectie ze kunnen 
aanhechten, zijn afkomstig van externe factoren, die of prosodisch of 
pragmatisch van aard zijn, of betrekking hebben op restricties op ten aanzien 
van onuitgesproken taalkundig materiaal. 
 Echter, dit is nog niet het hele verhaal. Ik beargumenteer dat, hoewel het 
functionele verschil tussen herformulerende en attributieve apposities 
informatief is, het niet één op één overeenkomt met het eerder genoemde 
syntactische verschil tussen appositionele coördinatie en Force phrase-
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adjunctie. Er is namelijk één geval waar een conflict tussen functie en 
syntactische structuur ontstaat. 
 De bron van dit conflict ligt bij zinnen zoals die in (9). Vanuit een 
functioneel perspectief, is de relatie tussen het appositieve naamwoord en het 
anker er een van herformulering (althans in de meest voor de hand liggende 
lezing), aangezien Pieter een meer informatieve naam is voor de persoon 
aangeduid door de specifieke onbepaalde naamwoordgroep een gemaskerde 
man. 
  
(9) Een gemaskerde man, Pieter, danste met Marjolijn. 
 
Ik laat zien dat in bepaalde situaties referentiële appositieve naamwoorden 
zoals Pieter in (9) elementen zijn die na het koppelwerkwoord staan in Force 
phrase-adjuncten die onderliggende ‘beknopte cleft-constructies’ zijn 
(Mikkelsen 2005), zoals in (10). Het conflict ligt hierin: hoewel ze hun ankers 
herformuleren, laten deze referentiële appositieve naamwoorden soms de 
syntactische kenmerken van de Force phrase-analyse zien die met 
attributieve apposities wordt geassocieerd. 
 
(10) [DP [DP Een gemaskerde man,] [ForceP <het was> Pieter,]] danste met 
Marjolijn. 
 
Om dit conflict op te lossen, neem ik afstand van het idee dat het functionele 
onderscheid tussen herformulerende en attributieve appositie van 
ontologische betekenis is voor de formele karakterisering van appositie 
(hoewel ik niet ontken dat dit functionele onderscheid gebruikt kan worden 
als geschikte leidraad). In plaats daarvan beweer ik dat appositie gedefinieerd 
moet worden enkel aan de hand van syntactische schemata. 
 Zo zijn we teruggekeerd bij het belangrijkste doel van dit proefschrift, 
namelijk het definiëren van de term appositie. Ik beweer dat appositie het 
best gedefinieerd kan worden met betrekking tot appositionele coördinatie. 
Dat wil zeggen, ik stel dat ‘echte’ apposities verbonden zijn met hun ankers 
en dat reguliere en appositionele coördinatie alleen verschillen in zoverre dat 
reguliere conjuncties verschillende referenten of concepten aanduiden (zie 
11a), terwijl appositionele conjuncties dezelfde referenten of concepten 
aanduiden (zie 11b). 
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(11) a. Joop eet elke vrijdag [vlai of poffertjesk]. 
 b. Joop eet elke vrijdag [Engelse custardi, of vlai,]. 
 
Deze definitie van appositie wordt gegeven in (12). 
 
(12) Definitie van appositie 
Wanneer α het eerste lid van een coördinatie is en β het niet-eerste lid 
geldt: 
Als β dezelfde referent of hetzelfde concept als α aanduidt, of een sub- 
of superset daarvan, dan is β een appositie. 
 
De definitie van appositie in (12) houdt in dat de ‘attributieve apposities’ die 
hierboven besproken zijn uiteindelijk geen ware apposities blijken te zijn. In 
plaats daarvan vormen ze een subgroep van een klasse van Force phrase-
adjuncten waarvan ik beweer dat die diverse parenthetische structuren 
omvat, zoals and-parentheticals (Kavalova 2007, zie 13a), exclamative 
epitheta (13b), vocatieven (13c), en andere. (Ik beweer in hoofdstuk drie dan 
ook dat ‘attributieve apposities’ eigenlijk zijn afgeleid van copular clausal 
and-parentheticals.) 
 
(13) a. Joop gaat – [VP [ForceP en hij zal dit betreuren –] vragen om een 
echtscheiding]. 
 b. Jaap heeft, [XP [ForceP de mazzelaar,] [XP een promotie gekregen]]. 
 c. Het bezwaar van Jan, [VP [ForceP mijn liefje,] [VP werd terecht 
opgemerkt]]. 
 
Het gebruik van een bepaald syntactisch schema om appositie te definiëren 
heeft directe terminologische en taxonomische gevolgen. Met betrekking tot 
de terminologie is het verwarrend bijstellingen zoals geïllustreerd in (2) als 
‘attributieve apposities’ te blijven aanduiden, omdat mijn definitie in (12) 
ontkent dat deze een appositionele status hebben. Nieuwe terminologie is 
dus vereist. Vanaf nu zal ik herformulerende apposities gewoon apposities 
noemen, zoals Burton-Roberts (1975) en McCawley (1998) deze term ook 
gebruiken. Om een verbinding met voorgaande literatuur te houden, zal ik 
vanaf nu attributieve apposities gewoon attributies noemen. Om deze 
eigenschap-toeschrijvende functie te benoemen, zal ik vanaf nu de term 
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attributieve functie gebruiken. Verder gebruik ik de (Engelse) notie 
appositive als een overkoepelende term voor apposities en attributies.  
 Met betrekking tot de taxonomische gevolgen zien we dat het definiëren 
van appositie met behulp van een coördinatieschema identiek aan dat van 
reguliere coördinatie leidt tot nieuwe argumenten tegen het opnemen van 
apposities in classificerend onderzoek naar parenthetische constructies zoals 
dat van Dehé & Kavalova (2007). Deze tegenargumenten ontstaan omdat 
met mijn analyse apposities op geen enkele theoretisch relevante manier 
parenthetisch zijn, tenzij men het tweede lid van een reguliere coördinatie 
constructie ook wil classificeren als parenthetisch. 
 Na de introductie van apposities in hoofdstuk één, ziet het proefschrift er 
als volgt uit. 
 Hoofdstuk 2: In §2.1 verdedig ik de stelling dat subclausale apposities 
met hun ankers worden gecoördineerd. Ik breid deze analyse uit naar 
clausale apposities in §2.2.1 en bespreek hoe ellipsis daarop kan inwerken in 
§2.2.2. In §2.2.3 bespreek ik het idee om de ‘biclausale’ analyse uit de 
literatuur toe te passen op subclausale apposities en concludeer dat dit niet 
haalbaar is. §2.2.5 en §2.2.6 zijn gewijd aan miscellanea die betrekking 
hebben op apposities: §2.2.5 gaat verder met de discussie uit §2.1 over het 
onderscheiden van apposities en attributies, terwijl §2.2.6 over de pragmatiek 
van apposities en soortgelijke constructies gaat. 
 Hoofdstuk 3: De focus van dit hoofdstuk ligt bij finiete parenthetische 
copular-zinnen (een subset van and-parentheticals) waarin alleen de 
woordgroep na het koppelwerkwoord wordt uitgesproken. Ik noem deze 
gereduceerde parenthetische zinnen attributies. In §3.1 introduceer ik deze 
attributies en ik benadruk het feit dat ze wel of niet referentieel kunnen zijn 
omdat ze twee mogelijke bronnen hebben, namelijk predicatieve zinnen 
zoals ‘(Joop is) een goede vader’ en beknopte cleft-zinnen zoals ‘(Het was) 
Pieter’. In §3.2 schets ik mijn syntactische analyse van attributies, die 
inhoudt dat ze hun bronzinnen als Force phrases behandelen die vrijelijk aan 
een gastzin kunnen hechten, en die uitlegt op welke manier de functionele 
elementen (d.w.z. onderwerp, hulpwerkwoorden, koppelwerkwoorden) in 
deze woordgroepen de status van onuitgesproken element krijgen. In §3.3 
bespreek ik manieren waarop attributies kunnen worden onderscheiden van 
andere appositives die er op het eerste gezicht hetzelfde uitzien. In §3.4-3.5 
geef ik verder bewijs voor de analyse van attributies zoals geschetst in §3.2. 
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 Hoofdstuk 4: In dit hoofdstuk streef ik ernaar appositieve relatiefzinnen 
(in het Engels appositive relative clauses, ARCs) een plaats te geven binnen de 
theorie van appositives die ik in de hoofdstukken twee en drie heb 
ontwikkeld. Modificeren ARC’s lege nominale apposities of lege nominale 
attributies, of zijn het onafhankelijk parenthetische Force phrase adjuncten? 
In §4.1 introduceer ik appositionele en attributionele relatiefzinnen –
reguliere beperkende relatiefzinnen die voorkomen in parenthetische 
omgevingen – en geef ik een syntactische analyse voor deze zinnen die 
fungeert als formele achtergrond voor latere paragrafen. Om te testen of 
ARC’s inderdaad beperkende relatiefzinnen zijn die voorkomen in 
parenthetische omgevingen, probeer ik in §4.2 en §4.3 te ontdekken of 
ARC’s lege apposities (§4.2) of lege attributies (§4.3) modificeren. Omdat 
ARC’s een andere distributie hebben dan zowel appositionele als 
attributionele relatiefzinnen, concludeer ik dat ARC’s noch lege apposities 
noch lege attributies modificeren. Dit betekent dat ARC’s onafhankelijke 
parenthetische zinnen zijn. Deze theorie werk ik verder uit in §4.4. 
 Hoofdstuk 5: In dit hoofdstuk breid ik de analyse die in de hoofdstukken 
2 tot 4 werd ontwikkeld uit naar het domein van de pragmatiek. In §5.1 
schets ik een op maat gemaakt model van conversatie dat als platform 
fungeert voor het onderzoeken van de pragmatische betekenis van apposities 
en Force phrase-adjuncten. In §5.2 laat ik zien dat de distributie van uitingen 
die attributies en ARC’s bevatten nagenoeg identiek is aan de pragmatische 
distributie van monologen. In §5.3 toon ik aan dat de syntactische analyse 
van apposities die in hoofdstuk twee werd geïntroduceerd de pragmatische 
betekenis van apposities correct voorspelt. In §5.4 bespreek ik twee 
alternatieve analyses van de pragmatische betekenis van apposities en ik toon 
aan dat de analyse die in §5.1 en §5.2 werd ontwikkeld eenvoudig en beter is 
dan deze alternatieven. 
 Hoofdstuk 6: In dit hoofdstuk geef ik kritiek op drie alternatieve analyses 
van appositives. Dit zijn de zogenaamde tweedimensionale semantische 
analyse (§6.1), de weeszinnen-analyse (§6.2) en de par-MERGE-analyse (§6.3).  
 Hoofdstuk 7 bevat de conclusie van dit proefschrift. 
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